{ "contract_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "data_as_of": "2026-08-06T02:50:22Z", "record": { "authority_type": "opinion", "body": "Court of Appeals of Oregon", "canonical_key": { "content_hash": "88eddc2d3d7b9543", "source": "courtlistener" }, "citation_aliases": [ { "confidence": 0.7, "display_value": "Dintleman and Dintleman", "normalized_value": "dintleman-and-dintleman-23b2be47", "scheme": "case-name", "source_id": "src:v1:us:opinion:courtlistener" } ], "court": "Court of Appeals of Oregon", "created_at": "2026-08-06T02:50:22Z", "heading": "Dintleman and Dintleman", "identity_state": "complete", "jurisdiction": "us-state-or", "kind": "authority_record", "record_id": "rec:v1:6436a634-5442-7387-88cb-ae32a8efefd5", "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "slug": "dintleman-and-dintleman-23b2be47", "title": "Dintleman and Dintleman" }, "verification": { "active_defect_ids": [], "as_of": "2026-08-05", "computed_at": "2026-08-06T02:50:22Z", "currentness": "2025-01-01", "grade": "B", "input_sha256": "88eddc2d3d7b9543f6c6f2926985eb766138288cedb61cbb72aa887bef0cb56d", "kind": "verification", "limitations": [ "Text was ingested from CourtListener public full text.", "Not yet matched byte-for-byte to an official court/reporter PDF or HTML edition.", "Treat as researchable public law text with an open official-verification task." ], "official_receipts": [], "policy_version": "grade-policy-v1-bulk-courtlistener", "reason": "CourtListener public full text captured with content hash; not yet matched to an official court or reporter edition.", "reason_code": "courtlistener_public_full_text_unverified_against_official_reporter", "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "source_classes": [ "independent_structured_corpus" ], "verified_at": null, "version_id": "ver:v1:c4d77a6b-667f-7a3c-8053-4569a4866ea9" }, "version": { "current_through": "2025-01-01", "decision_date": "2025-01-01", "effective_date": null, "finality_status": "public_full_text_unverified", "kind": "authority_version", "normalization_warnings": [ "Bulk CourtListener import; official reporter comparison pending." ], "normalized_text_sha256": "88eddc2d3d7b9543f6c6f2926985eb766138288cedb61cbb72aa887bef0cb56d", "observed_at": "2026-08-06T02:50:22Z", "parser_id": "bulk-courtlistener-v1", "parser_version": "1", "primary_text": "No. 381 April 30, 2025 213\n\n IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE\n STATE OF OREGON\n\n In the Matter of the Marriage of\n Pamela Danell DINTLEMAN,\n nka Pamela D. Cleveland,\n Petitioner-Respondent,\n and\n Jeff Lee DINTLEMAN,\n Respondent-Appellant.\n Jackson County Circuit Court\n 080903D2; A180055\n\n Benjamin M. Bloom, Judge.\n Argued and submitted May 13, 2024.\n Lauren Saucy argued the cause and filed the brief for\nappellant.\n James A. Wallan argued the cause and filed the brief for\nrespondent.\n Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and\nHellman, Judge.\n HELLMAN, J.\n Order denying motion for relief from judgment reversed\nand remanded.\n 214 Dintleman and Dintleman\n\n HELLMAN, J.\n This consolidated appeal in a domestic relations\ncase concerns a supplemental judgment that was entered\nfollowing the parties' stipulated general judgment of dissolu-\ntion. In three assignments of error, husband challenges the\ndenials of his motions to correct the supplemental judgment\nunder ORCP 71 and to vacate the supplemental judgment\nand the denial of his request to make an offer of proof. As\nexplained below, we conclude that the trial court erred as a\nmatter of law when it denied husband's motion because hus-\nband established a cognizable basis for relief under ORCP\n71 B(1). Accordingly, we reverse and remand the order deny-\ning the motion for relief from judgment.\n Because it is dispositive, we begin with husband's\nsecond assignment of error, which challenges the denial\nof his motion under ORCP 71 B. \"[A] trial court's decision\n[under ORCP 71 B] can rest on findings of disputed fact.\"\nUnion Lumber Co. v. Miller, 360 Or 767, 777, 388 P3d 327\n(2017). Accordingly, we \"will defer to a trial court's express\nor implied findings of disputed fact underlying its legal\ndeterminations.\"\n The parties were married in 1996 and the trial court\nentered a stipulated judgment of dissolution in 2009. That\njudgment provided that husband's \"military retirement ben-\nefits shall be equally divided as of the date of marriage to\nMay 15, 2009,\" and that the parties \"shall cooperate with\neach other in every respect to cause a Qualified Domestic\nRelations Order (QDRO) as may be necessary to be entered\nto achieve the intent of this agreement in the division of the\nretirement asset and will split the cost of preparing such\nQDRO equally.\" In January 2013, wife's attorney prepared a\nsupplemental judgment that awarded wife \"38.05 percent of\n[husband's] final disposable military retired pay[.]\" The judg-\nment referenced husband's mailing address as a post office\nbox. The trial court entered the supplemental judgment.\n Husband retired from the military in August 2021.\nAccording to husband, in October 2021 he received a let-\nter from Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)\nstating that wife \"would receive 38.05 Percent of [husband's]\n Cite as 340 Or App 213 (2025) 215\n\nentire retirement.\" Husband filed a motion to correct the\nsupplemental judgment under ORCP 71 A, B, and C, argu-\ning that the supplemental judgment \"[did] not accurately\nreflect the distribution,\" that the \"DFAS letter was the first\nthat [he] was aware of the change in percentage of financial\ncompensation to [wife],\" and that he did not receive notice of\nthe supplemental judgment until January 2022. The trial\ncourt denied husband's motion and found that \"[t]he court's\ninterest in the finality of judgment and orders is the deter-\nmining factor in a court's decision.\"1 The trial court denied\nhusband's subsequent motion to vacate the supplemental\njudgment. This appeal followed.\n On appeal, husband argues that the trial court\nabused its discretion when it denied his motion for relief\nfrom judgment. Specifically, husband argues that he estab-\nlished excusable neglect under ORCP 71 B(1) because \"he\nreceived no notice\" of the supplemental judgment, \"the court\nrecords show[ ] no motion or service was made on husband,\"\nand he \"clearly did not stipulate to the [supplemental judg-\nment].\" Moreover, husband contends that \"he exercised rea-\nsonable diligence\" by filing the motion \"within one year [of]\nreceiving notice of its existence.\"\n ORCP 71 B(1)(a) provides, in relevant part, that \"[o]\nn motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may\nrelieve a party or such party's legal representative from a\njudgment for * * * excusable neglect[.] \" A party must file an\nORCP 71 B(1) motion \"within a reasonable time,\" and \"not\nmore than one year after receipt of notice by the moving\nparty of the judgment.\" Id.\n \"[T]he decision whether to grant or deny a motion\nbrought under ORCP 71 B involves two determinations sub-\nject to our review. First, the trial court determines whether\nthe moving party has asserted a valid basis for relief.\"\nKerridge v. Jester, 316 Or App 599, 604, 502 P3d 1206 (2021),\nrev den, 369 Or 507 (2022). We review the first determina-\ntion for errors of law. Id.; see also Union Lumber, 360 Or\nat 778 (\"Conclusions that a trial court reaches under ORCP\n 1\n \"When there is a conflict between a written order and oral findings, the\nwritten order controls and serves as the basis for appellate review.\" State v.\nMcAllister, 72 Or App 611, 615 n 1, 696 P2d 1138 (1985).\n 216 Dintleman and Dintleman\n\n71 B as to whether a moving party's neglect, inadvertence,\nsurprise, or mistake constitute cognizable grounds for relief,\nare legal rulings that an appellate court reviews for errors\nof law.\").\n \"The focus of the inquiry is whether the totality of\nthe circumstances reflects that the party seeking relief from\njudgment has taken reasonable steps to protect its inter-\nests.\" Wetzel v. Sandlow, 318 Or App 608, 616, 509 P3d 182\n(2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, \"[a]\nny actions taken or omitted by [the moving party] must have\nbeen reasonable to show that their neglect was excusable.\"\nUnion Lumber, 360 Or at 781; see also Saldivar v. Roberts,\n240 Or App 371, 376, 246 P3d 91 (2011) (\"[T]he question here\nis whether defendants have offered a reasonable explana-\ntion for their failure to take any action.\").\n We have reviewed the record and conclude that\nthe trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined\nthat \"there was no * * * excusable neglect under ORCP 71\nB.\" In his motion, husband argued that \"[w]e cannot know\nwhether or not the proposed Supplemental Judgment * * *\never arrived at the post office box that [husband] briefly\nused prior to the service of that document by mail\" and\nthat even if he \"were negligent in not adequately managing\nhis addresses for the purposes of non-child-support-related\nlegal notification years after the dissolution was completed,\"\nthat negligence did not \"foreclose relief.\" (Emphasis in orig-\ninal; internal quotation marks omitted.) In support of that\nmotion, husband submitted a declaration stating that he\nobtained the post office box in August 2012—five months\nbefore the trial court entered the supplemental judgment—\nthat he \"did inform [wife] of the change,\" that he \"wasn't\naware of a requirement to advise anyone besides Support\nEnforcement of both [his] physical residence and mailing\naddress,\" and that he \"kept the PO box open\" for his daugh-\nter's use.\n Viewing husband's conduct in light of the stipulated\ndissolution judgment—which explicitly required the par-\nties to \"cooperate\" and \"equally divide\" husband's military\nretirement benefits during the marriage—we conclude that\nhusband's failure to inform the trial court of a new mailing\n Cite as 340 Or App 213 (2025) 217\n\naddress nearly three years after the dissolution judgment\nwas entered was reasonable. As a consequence, any neglect\n\"was excusable.\" Hiatt v. Congoleum Industries, 279 Or 569,\n577, 569 P2d 567 (1977) (concluding that the moving party\nestablished \"excusable neglect as a matter of law\" in failing\nto appear after a part-time employee \"who had no memory\nof the incident\" received the summons and complaint but \"[f]\nor reasons not known, the documents were not received by\nthe legal department\" because \"[t]here is nothing implausi-\nble about such evidence\"); see also Much v. Doe, 311 Or App\n652, 656, 493 P3d 38, rev den, 369 Or 69 (2021) (\"[A] motion\nunder ORCP 71 is typically addressed to the court through\nwritten submissions, including affidavits and declarations.\nThose declarations and affidavits become a part of the record\nwhen submitted.\").\n Further, we conclude that husband's excusable\nneglect establishes a \"cognizable basis for relief\" because\nwife was not entitled to the supplemental judgment as\nentered. Michael v. Pugel, 316 Or App 786, 793-94, 504 P3d\n1231, adh'd to as modified on recons, 318 Or App 564, 505\nP3d 1108 (2022) (concluding that \"the [attorney's] inadver-\ntence in signing the mistaken judgment is, itself, a sufficient\ncognizable basis for relief\" because it \"was not a judgment\nto which [the] defendants were entitled\" and the case was\nnot \"the sort that typically becomes subject to a motion for\nrelief under ORCP 71 B(1)(a)—viz., one which the party was\nlawfully entitled to have the court enter as a consequence of\na default or some analogous procedural failing or error on\nthe part of the party seeking relief\").\n Here, the stipulated dissolution judgment required\nthe parties to \"equally divide[ ]\" husband's military retire-\nment benefits \"as of the date of marriage to May 15, 2009.\"\nHowever, husband submitted an affidavit with his ORCP\n71 motion that indicated that the supplemental judgment\nawarded wife an \"inaccurate\" share of husband's military\nretirement benefits. That affidavit—prepared by an attor-\nney who practiced \"exclusively [in] family law and military\nfamily law\" and had \"authored many articles on * * * retire-\nment benefits allocation in divorce cases\"—stated that hus-\nband served in the military for 364 months and that the\n 218 Dintleman and Dintleman\n\nmarriage was 140 months. As a consequence, the attorney\ndetermined:\n \"The figure used by DFAS, 38.05%, is close to what we\n believe represents the entire marital share. This would\n mean that the pension share was improperly calculated\n and the pension was incorrectly divided. Generally speak-\n ing, a spouse is entitled to one-half of the marital share of\n the employee's retired pay. If 38.05% is the marital share,\n then the [wife] would be entitled to one-half of that figure,\n or 19.025%.\"\n Moreover, although the stipulated dissolution judg-\nment required the parties to \"cooperate with each other in\nevery respect * * * to achieve the intent of [the] agreement\nin the division of the retirement asset,\" the record indicates\nthat husband had \"zero knowledge\" that wife's counsel pre-\npared the supplemental judgment and that husband did not\nreceive it until 2022.2 Thus, \"in the unique posture\" of this\ncase, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient\nto establish that wife was not entitled to the supplemental\njudgment as entered and that husband has \"provided a cog-\nnizable basis for relief under ORCP 71 B(1)(a).\" Michael, 316\nOr App at 794. The trial court erred as a matter of law.\n When, as here, a party has established a cognizable\nground for relief, a trial court \"makes a second, discretionary\ndetermination, whether to grant relief on the asserted basis\nand on what terms.\" Kerridge, 316 Or App at 604; Union\nLumber, 360 Or at 778 (explaining that a trial court must\nmake that decision \"consistent with principles promotive of\nthe regular disposition of litigation\"). In doing so, \"courts\nare liberal in granting relief, for the policy of the law is to\nafford a trial upon the merits when it can be done without\ndoing violence to * * * established rules of practice.\" Union\nLumber, 360 Or at 778 (internal quotation marks omitted);\nsee also Wood v. James W. Fowler Co., 168 Or App 308, 312,\n7 P3d 577 (2000) (explaining that ORCP 71 B(1) \"is to be\nconstrued liberally to the end that every litigant shall have\nhis day in court\" (internal quotation marks omitted)).\n\n 2\n At the hearing on the ORCP 71 motion, wife's counsel stated, \"I assume,\nas is often the case, my client wanted it done and she paid so that * * * the order\ncould be entered.\"\n Cite as 340 Or App 213 (2025) 219\n\n We observe that, here, the trial court's order on hus-\nband's ORCP 71 motion provided, without explanation: \"The\ncourt's interest in the finality of judgment and orders is the\ndetermining factor in a court's decision.\" Although a court\nmay consider finality in making its discretionary decision,\nfinality is not the only factor a trial court must consider\nunder ORCP 71 B. Michael, 316 Or App at 794. We have\nidentified a nonexhaustive list of factors that a court must\nconsider, including: \"prejudice to [wife], whether [husband]\nacted with reasonable diligence upon discovery of the mis-\ntake, and whether [husband] has alleged potentially meri-\ntorious claims.\" Id. On remand, in making its discretionary\ndetermination, the court should consider all the relevant\nfactors while keeping in mind our well-established principle\nto construe ORCP 71 B \"liberally to the end that every liti-\ngant shall have his day in court.\" Wood, 168 Or App at 312\n(internal quotation marks omitted).\n In light of the foregoing, we do not reach husband's\nfirst assignment of error concerning the trial court's denial\nof his motion to vacate the supplemental judgment because\nwe understand it to be raised as an alternative to the sec-\nond assignment of error. We also do not reach his third\nassignment of error concerning an offer of proof because we\nunderstand husband to argue that it would be necessary to\naddress it only if we concluded that the record was insuffi-\ncient to reverse on his first two assignments.\n Order denying motion for relief from judgment\nreversed and remanded.", "publication_date": "2025-01-01", "publication_status": "public", "record_id": "rec:v1:6436a634-5442-7387-88cb-ae32a8efefd5", "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "source_locators": [ { "artifact_id": "art:v1:2deae69e-2f70-7394-8773-58bed3f08be9", "locator": "full-text", "quote_sha256": "88eddc2d3d7b9543f6c6f2926985eb766138288cedb61cbb72aa887bef0cb56d" } ], "status": "current", "structure_sha256": "88eddc2d3d7b9543f6c6f2926985eb766138288cedb61cbb72aa887bef0cb56d", "text_scope": { "excludes": [ "footer", "navigation", "annotations", "headnotes", "summaries", "editorial_content" ], "includes": [ "opinion_body" ] }, "version_id": "ver:v1:c4d77a6b-667f-7a3c-8053-4569a4866ea9" } }