{
  "contract_version": "1.0.0-draft.1",
  "data_as_of": "2026-08-06T02:50:22Z",
  "record": {
    "authority_type": "opinion",
    "body": "Judicial opinion",
    "canonical_key": {
      "content_hash": "849540186cb01a40",
      "source": "courtlistener"
    },
    "citation_aliases": [
      {
        "confidence": 0.7,
        "display_value": "Perreira v. Perreira. ICA mem. op., filed 01/31/2025 [ada], 155 Haw. 296. Consolidated with CAAP-20-0000038. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/01/2025. S.Ct. Order Dismissing Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/07/2025 [ada]. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/21/2025. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 05/02/2025 [ada].",
        "normalized_value": "perreira-v-perreira-ica-mem-op-filed-01-31-2025-ada-155-haw-296-consolidated-wit-d8687800",
        "scheme": "case-name",
        "source_id": "src:v1:us:opinion:courtlistener"
      }
    ],
    "court": null,
    "created_at": "2026-08-06T02:50:22Z",
    "heading": "Perreira v. Perreira. ICA mem. op., filed 01/31/2025 [ada], 155 Haw. 296. Consolidated with CAAP-20-0000038. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/01/2025. S.Ct. Order Dismissing Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/07/2025 [ada]. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/21/2025. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 05/02/2025 [ada].",
    "identity_state": "complete",
    "jurisdiction": "us-federal",
    "kind": "authority_record",
    "record_id": "rec:v1:90a6f533-65a1-7622-8f27-19ec8edc3918",
    "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1",
    "slug": "perreira-v-perreira-ica-mem-op-filed-01-31-2025-ada-155-haw-296-consolidated-wit-d8687800",
    "title": "Perreira v. Perreira. ICA mem. op., filed 01/31/2025 [ada], 155 Haw. 296. Consolidated with CAAP-20-0000038. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/01/2025. S.Ct. Order Dismissing Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/07/2025 [ada]. Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 03/21/2025. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 05/02/2025 [ada]."
  },
  "verification": {
    "active_defect_ids": [],
    "as_of": "2026-08-05",
    "computed_at": "2026-08-06T02:50:22Z",
    "currentness": "2025-09-15",
    "grade": "B",
    "input_sha256": "849540186cb01a4008dbae1cd02439b5ccc736a89e4607d005434ca10e4c75eb",
    "kind": "verification",
    "limitations": [
      "Text was ingested from CourtListener public full text.",
      "Not yet matched byte-for-byte to an official court/reporter PDF or HTML edition.",
      "Treat as researchable public law text with an open official-verification task."
    ],
    "official_receipts": [],
    "policy_version": "grade-policy-v1-bulk-courtlistener",
    "reason": "CourtListener public full text captured with content hash; not yet matched to an official court or reporter edition.",
    "reason_code": "courtlistener_public_full_text_unverified_against_official_reporter",
    "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1",
    "source_classes": [
      "independent_structured_corpus"
    ],
    "verified_at": null,
    "version_id": "ver:v1:3922f5f9-6456-7afa-8a85-25c79507487b"
  },
  "version": {
    "current_through": "2025-09-15",
    "decision_date": "2025-09-15",
    "effective_date": null,
    "finality_status": "public_full_text_unverified",
    "kind": "authority_version",
    "normalization_warnings": [
      "Bulk CourtListener import; official reporter comparison pending."
    ],
    "normalized_text_sha256": "849540186cb01a4008dbae1cd02439b5ccc736a89e4607d005434ca10e4c75eb",
    "observed_at": "2026-08-06T02:50:22Z",
    "parser_id": "bulk-courtlistener-v1",
    "parser_version": "1",
    "primary_text": "*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***\n\n Electronically Filed\n Supreme Court\n SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX\n 15-SEP-2025\n 01:56 PM\n Dkt. 19 OPA\n\n IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII\n\n ---o0o---\n________________________________________________________________\n\n WILLIAM S. PERREIRA,\n Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n vs.\n\n GERTRUDE B. PERREIRA n.k.a. GERTRUDE B. HAIA,\n Respondent /Defendant-Appellee.\n________________________________________________________________\n\n SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX\n\n CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS\n (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX and CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; FC-D NO. 88-279)\n\n SEPTEMBER 15, 2025\n\n RECKTENWALD, C.J., McKENNA, EDDINS, GINOZA, AND DEVENS, JJ.\n\n OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.\n\n I. INTRODUCTION\n This case arises from a marital property division\n\ndispute between former spouses, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant\n\nWilliam S. Perreira (William) and Respondent/Defendant-Appellee\n\nGertrude B. Perreira n.k.a. Gertrude B. Haia (Barbara), over\n\n 1\n *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***\n\nBarbara's share of William's State of Hawai‘i Employees'\n\nRetirement System (ERS) benefits following their 1989 divorce.\n\n William presents two questions to this court. First,\n\nwhether Barbara's 2008 motion to enforce the Family Court of the\n\nThird Circuit's division order was time-barred by the ten-year\n\nstatute of limitations under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS)\n\n§ 657-5 (Supp. 2001). Second, whether the family court's entry\n\nof a Hawai‘i Domestic Relations Order (HiDRO) under HRS § 88-93.5\n\n(Supp. 2018) was an ex post facto violation of William's rights\n\nunder the United States Constitution and Hawai‘i law.\n\n For the reasons discussed below, we answer both\n\nquestions in the negative. Accordingly, we affirm the\n\nIntermediate Court of Appeals' (ICA) judgment on appeal.\n\n II. BACKGROUND\n In 1990, the Family Court of the Third Circuit (family\n\ncourt) awarded Barbara a percentage of William's ERS retirement\n\nbenefit, with payments to commence at \"the earliest date when\n\n[William] shall be qualified to retire.\" William subsequently\n\nqualified to retire on April 1, 1999.\n\n In 2008, having not received any payments for her\n\nshare of William's retirement benefit, Barbara moved to enforce\n\nthe original division order. In 2012, the family court granted\n\nBarbara's motion and awarded her 31% of William's pension as\n\nvalued on the date which he qualified to retire. In 2017,\n\n 2\n *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***\n\nBarbara moved for further relief, alleging that William had\n\nfailed to disclose information regarding the value of his\n\nretirement benefits and further failed to make any payments\n\npursuant to the 2012 order. In 2019, the family court again\n\ngranted Barbara's motion, consistent with the 2012 order. The\n\ncourt further awarded Barbara 10% per annum interest along with\n\nattorneys' fees and costs related to both her 2008 and 2017\n\nmotions.\n\n William appealed the 2019 orders arguing, inter alia,\n\nthat Barbara's original 2008 motion to enforce was time-barred\n\nby the ten-year statute of limitations imposed by HRS § 657-5.\n\n In August 2020, while the 2019 orders were pending on\n\nappeal to the ICA, Barbara moved for entry of a HiDRO under HRS\n\n§ 88-93.5. The family court granted her motion, finding that\n\nBarbara was entitled to William's entire monthly retirement\n\npension until the sums due to her pursuant to the 2019 orders\n\nwere satisfied in full. In March 2021, the family court entered\n\na HiDRO directing the ERS to pay to Barbara $5,246.85 per month,\n\nWilliam's total monthly distribution. William appealed the\n\norder granting HiDRO, arguing that HRS § 88-93.5, which took\n\neffect on July 1, 2020, could not be applied retroactively to\n\nthe family court's 2019 orders.\n\n The ICA consolidated the appeals and, on January 31,\n\n2025, issued a memorandum opinion. As to William's appeal of\n\n 3\n *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***\n\nthe 2019 orders, the ICA held that Barbara's right to enforce\n\nthe family court's 1990 division order did not accrue until\n\nWilliam qualified for retirement on April 1, 1999, and, thus,\n\nBarbara's 2008 motion to enforce was not time-barred. Regarding\n\nthe family court's order granting HiDRO, the ICA reversed the\n\nHiDRO without expressly addressing William's ex post facto\n\nargument and remanded \"solely for the family court to enter a\n\nfinal judgment to clarify the record.\"\n\n William timely filed an application for writ of\n\ncertiorari, which we accepted.\n\n III. DISCUSSION\n William argues on certiorari that the ICA gravely\n\nerred in holding that Barbara's 2008 motion to enforce was not\n\nbarred by the statute of limitations. This argument lacks\n\nmerit.\n\n Generally, \"we will not disturb the family court's\n\ndecisions on appeal unless the family court disregarded rules or\n\nprinciples of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a\n\nparty litigant.\" Kakinami v. Kakinami, 125 Hawai‘i 308, 311-12,\n\n260 P.3d 1126, 1129-30 (2011) (quoting Fisher v. Fisher, 111\n\nHawai‘i 41, 46, 137 P.3d 355, 360 (2006)).\n\n HRS § 657-5 prohibits a person seeking enforcement of\n\na judgment or decree from doing so \"after the expiration of ten\n\nyears from the date a judgment or decree was rendered.\" If the\n\n 4\n *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***\n\nten-year statute of limitations expires before enforcement or an\n\nextension is sought, then the judgment or decree is \"presumed to\n\nbe paid and discharged.\" Id.\n\n William argues that statute of limitations began to\n\nrun as of the date the 1990 Division Order was filed. However,\n\nin construing HRS § 657-5, this court has previously held that\n\nthe statute of limitations for enforcing a judgment does not\n\nbegin to run until \"the cause of action—the judgment that\n\ncreates the enforceable claim or right—comes into existence as\n\nan enforceable claim or right.\" Estate of Roxas v. Marcos, 121\n\nHawai‘i 59, 69, 214 P.3d 598, 608 (2009) (internal quotation\n\nmarks omitted). It would be illogical, and contrary to our\n\nwell-established case law, to require that parties seek\n\nenforcement of a divorce decree or judgment, as William\n\nproposes, before the obligor is even in default. Cf. Segelken\n\nv. Hawaiian Tr. Co., 20 Haw. 225, 228 (Haw. Terr. 1910) (\"[W]hen\n\nthe payment of a claim or the liability of a party is made\n\ndependent upon the performance of any condition precedent or the\n\nhappening of any contingency, a right of action does not accrue,\n\nor the statute begin to run, until the performance of such\n\ncondition or the happening of such contingency.\").\n\n Here, William was not obligated to begin making\n\npayments, and Barbara's right to enforce the judgment did not\n\n\"come[] into existence,\" until \"the earliest date when [William]\n\n 5\n *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***\n\nshall be qualified to retire,\" which the family court determined\n\nto be April 1, 1999. See Estate of Roxas, 121 Hawai‘i at 69, 214\n\nP.3d at 608. Thus, Barbara's 2008 Motion to Enforce was not\n\ntime-barred because the statute of limitations under HRS § 657-5\n\ndid not expire until April 1, 2009, ten years after William\n\nreached retirement eligibility and the first monthly payment\n\nbecame due.\n\n William also argues on certiorari that, because the\n\nstatute took effect after the divorce decree and division orders\n\nwere entered, the application of HRS § 88-93.5 is an ex post\n\nfacto violation of article I, section 10 of the United States\n\nConstitution, HRS § 1-3 (2009), and Hawaiʻi state and federal\n\ncase law. Because the ICA reversed the HiDRO on other grounds,\n\nit did not address William's ex post facto arguments. 1 We\n\naddress them here.\n\n Under article I, section 10, clause 1 of the U.S.\n\nConstitution, \"[n]o state shall enter into any . . . ex post\n\nfacto Law.\" U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Interpreting this\n\nclause, the United States Supreme Court has stated, \"the true\n\nconstruction of the prohibition extends to criminal, not to\n\ncivil, cases.\" Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (1798). Thus,\n\nthe ex post facto prohibition has been widely \"interpreted to\n\n 1 Because they are not presented to us on certiorari, we express no\nopinion as to the other issues raised before the ICA.\n\n 6\n *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***\n\npertain exclusively to penal statutes.\" Kansas v. Hendricks,\n\n521 U.S. 346, 370 (1997); State v. Nakata, 76 Hawai‘i 360, 375,\n\n878 P.2d 699, 714 (1994) (\"The [ex post facto] clause prohibits\n\nstates from enacting retrospective penal legislation.\")\n\n(emphasis added); Gray v. Admin. Dir. of the Ct., 84 Hawai‘i 138,\n\n141 n.5, 931 P.2d 580, 583 n.5 (1997) (explaining that civil\n\nproceedings \"do not apply to constitutional ex post facto\n\nclauses, which relate only to ‘punitive legislation,' i.e.\n\n‘prosecutions for crime.'\") (citations omitted). HRS § 88-93.5\n\nis a civil statute concerning the \"[d]istribution of property in\n\na divorce action.\" Thus, because HRS § 88-93.5 is not punitive\n\nin either its intent or its effect, its application here does\n\nnot \"run[] afoul of the federal ex post facto clause.\" See\n\nState v. Guidry, 105 Hawai‘i 222, 235, 96 P.3d 242, 255 (2004).\n\n William's argument under HRS § 1-3 is also unavailing.\n\nHRS § 1-3 provides that \"[n]o law has any retrospective\n\noperation, unless otherwise expressed or obviously intended.\"\n\nInterpreting Hawaiʻi law on retrospective operation, the United\n\nStates District Court for the District of Hawai‘i has recently\n\ndistilled the analysis as follows:\n\n The [Hawai‘i Supreme] Court begins its analysis by\n considering the text of the statute. If retrospectivity is\n not clearly stated or the text is ambiguous, the Court will\n turn to the legislative history. If the retrospectivity is\n not clearly stated or the legislative history is ambiguous,\n the Court will then consider whether application of the\n statute to [a party] would impair [that party's] existing\n substantial rights.\n\n 7\n *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***\n\nN.K. Collins, LLC v. William Grant & Sons, Inc., 472 F.Supp.3d\n\n806, 820-21 (D. Haw. 2020).\n\n Put differently, absent any express language limiting\n\nthe temporal scope of the statute, \"the court must determine\n\nwhether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e.,\n\nwhether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted,\n\nincrease a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new\n\nduties with respect to transactions already completed.\" Gov.\n\nEmps. Ins. Co. v. Hyman, 90 Hawaiʻi 1, 5, 975 P.2d 211, 215\n\n(1999) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280\n\n(1974)).\n\n Here, HRS § 88-93.5 does not by its plain text\n\nexpressly limit the temporal scope of the statute. HRS § 88-\n\n93.5(a) defines a HiDRO as a domestic relations order that:\n\n (1) Creates or recognizes the right of an alternate\n payee, or assigns to an alternate payee, the right to\n receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with\n respect to a member, a former member with vested\n benefit status, or retirant under the system;\n\n (2) Directs the system to disburse benefits to the\n alternate payee; and\n\n (3) Meets the requirements of this section.\n\n(Emphasis added.)\n\n Clearly, the statute is prospective in its operation\n\nin the sense that it \"[d]irects the system to disburse benefits\n\n 8\n *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***\n\nto the alternate payee.\" 2 See HRS § 88-93.5(a)(2). However, the\n\nstatute expressly provides that the right of an alternate payee\n\n\"to receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with\n\nrespect to a . . . retirant under the system,\" may be \"create[d]\n\nor recognize[d]\" by the entry of a HiDRO. See id. (emphasis\n\nadded). This phrasing plainly indicates that a HiDRO may be\n\nentered to effectuate payment to a former spouse whose right to\n\nthe benefit was established prior to the entry of the HiDRO and,\n\nin some cases, prior to the ERS member's retirement. This\n\napplication is spelled out even more plainly in the legislative\n\nhistory of HRS § 88-93.5. Act 263, the enacting legislation of\n\nHRS § 88-93.5, provides:\n\n The purpose of this Act is to authorize and require the\n [ERS] to make direct payments to the spouse or former\n spouse of an [ERS] member or retirant when the spouse or\n former spouse has been awarded all or a portion of the\n member's or retirant's retirement benefits as part of a\n property division adjudicated, ordered, or decreed by a\n court in a domestic relations proceeding.\n\n2016 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 263, § 1 at 846 (emphasis added).\n\n Given that the legislature expressly contemplated that\n\na HiDRO may recognize a former spouse's existing rights to a\n\nretirant's benefits, it is reasonable to conclude that the\n\n 2 The prospective operation of the statute is further evidenced by\nthe statutory definition of \"benefits payable\" as \"any payment to be made to\na member, a former member with vested benefit status, or retirant.\" HRS\n§ 88-93.5(a) (emphasis added); see also HRS § 88-93.5(n) (stating that\npayment according to the terms of a post-retirement HiDRO \"shall commence as\nof the first day of the month following the date upon which the order is\ndetermined to be qualified\").\n\n 9\n *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***\n\nlegislature intended that HRS § 88-93.5 would be invoked to\n\neffectuate payments pursuant to judgments or court orders issued\n\nprior to the statute's effective date. 3 The relevant\n\ndetermination is whether the retroactive application of HRS\n\n§ 88-93.5 in this case, i.e., the entry of a HiDRO, would impair\n\nWilliam's substantive rights or merely \"prescribe methods of\n\nenforcing or giving effect to existing rights\" as defined by the\n\nfamily court's prior division orders. See Clark v. Cassidy, 64\n\nHaw. 74, 77, 636 P.2d 1344, 1347 (1981).\n\n Turning again to the legislative history, in 2015, the\n\nSenate Committee on Judiciary and Labor, after voting to approve\n\nthe provision, reported its finding \"that this measure will\n\nensure that a member's or retirant's pension or related benefits\n\nare correctly divided pursuant to a divorce action award and\n\npromptly paid.\" S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1058, in 2015 Senate\n\nJournal, at 1274. The committee further noted that the new\n\nprovision would \"help align [HRS] chapter 88 . . . to the\n\nfederal Employee Retirement Income Security Act [(ERISA)].\" Id.\n\nUnder ERISA, by way of amendment through the Retirement Equity\n\n 3 William rejects this conclusion. He argues that, because Act 30\namending HRS § 88-93.5 \"specified that the Act would take effect in the\nfuture – on July 1, 2020,\" the statute should be read only to apply\nprospectively. [App. at 7-8, SC Dkt. 1:9-11] This contention is belied by\nthe legislative history of Act 30, which explains that delay of the effective\ndate was not meant to limit the temporal scope of the statute, but rather was\n\"necessary for development and application of necessary resources to support\nimplementation and fund the costs of computer system modifications, ERS\nmember and other affected parties' education, and increased operational\ncosts.\" S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 3205, in 2018 Senate Journal, at 1363.\n\n 10\n *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***\n\nAct of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, a former spouse may request\n\nentry of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) pursuant to\n\n29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3). The QDRO, like a HiDRO, \"creates or\n\nrecognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right to . . .\n\nreceive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to\n\na participant under a plan\" provided by the participant's\n\nprivate employer. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I).\n\n Interpreting the application of a QDRO, Hawaiʻi courts\n\nhave held that a QDRO is \"merely a collateral enforcement device\n\nthat will implement the substantive rulings that are already\n\nwithin the [existing order].\" Romero v. Romero, Nos. 28664,\n\n28898, 2012 WL 1951328, at *2 (Haw. App. May 31, 2012) (SDO).\n\nThis treatment of the QDRO is consistent with other\n\njurisdictions that have held \"the entry of a QDRO is a method of\n\nenforcing or implementing the terms of an existing divorce\n\njudgment.\" Ex parte Montgomery, 79 So.3d 660, 669 (Ala. Civ.\n\nApp. 2011); Kesting v. Kesting, 370 P.3d 729, 732 (Idaho 2016)\n\n(\"[W]e agree with other courts that have concluded that a QDRO\n\nmay be entered to enforce a prior support obligation.\")\n\n(collecting cases). More specifically, federal courts have\n\nexpressly held that the QDRO statute may be applied to divorce\n\norders entered prior to the enactment of the statute. Samaroo\n\nv. Samaroo, 193 F.3d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 1999) (\"Although the\n\nRetirement Equity Act was not in effect on [the date of the\n\n 11\n *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***\n\nparties' divorce], plan administrators may, in their discretion,\n\ntreat orders entered before the date of the Act as QDROs.\");\n\nJohn Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Timbo, 67 F.Supp.2d 413, 417-\n\n18 (D.N.J. 1999) (mem. op.) (\"A divorce decree entered prior to\n\nthe effective date of the Retirement Equity Act can be treated\n\nas a QDRO.\").\n\n Upon review of the legislative history of HRS § 88-\n\n93.5, and the weight of authority relating to the analogous\n\nfederal statute, we conclude that the family court's application\n\nof the HiDRO statute in this case was merely a method of\n\nenforcing or giving effect to Barbara's existing rights under\n\nthe 2019 orders. See Clark 64 Haw. at 77, 636 P.2d at 1346-47.\n\n Barbara's rights to William's ERS retirement benefits\n\nwere established by the 1990 division order. Those rights were\n\nlater clarified by the family court's 2012 and 2019 orders. At\n\nno point over the two decades of proceedings did William comply\n\nwith the family court's orders or make any payment from his\n\nretirement benefit to Barbara as he was required to do. The\n\nfamily court's order granting HiDRO made clear that the HiDRO\n\nwas a method of enforcing Barbara's rights as defined by the\n\ncourt's 2019 Orders. The ICA affirmed as much, holding that\n\n\"the Order Granting H[i]DRO sought to enforce the [2019 orders],\n\nrather than amend or alter them.\" As such, the order granting\n\nHiDRO did not further impair William's rights to his ERS\n\n 12\n *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***\n\nbenefit, increase his liability for past conduct, or impose on\n\nhim any new obligations. See Hyman, 90 Hawaiʻi at 5, 975 P.2d at\n\n215. Accordingly, entry of the HiDRO pursuant to HRS § 88-93.5\n\nwas not an ex post facto violation of William's substantive\n\nrights. See id.\n\n IV. CONCLUSION\n The ICA's March 5, 2025, Judgment on Appeal is\n\naffirmed.\n\nDouglas L. Halsted /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald\nfor petitioner\n /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna\nMoses K.N. Haia III\nfor respondent /s/ Todd W. Eddins\n\n /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza\n\n /s/ Vladimir P. Devens\n\n 13",
    "publication_date": "2025-09-15",
    "publication_status": "public",
    "record_id": "rec:v1:90a6f533-65a1-7622-8f27-19ec8edc3918",
    "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1",
    "source_locators": [
      {
        "artifact_id": "art:v1:f2824584-3190-796b-8b5e-cd5cc5c64da4",
        "locator": "full-text",
        "quote_sha256": "849540186cb01a4008dbae1cd02439b5ccc736a89e4607d005434ca10e4c75eb"
      }
    ],
    "status": "current",
    "structure_sha256": "849540186cb01a4008dbae1cd02439b5ccc736a89e4607d005434ca10e4c75eb",
    "text_scope": {
      "excludes": [
        "footer",
        "navigation",
        "annotations",
        "headnotes",
        "summaries",
        "editorial_content"
      ],
      "includes": [
        "opinion_body"
      ]
    },
    "version_id": "ver:v1:3922f5f9-6456-7afa-8a85-25c79507487b"
  }
}