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    "primary_text": "IN THE SUPREME COURT\n STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA\n\n 2025 ND 94\n\nSuzanne Jane Nagle, Plaintiff and Appellee\n v.\nGene Murray Nagle, Defendant and Appellant\n\n No. 20240260\n\nAppeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial\nDistrict, the Honorable Cynthia M. Feland, Judge.\n\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\n\nOpinion of the Court by Bahr, Justice, in which Chief Justice Jensen and Justices\nMcEvers and Tufte joined. Justice Crothers filed a specially concurring opinion.\nJustice McEvers filed a concurring opinion.\n\nTheresa L. Kellington, Bismarck, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.\n\nJustin D. Hager, Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellant.\n Nagle v. Nagle\n No. 20240260\n\nBahr, Justice.\n\n[¶1] Gene Nagle appeals from a divorce judgment. He argues the district court\nerred by treating the parties' second marriage as a long-term marriage and by\nfinding a near equal distribution of the parties' marital estate was fair and\nequitable. Gene Nagle also claims the court erred in its property division because\nthe court awarded Suzanne Nagle property that she previously waived her rights\nto in their first divorce. Suzanne Nagle argues Gene Nagle did not timely appeal\nthe court's denial of his motion in limine and is precluded from appealing issues\ndecided in reliance on Nelson v. Nelson, 1998 ND 176, 584 N.W.2d 527. We\nconclude the court's equitable distribution of the marital estate under the Ruff-\nFischer guidelines is clearly erroneous. We reverse and remand for further\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\n\n I\n\n[¶2] The parties were married and divorced twice. They first married in August\n1982, and stipulated to a divorce in December 2018. They have two grown\nchildren. In December 2017, Gene Nagle had back surgery that left him disabled,\nand he pursued a medical malpractice action and an appeal of disability benefits.\nNeither action was completed when the parties first divorced. Under the terms\nof the first divorce, Gene Nagle received any proceeds from both claims. Gene\nNagle settled the medical malpractice action but testified he could not disclose\nthe amount he received. Gene Nagle receives disability benefits which will end\nin June 2025.\n\n[¶3] The parties renewed their relationship roughly three and a half years after\ntheir divorce. Suzanne Nagle was employed in a variety of different occupations\nbetween the parties' first divorce and resuming their relationship. She was\nworking in a pharmacy department in May 2022 but quit before the remarriage\nto allow the parties to travel. The parties moved in together in June or July 2022,\nremarried in August 2022, and physically separated on February 2, 2023,\nmaintaining separate residences from that point forward. When they were back\n\n 1\n together, Gene Nagle paid most of the couple's expenses, including payment for\nimprovements to Suzanne Nagle's property. Suzanne Nagle initiated the second\ndivorce action on June 12, 2023.\n\n[¶4] Before trial, Gene Nagle filed a motion in limine arguing, in relevant part,\nthat a psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner should not be allowed to\ntestify about the parties' first marriage because the evidence was irrelevant and\nbarred by res judicata. Suzanne Nagle argued the district court must consider\nthe parties' first marriage and all relevant pre-divorce conduct of the parties. The\ncourt denied the motion as it was \"currently presented\"—essentially reserving\nits ruling until trial—and, relying on Nelson, stated it would consider the totality\nof the parties' relationship for property distribution purposes.\n\n[¶5] At the time of trial, Suzanne Nagle was 62 years old, was not working, and\nhad not worked since the two remarried. Suzanne Nagle testified she would\nbegin seasonal employment at a garden center on May 1, 2024, and would\nprovide daycare for her grandchildren. Gene Nagle was 65 years old and had not\nworked since December 2017 because he was disabled. During trial, the parties\nagreed to the district court taking judicial notice of their first divorce settlement\nagreement and the resulting findings of facts, conclusions of law, order for\njudgment, and judgment.\n\n[¶6] The district court made findings under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines and\nconcluded an equal distribution of the marital estate was fair and equitable. Each\nparty was generally awarded the property and associated debt they brought into\nthe second marriage—Gene Nagle was awarded a net marital estate of\n$1,526,907, and Suzanne Nagle was awarded a net marital estate of $1,063,535.\nGene Nagle was ordered to make a cash payment of $231,500 to Suzanne Nagle\nto equalize the marital estate. Suzanne Nagle requested spousal support, which\nthe court denied. Gene Nagle timely appealed the court's property distribution.\n\n II\n\n[¶7] Suzanne Nagle argues Gene Nagle did not timely appeal the district\ncourt's order denying his motion in limine. Therefore, she asserts, he cannot now\nargue issues related to the Nelson decision.\n\n 2\n [¶8] Orders on motions in limine are preliminary and \"subject to change when\nthe case unfolds, particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was\ncontained in the defendant's proffer.\" Nesvig v. Nesvig, 2006 ND 66, ¶ 31, 712\nN.W.2d 299. \"[E]ven if nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is\nfree, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine\nruling.\" Id. \"Generally, interlocutory orders in an action are merged into the final\njudgment and may be reviewed on appeal of that judgment.\" Tibbetts v.\nDornheim, 2004 ND 129, ¶ 11, 681 N.W.2d 798. \"Upon an appeal from a judgment,\nthe court may review any intermediate order or ruling which involves the merits\nand affects the judgment appearing upon the record.\" N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(2).\n\n[¶9] Because the district court's order was interlocutory, Gene Nagle was not\nrequired or permitted to appeal from the order denying his motion in limine. See\nN.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (explaining that if a district court \"does not end the action as\nto any of the claims,\" the order is not appealable because it is not a final judgment\nand \"may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment\"). The order\nmerged into the divorce judgment and may be reviewed by this Court on appeal.\nTherefore, Gene Nagle is not precluded from arguing on appeal the court erred\nin its application of Nelson.\n\n III\n\n[¶10] Gene Nagle argues the district court erred by treating the parties' second\nmarriage as long term, the court's equal distribution of the marital property is\nclearly erroneous, and Suzanne Nagle is being allowed to collaterally attack the\nproperty distribution from the first marriage.\n\n A\n\n[¶11] When granting a divorce, a district court is required to equitably distribute\nthe divorcing parties' property and debts under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1). Our\nstandard for reviewing the court's distribution of the marital estate is well\nestablished:\n\n We will not reverse a district court's findings on valuation and\n division of marital property unless they are clearly erroneous. A\n\n 3\n finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous\n view of the law, there is no evidence to support it, or if, although\n there is some evidence to support it, on the entire evidence the\n reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake\n has been made. A choice between two permissible views of the\n evidence is not clearly erroneous if the district court's findings are\n based either on physical or documentary evidence, or inferences\n from other facts, or on credibility determinations.\n\nStephenson v. Stephenson, 2011 ND 57, ¶ 7, 795 N.W.2d 357 (cleaned up).\n\n B\n\n[¶12] The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the district court's equitable\ndistribution of the marital estate under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines is clearly\nerroneous. We conclude it is.\n\n[¶13] Under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1), \"[w]hen a divorce is granted, the court shall\nmake an equitable distribution of the property and debts of the parties.\" The\ncourt first determines the value of the marital estate. Stephenson, 2011 ND 57, ¶ 9.\nThe court then considers the well-established Ruff-Fischer guidelines, which\ninclude:\n\n [T]he respective ages of the parties, their earning ability, the duration\n of the marriage and conduct of the parties during the marriage, their\n station in life, the circumstances and necessities of each, their health\n and physical condition, their financial circumstances as shown by\n the property owned at the time, its value at the time, its income-\n producing capacity, if any, whether accumulated before or after the\n marriage, and such other matters as may be material.\n\nCeynar v. Ceynar, 2025 ND 53, ¶ 5, 18 N.W.3d 613. (emphasis added) (quoting\nSwanson v. Swanson, 2019 ND 25, ¶ 6, 921 N.W.2d 666). \"In making an equitable\ndistribution of marital property, a court must consider all of the parties' assets.\"\nId. (quoting Swanson, ¶ 6). \"We have repeatedly held that separate property,\nwhether inherited or otherwise, must initially be included in the marital estate,\nand have never held that property brought into a marriage or acquired by gift or\ninheritance by one spouse, be irrevocably set aside to that spouse.\" Id. (quoting\n\n 4\n Swanson, ¶ 9). \"The origin of the property is only one factor to consider under\nthe Ruff-Fischer guidelines, even if the property was acquired before the marriage\nor inherited.\" Id. (quoting Hitz v. Hitz, 2008 ND 58, ¶ 14, 746 N.W.2d 732); see also\nStephenson, 2011 ND 57, ¶ 22 (\"A court may consider the source of property when\ndividing the marital estate, but all property, regardless of its source, must be\nincluded in the estate for equitable distribution.\").\n\n[¶14] Similarly, the \"duration of the marriage\" is only one factor the district\ncourt must consider in determining an equitable division of the marital estate\nunder the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. Ceynar, 2025 ND 53, ¶ 5. \"Generally, a long-\nterm marriage supports an equal division of marital assets, but the division need\nnot be equal to be equitable. In a short-term marriage, the district court may\ndistribute property based on what each party brought into the marriage.\"\nBuchholz v. Buchholz, 2022 ND 203, ¶ 25, 982 N.W.2d 275 (quoting Paulson v.\nPaulson, 2021 ND 32, ¶ 24, 955 N.W.2d 92); see also Vetter v. Vetter, 2020 ND 40,\n¶ 19, 938 N.W.2d 417 (\"An equal division of marital property is a logical starting\npoint in a long-term marriage. While we have said a court may unequally divide\nproperty in a short-term marriage and award the parties what each brought into\nthe marriage, marriages of longer durations generally support an equal\ndistribution of property.\" (cleaned up)). Irrespective of whether the marriage is\nlong or short term, the division of property must be equitable. Walden v. Walden,\n2025 ND 32, ¶ 21, 17 N.W.3d 521 (\"In a short-term marriage, the court may return\nto the parties what they brought into the marriage, but the division of property\nand debt must be equitable.\").\n\n 1\n\n[¶15] Here, the district court considered the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. Relevant to\nour disposition, the court found \"this case involves a long-term first marriage\nand a short-term second marriage.\" It later stated, \"Although their combined\nmarriages are of long duration, the second marriage was extremely short.\"\nConsidering the facts from both marriages, the court conducted a detailed\nanalysis of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. The court's Ruff-Fischer analysis strongly\nleaned toward Gene Nagle receiving more of the marital estate, not an equal\ndivision. Yet, despite its analysis and findings, the court equally divided the\n\n 5\n marital property. The court appears to have done so because it combined the two\nmarriages and treated them as a single long-term marriage. If that is the basis of\nthe court's equal property division, the court's division of marital property is\nclearly erroneous because it is induced by an erroneous view of the law.\n\n[¶16] The \"duration of the marriage\" factor is the length of the marriage being\ndissolved by the district court, irrespective of whether there was a prior marriage\nor marriages with the same party or another person. See N.D.C.C. § 14-05-01(2)\n(\"Marriage is dissolved only: . . . 2. By a judgment of a court of competent\njurisdiction decreeing a divorce of the parties.\"); N.D.C.C. § 14-05-02 (\"The effect\nof a judgment decreeing a divorce is to restore the parties to the state of\nunmarried persons, but neither party to a divorce may marry except in\naccordance with the decree of the court granting the divorce.\").\n\n[¶17] In Nelson, this Court did not hold the Nelsons' second marriage was a long-\nterm marriage; rather, it emphasized that the district court \"must equitably\ndivide the property based upon the circumstances of the particular case.\" 1998\nND 176, ¶ 6. In Nelson, those circumstances included that, although \"the second\nmarriage was short,\" the parties began living together again three months after\ntheir divorce, meaning \"the property of their marital estate remained intact.\" Id.\n¶¶ 3, 8. This Court concluded the district court should have considered these\nfacts \"in making an equitable division of the property.\" Id. ¶ 8. This Court also\nfound the court's \"finding Joyce Nelson made no contribution to the\naccumulation of the retirement benefits since the 1991 divorce is without support\nin the record and is clearly erroneous.\" Id.\n\n[¶18] Stephenson also did not hold the parties' first marriage had to be\nconsidered when determining the length of the second marriage, which was\nitself long term. 2011 ND 57, ¶¶ 3-4 (remarried in 1997 and divorced in 2008).\nThis Court appears to have recognized the second marriage as long term, stating,\n\"Generally a long-term marriage supports an equal division of the marital estate,\nbut a property division does not need to be equal to be equitable and a\nsubstantial disparity must be explained.\" Stephenson, ¶ 9. This Court reversed\nthe district court in Stephenson because there was no evidence in the record to\nsupport the court's finding about the value of Daniel Stephenson's retirement\n\n 6\n accounts and the court did not adequately explain the basis for its decision. Id.\n¶¶ 14, 17.\n\n[¶19] Neither Nelson nor Stephenson held the parties' prior marriage should be\ncombined with the parties' second marriage to determine the length of the\nparties' second marriage. Nelson and Stephenson also did not hold that the\nanalysis under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines changes because the parties were\npreviously married to each other. Rather, as required under the Ruff-Fischer\nguidelines, the length of the second marriage, short or long term, was one factor\nconsidered when determining the equitable division of the marital property.\n\n[¶20] Lill v. Lill, 520 N.W.2d 855 (N.D. 1994), and Linn v. Linn, 370 N.W.2d 536\n(N.D. 1985), are instructive. In Lill, the parties \"were married to each other for\nthe second time on February 14, 1992. They separated in August 1992, and were\ndivorced in December 1993.\" 520 N.W.2d at 856. Relevant to this case, on appeal\nDavid Lill argued the district court erred in awarding Sandra Lill $5,000 in its\ndivision of property. Id. at 857. The crux of David Lill's argument was that it\n\"seems unfair\" to award Sandra Lill $5,000 \"following a marriage of such short\nduration.\" Id. We explained, \"In a short-term marriage, it is entirely proper to\naward property that restores the parties to their premarital status, should the\ncircumstances warrant.\" Id. The court found Sandra Lill \"brought savings of\napproximately $4500 to the marriage, which were reduced to $400 at the time of\nthe divorce hearing, and accumulated a debt of approximately $3,500 as a result\nof the marriage.\" Id. Based on that finding, we concluded the court's award of\n$5,000 to Sandra was not clearly erroneous. Id. We later noted, \"[B]ecause of the\nshort duration of the marriage, the marital estate was divided to return the\nparties to their economic status before the marriage.\" Id. at 858.\n\n[¶21] Linn also involved a remarriage. The parties' first marriage lasted\napproximately 22 years (May 14, 1953, through February 16, 1975). 370 N.W.2d\nat 538. They \"were remarried on September 24, 1976. Dorothy commenced an\naction for divorce in June of 1979; that action was dismissed in February 1981.\nDorothy initiated this action for divorce in September of 1982[.]\" Id. In\ndistributing the marital property, the district court considered the duration of\nthe second marriage only and what the parties brought into the second marriage.\n\n 7\n Id. at 539-40. On appeal, Dorothy Linn challenged, among other things, the\nportion of the divorce judgment concerning property division. Id. at 541. She\nargued the court erred \"by not distributing to her some of the property that\nRoger [Linn] brought into the second marriage.\" Id. We noted \"the short duration\nof the second marriage[.]\" Id. at 541 n.3. Affirming the court's distribution of the\nmarital property, we stated the court followed the Ruff-Fischer guidelines by\ndetermining the value of all the property owned by the parties, assigning specific\nvalues to each item of real and personal property, and considering which party\nbrought that item into the second marriage. Id. at 542. We concluded \"the court\nproperly followed the Ruff-Fischer guidelines in considering the property each\nparty brought into the second marriage and awarding that property to its\nprevious owner.\" Id.\n\n[¶22] Significantly, in both Lill and Linn the district courts and this Court only\nconsidered the duration of the parties' second marriage under the Ruff-Fischer\nguidelines. The district courts and this Court also considered the property each\nparty brought into the second marriage; in neither case were the courts\nconcerned with how the property was divided after the first marriage. Nelson,\nStephenson, Lill, and Linn all stand for the proposition that the \"duration of the\nmarriage\" factor under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines is the length of the marriage\nbeing dissolved by the district court, even when the parties were previously\nmarried.\n\n[¶23] \"No bright-line rule exists to determine whether a marriage is short or long\nterm.\" Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 2025 ND 8, ¶ 16, 16 N.W.3d 221. Here, the\ndistrict court found the Nagles' \"second marriage was extremely short.\"\nHowever, the court appears to have combined the parties' first and second\nmarriages and treated them as a single long-term marriage in making its\nequitable distribution of the parties' property. If it did, that was legal error. The\n\"duration of the marriage\" refers to the marriage before the court and is\ndetermined irrespective of prior marriages.\n\n[¶24] The above analysis does not impact or modify our cases stating, \"When\nparties live together and then marry it is appropriate for the court to consider all\nof their time together in dividing the marital property.\" Nelson, 1998 ND 176, ¶ 7;\n\n 8\n see also Northrop v. Northrop, 2001 ND 31, ¶ 14, 622 N.W.2d 219 (\"When parties\nlive together for a time, have children together, and then marry, our Court has\nmade it clear the trial court may properly consider all of their time together.\").\nThe length of time parties live together are \"the circumstances of the particular\ncase\" the district court must consider when determining the equitable division\nof the marital property, as is \"the totality of [a remarried couple's] relationship,\"\nNelson, ¶¶ 6, 8, including the length between the marriages, the duration of the\nsecond marriage, the marital property, whether the marital property was\naccumulated before or after the marriage, and other material facts.\n\n 2\n\n[¶25] The district court conducted a detailed analysis of the Ruff-Fischer\nguidelines. The court's analysis strongly leaned toward Gene Nagle receiving\nmore of the marital estate, not an equal division. Yet, despite its analysis and\nfindings, the court equally divided the marital property. In its analysis, the court\ndid not identify evidence warranting the equal division of the marital property.\nThus, if the court's property division was not based on the legal error of treating\nthe marriage as long term, the court's equal property division was clearly\nerroneous because the court failed to identify evidence and make findings that\nsupport the equal division of the marital property.\n\n 3\n\n[¶26] Gene Nagle argues the district court erred in its property division because\nthe court awarded Suzanne Nagle property that she waived her rights to in their\nfirst divorce. Gene Nagle misreads Nelson and Stephenson.\n\n[¶27] In both Nelson and Stephenson, this Court noted that when the parties\nremarried, all their property became marital property subject to equitable\ndistribution. 1998 ND 176, ¶ 8; 2011 ND 57, ¶ 22. As stated in Stephenson, \"A\ncourt may consider the source of property when dividing the marital estate, but\nall property, regardless of its source, must be included in the estate for equitable\ndistribution.\" 2011 ND 57, ¶ 22. Thus, despite the prior divorce judgment, the\nparties' property—whether distributed in the prior divorce judgment, obtained\nbefore the second marriage, or acquired during the second marriage—was\n\n 9\n marital property included in the marital estate for equitable distribution. The\ndistrict court \"was required to divide the parties' property considering the\ntotality of their relationship, and the prior judgment did not apply.\" Id.\n\n[¶28] In other words, the prior divorce judgment did not control the district\ncourt's equitable distribution of the marital property in the subsequent divorce.\nHowever, in making its equitable distribution, the court was required to consider\nthe source of the property and whether it was accumulated before or after the\nmarriage. Ceynar, 2025 ND 53, ¶ 5; Stephenson, 2011 ND 57, ¶ 22; see also Mertz v.\nMertz, 2015 ND 13, ¶ 17, 858 N.W.2d 292 (explaining the time of the acquisition\nof property and its source is significant when determining equitable division of\nthe marital estate); Zuger v. Zuger, 1997 ND 97, ¶ 8, 563 N.W.2d 804 (stating \"the\nsource of the property is only one factor for the court to consider in making an\nequitable distribution\"). Because, upon remarriage, all property is deemed\nmarital property subject to equitable distribution in the current divorce and the\nprior divorce judgment did not apply, i.e., control the court's distribution in the\ncurrent divorce, Suzanne Nagle was not relitigating the property division in the\nfirst divorce by seeking a particular property division in the current divorce.\nRather, Suzanne Nagle was litigating for the first time the property division of\nthe current marital estate in the current divorce proceeding.\n\n 4\n\n[¶29] In conclusion, the district court's equitable distribution of the marital\nestate under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines is clearly erroneous. Either the court\nmisapplied the law by combining the parties' two marriages and treating the\n\"extremely short\" second marriage as long term, or the court failed to identify\nevidence and make findings that support the equal division of the marital\nproperty. Either way, reversal and remand are appropriate. Accordingly, we\nreverse the court's property division and remand the matter for the court to make\nan equitable distribution of the marital property under the Ruff-Fischer\nguidelines treating the marriage as short term and to provide an explanation\nwhy the division is equitable under the facts and circumstances of this case.\n\n 10\n [¶30] \"Property division and spousal support are interrelated and intertwined\nand often must be considered together.\" Mertz, 2015 ND 13, ¶ 27. Because\nproperty division and spousal support are interrelated, to the extent the district\ncourt's decision on spousal support was related to its property division, the court\nmay reconsider the issue of spousal support in conjunction with the property\ndivision.\n\n IV\n\n[¶31] We reverse the district court's property division and remand for the\ndistrict court to make an equitable distribution of the marital property under the\nRuff-Fischer guidelines and to provide an explanation why the division is\nequitable under the facts and circumstances of this case.\n\n[¶32] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.\n Lisa Fair McEvers\n Jerod E. Tufte\n Douglas A. Bahr\n\nCrothers, Justice, specially concurring.\n\n[¶33] I agree with the majority opinion, as far as it goes. However, Gene Nagle\nargued to the district court that res judicata applies to the first divorce between\nhim and Suzanne Nagle. He argued on appeal that Suzanne Nagle should be\nprevented from collaterally attacking the property distribution from the first\nmarriage. I believe we should address the issue because the application of res\njudicata is a question of law. I also believe the district court's failure to abide by\nthat principle led it to mistakenly rely on Nelson v. Nelson, 1998 ND 176, 584\nN.W.2d 527, for the proposition the parties' two marriages could be treated as\none.\n\n[¶34] We have explained the applicability and reviewability of res judicata as\nfollows:\n\n Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of\n claims that were raised, or could have been raised, in prior actions\n between the same parties or their privies. Res judicata means a valid,\n\n 11\n final judgment is conclusive with regard to claims raised, or claims\n that could have been raised, as to the parties and their privies in\n future actions. Whether res judicata applies is a question of law,\n fully reviewable on appeal.\n\nFredericks v. Vogel Law Firm, 2020 ND 171, ¶ 10, 946 N.W.2d 507 (cleaned up).\n\n[¶35] Here, the Nagles' first divorce was finalized in December 2018. The parties\nconfirmed at oral argument that terms of the first divorce judgment, including\nproperty divisions, were fully complied with. When the Nagles remarried,\nnothing remained to be done under the 2018 judgment. The Nagles remarried\nthree and one half years after the first divorce. The second marriage occurred in\nAugust 2022 and the second divorce action commenced in June 2023. Because the\nfirst marriage was fully and finally resolved in 2018, res judicata prevents\nrelitigation of any part of the first marriage between the Nagles, including the\nproperty division. But, to the extent a party still owns the property, the result of\nthe property division in the first marriage necessarily will be the start of the\nproperty division in the second marriage. See majority opinion, ¶ 13; Willprecht\nv. Willprecht, 2020 ND 77, ¶ 19, 941 N.W.2d 556 (\"The [district] court must\ninclude all of the parties' assets and debts in the marital estate and then consider\nthe Ruff-Fischer guidelines to determine an equitable distribution.\").\n\n[¶36] In In re the Marriage of Parks, 58 Wash. App. 511, 512, 794 P.2d 59 (1990),\nMarven Parks appealed from a decree dissolving his and Judy Parks' second\nmarriage, claiming the trial court inappropriately considered the total number\nof years of the parties' two marriages when it allocated property. Id. Washington\nstate had a statute providing, \"A decree of dissolution of marriage . . . is final\nwhen entered, subject to the right of appeal.\" Id. at 514 (citing Wash. Rev. Code\nAnn. § 26.09.150 (2021)). On appeal, the court held \"the trial court erred as a\nmatter of law\" by including the duration of the first marriage in distributing\nproperty during the second divorce. Id. at 515-16. The court reasoned, \"When the\ncourt here again considered the length of the parties' first marriage, it in effect\nreopened the first decree, in contravention of basic principles of res judicata. The\ndistribution in this dissolution should not involve consideration of the first\nmarriage other than to establish the character of the property.\" Id. at 516.\n\n 12\n [¶37] Under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24, a divorce court must divide all property and\ndebts. Much like in Washington state, after entry of judgment a North Dakota\ndivorce court does not retain jurisdiction to modify a final property distribution.\nKopp v. Kopp, 2001 ND 41, ¶ 5, 622 N.W.2d 726. Rather, a court can make a post-\njudgment redistribution of property and debts only when \"a party has failed to\ndisclose property and debts as required by rules adopted by the supreme court\nor the party fails to comply with the terms of a court order distributing property\nand debts.\" N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(3). No party here claims the continuing\njurisdiction authority in N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(3) applies to the 2018 divorce.\nTherefore, the judgment in that divorce was final.\n\n[¶38] Gene Nagle argued to the district court and argues on appeal that the court\nerred following the strictures of Nelson v. Nelson, and that res judicata bars\nreconsideration of facts and property involved in the first property distribution.\nThe court rejected Gene Nagle's argument, instead finding this case was similar\nto Nelson and Stephenson, and the Ruff-Fischer guidelines should be applied to the\nfacts evolving over both marriages. The court therefore began its property\ndivision analysis with each party's employment starting \"[a]t the time of their\nfirst marriage.\" As a matter of law, that approach incorrectly blends the two\nmarriages, and incorrectly applies the result in Nelson.\n\n[¶39] In Nelson, the parties were divorced in 1991, began living together again\nthree months later, and remarried in 1993. 1998 ND 176, ¶ 3. The parties\nseparated in May 1995 and divorced approximately a year later. Id. This Court\nreversed the district court's treatment of the second marriage as short term. Id.\n¶ 8. However, that result was directed by the fact that, \"[a]lthough the second\nmarriage was short when compared to the 24 years they were together in the first\nmarriage, the property of their marital estate remained intact.\" Id. Therefore,\nterms of the first divorce judgment were not complied with and the division of\nproperty ordered in that proceeding never occurred.\n\n[¶40] To the extent the district court also relied on Stephenson v. Stephenson to\nreach its incorrect result, taking that path also was in error. In Stephenson, the\nparties married in 1983 and divorced in 1994. 2011 ND 57, ¶ 2, 795 N.W.2d 357.\nTerms of the divorce judgment directed Sharrie Stephenson to receive 25% of\n\n 13\n Daniel Stephenson's retirement benefits. Id. ¶ 3. The parties remarried in 1997,\nand Daniel Stephenson began drawing retirement benefits that same year. Id.\nSharrie Stephenson never received her share of the retirement benefits. Id. The\nparties separated in 2005 and began divorce proceedings in 2008. Id. ¶ 4. Thus,\n\"The parties' first marriage lasted eleven years and the second marriage lasted\nthirteen years.\" Id. ¶ 10. This Court in Stephenson cited Nelson in support of our\nconclusion, \"The court was required to divide the parties' property considering\nthe totality of their relationship, and the prior judgment did not apply.\" Id. ¶ 22.\n\n[¶41] In Stephenson, like in Nelson, terms of the original divorce were not\ncomplied with because the obligee did not receive before the second marriage all\nof the property she was awarded in the first divorce. It also is significant that the\nStephensons' second marriage was long term, which fact itself called for a\nproperty division greater than for a short-term marriage. See Vetter v. Vetter, 2020\nND 40, ¶ 19, 938 N.W.2d 417 (\"An equal division of marital property is a logical\nstarting point in a long-term marriage. While we have said a court may\nunequally divide property in a short-term marriage and award the parties what\neach brought into the marriage, marriages of longer durations generally support\nan equal distribution of property.\") (cleaned up).\n\n[¶42] The holdings in Nelson and Stephenson were based on significantly\ndifferent facts than are present in this case, and I would limit both holdings to\ntheir facts. In both cases, the divorced couples' remarriages occurred before the\njudgments in the first divorces were complied with. In Stephenson, the second\nmarriage was long term.\n\n[¶43] Here, the Nagles' first divorce was final, after which each party separately\nowned their property. To the extent they owned any of that property or\naccumulated property when they remarried, that property constituted the\nmarital estate when they again divorced. Therefore, I agree we must reverse. But\nI would do so by expressly holding the district court committed legal error by\nfollowing the results in Nelson and Stephenson, by not recognizing the first\ndivorce was res judicata as to the property and debts of that marriage, and by\nnot treating the second marriage as short term and applying the Ruff-Fischer\nguidelines accordingly.\n\n 14\n [¶44] Daniel J. Crothers\n\nMcEvers, Justice, concurring.\n\n[¶45] I agree with, and have signed with the majority opinion. I write in response\nto Justice Crothers's special concurrence because I do not think res judicata\nshould be considered on appeal.\n\n[¶46] While I agree with Justice Crothers that Gene Nagle argued res judicata in\nthe district court, he did not make that argument to this Court. Although he\nbriefly argued that Suzanne Nagle was allowed to collaterally attack her\ndecisions to stipulate certain matters in the first divorce, his argument was that\nthe district court erred in its property division because Suzanne Nagle was\nawarded property that she waived her rights to by stipulation in their first\ndivorce. His primary argument was that the court clearly erred by treating the\nparties' second marriage as a long-term marriage, and by concluding the equal\ndistribution of the parties' marital estate was fair and equitable given the second\nmarriage was a short-term marriage. He argued the circumstances of this case\ncan be differentiated from both Nelson and Stephenson. I agree.\n\n[¶47] Res judicata principles should not be considered or applied because they\nwere not adequately argued on appeal. Rule 28(b), N.D.R.App.P., governs the\ncontent of an appellant's brief, and specifically, Rule 28(b)(4) requires a\nstatement of the issues. Gene Nagle's stated issues were: (1) \"Did the lower court\nerr in its reliance on Nelson v. Nelson, 1998 ND 176, 584 N.W.2d 527?\"; and (2)\n\"Did the lower court err in its equitable distribution concerning the parties'\nshort-term second marriage?\" Rule 28(b)(7) also requires citations to authorities\nand the record on which the appellant relies. Issues are waived if they are not\nsupported by argument, reasoning, or authority. Sorum v. Dalrymple, 2014 ND\n233, ¶ 15, 857 N.W.2d 96. The term \"res judicata\" does not appear in Gene\nNagle's appellate brief. Gene Nagle cites to no legal authority regarding the\nprinciples of res judicata, nor does he cite to the record where such an argument\nwas preserved. Gene Nagle waived any argument regarding the application of\nthe doctrine of res judicata by not raising and briefing it on appeal. See Northstar\nCtr., LLC v. Lukenbill Fam. P'ship, LLLP, 2024 ND 212, ¶ 72, 17 N.W.3d 1 (\"Issues\n\n 15\n not briefed on appeal are waived.\"). For these reasons, I do not agree that this\nCourt should consider whether res judicata may have applied.\n\n[¶48] Lisa Fair McEvers\n\n 16",
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