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    "primary_text": "J-A21005-21\n\n 2022 PA Super 48\n\n ROBERT A. SICHELSTIEL, JR. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF\n : PENNSYLVANIA\n Appellant :\n :\n :\n v. :\n :\n :\n VICTORIA L. SICHELSTIEL : No. 1804 EDA 2020\n\n Appeal from the Order Entered July 27, 2020,\n in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County,\n Civil Division at No(s): No. 2003-05445.\n\nBEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*\n\nOPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MARCH 17, 2022\n\n Appellant Robert A. Sichelstiel, Jr. (Father) challenges the child support\n\nobligation that the trial court ordered him to pay Appellee Victoria L. Sichelstiel\n\n(Mother) for their 17-year-old daughter. Specifically, Father disputes the\n\ncalculation of his net income. In determining Father's net income, the hearing\n\nofficer included all of Father's \"flow-through\" income, which Father receives\n\nfrom various business ventures. However, most of the flow-through income\n\nwas retained by the businesses, and Father only received relatively small\n\ndistributions. The trial court adopted the hearing officer's recommendation,\n\nand it ordered Father to pay Mother $2,361.96 per month in child support.\n\nOn appeal, Father argues the flow-through income should have been excluded\n\nfrom his net income, because as a minority owner of those businesses, he had\n\n____________________________________________\n* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.\n J-A21005-21\n\nno control over the decision to retain or distribute earnings. After review, we\n\nagree with Father's position. For the reasons below, we vacate that portion\n\nof the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings.\n\n The factual and procedural history may be abbreviated as follows: The\n\nparties married in 1996, and the daughter was born in June 2002. The parties\n\ndivorced in 2003, and Father paid support directly to Mother for approximately\n\n16 years. In May 2019, Mother filed a complaint for child support, and the\n\nmatter was set before a hearing officer. The hearing officer determined\n\nFather's monthly net income was $22,842.80, and that it came from three\n\nsources: Father's salary from his employment as a commercial real estate\n\nbroker; his one-time performance bonus; and his income from various\n\nbusiness ventures.\n\n This appeal only involves the third category - Father's income from the\n\nbusiness ventures. Father owns a minority interest in nine separate\n\nbusinesses. According to Father's 2018 tax return, Father received $155,014\n\nin flow-through income from these businesses. Each of these businesses\n\nelected to avoid tax liability at the corporate level by requiring the individual\n\nowners to report the income on their personal tax returns.\n\n This sort of income structure is commonly referred to as \"flow-through\"\n\nor \"pass-through\" income because the income flows through the corporation\n\nto the individual taxpayers. The taxpayers' flow-through income is reported\n\non the Schedule K-1 of Tax Form 1065. The Schedule K-1 denotes each\n\n -2-\n J-A21005-21\n\nindividual's ownership share, and whether the business retained or distributed\n\nits earnings to the owners.\n\n Of Father's nine businesses, three distributed earnings totaling $23,041\n\nto him; the rest of the businesses retained the balance of his flow-through\n\nincome (approximately $131,973). Moreover, Father testified he used\n\nvirtually all the distributed earnings he received to pay the tax liability that he\n\nowed on the entirety of the flow-through income. Thus, at the support\n\nhearing, Father argued that since none of the flow-through income ultimately\n\nwent into his pocket, none should be considered when calculating his child\n\nsupport obligation.\n\n To calculate Father's monthly net income, the hearing officer included\n\nall of Father's flow-through income, both the distributed earnings and the\n\nretaining earnings, totaling $155,014. The hearing officer then determined\n\nFather's monthly net income was $22,842.80. Under the support guidelines,\n\nthe hearing officer recommended Father's child support in the amount of\n\n$2,361.96 per month, effective December 1, 2019 forward.1\n\n Father filed exceptions with the trial court, arguing that the hearing\n\nofficer misapplied the law on flow-through income. The trial court dismissed\n\n____________________________________________\n1 Although irrelevant for our purposes, we note that the child support\nobligation was broken down into four separate time-periods to account for the\nchanges in the medical insurance costs. The obligations spanned from: 1)\nMay 2019 to August 2019; 2) August 2019 to October 2019; 3) October 2019\nto November 2019; and 4) December 2019 forward. Father's obligation\npresumably terminated in June 2020, which was month when the parties'\ndaughter turned 18 and was set to graduate from high school.\n\n -3-\n J-A21005-21\n\nFather's exceptions by its order dated July 27, 2020. In reaching its decision,\n\nthe trial court hypothesized that even if the hearing officer made a mistake,\n\nthe amount of Father's support obligation was still appropriate. The trial court\n\nreasoned that, per Pennsylvania Rule of Procedure 1910.16-4, the hearing\n\nofficer could have deviated Father's obligation upward, because his daughter\n\ndoes not spend any overnights with him. The court ruled that if the hearing\n\nofficer did not include Father's flow-through income, but deviated the award\n\nupward, the result would be essentially the same. Father timely filed2 this\n\nappeal, and he presents the following issues for our review:\n\n 1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and\n committed an abuse of discretion in including Father's\n flow-through income from his minority interest in\n several real estate ventures, when Father presented\n uncontroverted evidence establishing that he does not\n have control over the distributions of income from the\n entities in which he has a non-controlling interest and\n only received actual distributions to pay taxes on the\n flow-through income and as a transfer to another\n entity for repair costs.\n\n 2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and\n committed an abuse of discretion when it made a\n finding that the support hearing officer made\n credibility determinations regarding Father's income\n when neither the record or the recommendation and\n order of the support hearing officer support a\n\n____________________________________________\n2 We observe that Father filed his Concise Statement of Matters of on Appeal\non September 3, 2020. For reasons unclear, the trial court did not issue its\nPa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion until March 30, 2021, almost seven months later.\nWe remind the trial court that it shall file its opinion within 60 days of the\nfiling of the notice of appeal – and within 30 days if the case is designated a\n\"children's fast track appeal.\" See Pa.R.A.P. 1931(a) (emphasis added). This\nextended delay only complicates any potential overpayment upon remand.\n\n -4-\n J-A21005-21\n\n conclusion that the support hearing officer found\n Father's testimony or evidence lacking in credibility.\n\n 3. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and\n committed an abuse of discretion when it found that\n Father failed to meet his burden that he did not control\n the ability to retain or disburse earnings or that K-1\n income reflected on a tax return was not actually\n received.\n\n 4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and\n committed an abuse of discretion when it made a\n finding that the support hearing officer could have\n increased the base order by 30%, or $670.80 per\n month, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil\n Procedure 1910.16-4 for lack of parenting time.\n\nFather's Brief at 8 (capitalization adjusted).\n\n We begin with our well-settled standard of review in matters concerning\n\nchild support orders:\n\n When evaluating a support order, this Court may only\n reverse the trial court's determination where the order\n cannot be sustained on any valid ground. We will not\n interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court\n absent an abuse of the discretion or insufficient evidence to\n sustain the support order. An abuse of discretion is not\n merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion,\n the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment\n exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly\n unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or\n ill will, discretion has been abused. In addition, we note that\n the duty to support one's child is absolute, and the purpose\n of child support is to promote the child's best interests.\n\nSilver v. Pinskey, 981 A.2d 284, 291 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) (citation\n\nomitted).\n\n In Pennsylvania, child support awards are calculated in accordance with\n\nspecific statutory guidelines, using a complex system that accounts for the\n\n -5-\n J-A21005-21\n\nobligor's capacity to pay and the reasonable needs of the particular children.\n\nCommonwealth v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204, 1216 (Pa. 2013). The guidelines\n\nprovide extremely detailed instructions for calculating child support awards\n\nbased on the obligor's net income from all sources. Id. at 1217; see also 23\n\nPa.C.S.A. § 4322(a). As a general rule, the amount of support to be awarded\n\nis based upon the parties' monthly net income over at least a six-month\n\naverage. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2.\n\n Moreover, the Domestic Relations Code defines the term \"income\" and\n\nincludes income from any source. Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(a); see also 23\n\nPa.C.S.A. § 4302. Income is defined as follows:\n\n \"Income.\" Includes compensation for services, including,\n but not limited to, wages, salaries, bonuses, fees,\n compensation in kind, commissions and similar\n items; income derived from business; gains derived\n from dealings in property; interest; rents; royalties;\n dividends; annuities; income from life insurance and\n endowment contracts; all forms of retirement; pensions;\n income from discharge of indebtedness; distributive\n share of partnership gross income; income in respect of\n a decedent; income from an interest in an estate or trust;\n military retirement benefits; railroad employment\n retirement benefits; social security benefits; temporary and\n permanent disability benefits; workers' compensation;\n unemployment compensation; other entitlements to money\n or lump sum awards, without regard to source, including\n lottery winnings; income tax refunds; insurance\n compensation or settlements; awards or verdicts; and any\n form of payment due to and collectible by an\n individual regardless of source.\n\n23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302 (emphasis added).\n\n -6-\n J-A21005-21\n\n To arrive at the monthly net income, the court shall deduct specific items\n\nfrom the monthly gross income. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(c)(1). Rule\n\n1910.16-2(c)(1) provides, in relevant part:\n\n (1) Unless these rules provide otherwise, the trier-of-fact\n shall deduct only the following items from monthly gross\n income to arrive at monthly net income:\n\n (i) federal, state, and local income taxes;\n\n (ii) unemployment compensation taxes and Local Services\n Taxes (LST);\n\n (iii) F.I.C.A. payments (Social Security, Medicare and Self-\n Employment taxes) and non-voluntary retirement\n payments;\n\n (iv) mandatory union dues; and\n\n (v) alimony paid to the other party.\n\nPa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(c)(1).\n\n With these principles in mind, we turn to the substance of Father's\n\nappeal. We address contemporaneously Father's first three appellate issues,\n\nas they all pertain to the trial court's treatment of Father's flow-through\n\nincome. Both the trial court and Father agree this case is governed by Fennell\n\nv. Fennell, 753 A.2d 866 (Pa. Super. 2000), but they differ on how Fennell\n\nshould be applied.3\n\n In Fennell, the mother sought child support from the father. The\n\nquestion was whether the father's flow-through income should be included\n\nwhen calculating his monthly net income. On his tax return, the father\n\n____________________________________________\n3 Mother chose not to submit an appellee brief.\n\n -7-\n J-A21005-21\n\nreported flow-through income from a company called Muscle Products, in\n\nwhich the father owned a minority stake. Muscle Products was a Subchapter\n\nS corporation, meaning that just like the businesses in the instant case, Muscle\n\nProducts could elect to avoid tax at the corporate level by requiring individual\n\nshareholders to pay tax on corporate earnings. Muscle Products did not\n\ndistribute its corporate earnings to the father; instead, the company retained\n\nthe father's share of its earnings and reinvested it in the company. The father\n\nnever received Muscle Products profit in cash for his personal use. None of\n\nthat made much difference to the Internal Revenue Service, of course, which\n\nstill required the father to report the income on his personal tax return. See\n\ngenerally Fennell, 753 A.2d at 867.\n\n The issue in Fennell was whether, for child support purposes, the\n\nfather's net income should include his share of corporate earnings, even\n\nthough he did not actually take home any of that income. The trial court\n\nacknowledged that the father owned only a minority interest in the\n\ncorporation, and it also agreed with the father that the corporation's decision\n\nto retain the father's earnings was a \"business decision\" – i.e., to grow or\n\npreserve the company. Id. Importantly, \"[t]here was no finding…that the\n\nretention of earnings in Muscle Products in any way constituted an effort to\n\nshield income from Father's support obligation.\" Id. Still, the trial court\n\nincluded the father's share of the corporate earnings in its child support\n\ncalculations, despite Muscle Products retention of those earnings. Id. at 867-\n\n868. The father appealed, and we concluded the trial court erred.\n\n -8-\n J-A21005-21\n\n We recognized that \"all benefits flowing from corporate ownership must\n\nbe considered in determining income available to calculate a support\n\nobligation.\" Id. at 868 (citations omitted). \"[T]he owner of a closely-held\n\ncorporation cannot avoid a support obligation by sheltering income that should\n\nbe available for support by manipulating salary, perquisites, corporate\n\nexpenditures, and/or corporate distributions amounts.\" Id. \"By the same\n\ntoken, however, we cannot attribute as income funds not actually available\n\nto or received by the party.\" Id. (emphasis added).\n\n Because the father did not actually receive corporate distributions, nor\n\ndid the father have the ability to control whether the company would issue\n\ndistributions or retain its earnings, we concluded that the trial court erred\n\nwhen it considered that income. Id. at 869. We clarified, however, that our\n\nholding did \"not create a presumption that corporate retained earnings per se\n\nare to be excluded from available income for purposes of support calculations.\"\n\nId. (footnote omitted). Rather, \"in situations where the individual with the\n\nsupport obligation is able to control the retention or disbursement of funds\n\nby the corporation, he or she still will bear the burden of proving that such\n\nactions were ‘necessary to maintain or preserve' the business.\" Id. (emphasis\n\nadded) (citation omitted).\n\n Notably, Judge Del Sole dissented from the Majority's decision. Judge\n\nDel Sole explained that while he agreed retained corporate earnings may not\n\nalways be considered income for support, he reasoned that it was the burden\n\nof the party seeking exclusion to convince the court. Judge Del Sole would\n\n -9-\n J-A21005-21\n\nhave affirmed the trial court, because the trial court was not persuaded by the\n\nfather's argument. See id. (Dissenting Opinion).\n\n Returning to the instant case, the trial court and Father disagree over a\n\nparty's burden of proof regarding the party's control over the business funds.\n\nFather argues he met his burden, merely by showing that he was a minority\n\nowner in each business. Conversely, the trial court determined Father did not\n\nmeet his burden, because the hearing officer found Father's testimony and\n\nevidence lacked credibility. See Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 3/30/21, at 12.\n\nThe trial court opined:\n\n Father did not meet his burden in proving his inability to\n control the retention or disbursement of earnings of all these\n entities. Instead, Father's focus during the hearing was his\n simple assertion that he did not receive the K-1 [i.e., the\n flow-through] income, per se, just the amount to pay taxes.\n However, this falls far short of the requirement that he\n provide detailed evidence to back up this claim. The\n [hearing] officer correctly proceeded to determine Father's\n income based on what was presented. [The trial court] will\n not substitute the credibility determinations or the judgment\n on this point for that of the hearing officer.\n\nId. (footnote omitted, capitalization adjusted).\n\n The trial court went on to explain that, although the hearing officer's\n\nreport and recommendation were only advisory, they should be given the\n\nfullest consideration, especially on the issue of witness credibility, because the\n\nhearing officer had the opportunity to observe and assess the behavior and\n\ndemeanor of the parties. Id. (citing Gutteridge v. J3 Energy Group, Inc.,\n\n165 A.3d 908, 916 (Pa. Super. 2017)).\n\n - 10 -\n J-A21005-21\n\n On appeal, Father challenges the trial court's rationale, arguing that the\n\nhearing officer never made explicit credibility determinations. Father\n\nmaintains the trial court only inferred that the hearing officer made an adverse\n\ncredibility finding, simply because the hearing officer ruled for Mother. Father\n\nconcludes that the trial court's reliance on such an inference was erroneous.\n\n For support, Father cites Page's Dept. Store v. Velardi, 346 A.2d 556,\n\n561 (Pa. 1975). In Page's Dept. Store, our Supreme Court held, \"[a]n\n\nappellate court or other reviewing body should not assume from the absence\n\nof a finding on a specific point that the question has been resolved in favor of\n\nthe party who prevailed below, for the point may have been overlooked or the\n\nlaw misunderstood at the trial or hearing level.\" Id. Father also cites Justice\n\nNewman's concurring and dissenting statement in Daniels v. Worker's\n\nCompensation Appeal Board (Tri State Trans.), 828 A.2d 1043, 1054-57\n\n(Pa. 2001), which articulates the \"very real concern\" that a lower court will\n\nsometimes seek to insulate its findings from review by designating them as\n\ncredibility findings.\n\n After review, we agree with Father's position. The trial court improperly\n\ninferred that the hearing officer's decision was based on Father's lack of\n\ncredibility. Apart from a brief accounting of what dollar amounts were used\n\nin the support formula, the hearing officer's report and recommendation\n\ncontained no factual findings, let alone credibility findings. Similarly, our\n\nreview of the transcript discloses no other testimonial exchange suggesting\n\nthat the hearing officer had any concern with Father's testimony or evidence.\n\n - 11 -\n J-A21005-21\n\nFather testified what the flow-through income was, where it came from, and\n\nhow he used the distributed earnings to cover his tax bill. This testimony was\n\nneither contested by Mother, nor investigated by the hearing officer. There\n\nwas no inquiry at all into Father's ability to control whether his various\n\nbusinesses issued distributions, or whether it was the businesses' standing\n\npractice to retain earnings. The hearing officer made no finding that Father\n\nwas attempting to shield his income to avoid paying support.\n\n Contrary to the trial court's view, Father corroborated his testimony with\n\ndocumentation, specially Exhibit D-6. Exhibit D-6 contained the respective K-\n\n1 Schedules showing Father's ownership share of the business, the flow-\n\nthrough income for each business, and whether that business issued a\n\ndistribution. Initially, Father had trouble emailing Exhibit D-6 to the hearing\n\nofficer, due to the size of the electronic file. The hearing officer allowed Father\n\nto fax the documentation after the hearing, at which point the hearing officer\n\nsaid she would review the entire matter.\n\n Based on these facts, the trial court should not have assumed that the\n\nhearing officer's decision was predicated on a credibility finding. Father's\n\nminority ownerships were only cursorily addressed at the hearing, and not\n\naddressed at all in the hearing officer's report. We cannot infer from the\n\nhearing officer's silence on this point that she found Father had the ability to\n\ncontrol the distribution of corporate earnings, or that Father was shielding his\n\nincome from his support obligation. After all, one could just as easily infer the\n\n - 12 -\n J-A21005-21\n\nhearing officer \"overlooked\" or \"misunderstood\" the law. See Page's Dept.\n\nStore, supra.4\n\n Still, an error of judgment is not tantamount to an abuse of discretion.\n\nSilver, supra. \"[T]his Court may only reverse the trial court's determination\n\nwhere the order cannot be sustained on any valid ground.\" Id. Rather, \"[w]e\n\nwill not interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court\" unless there\n\nis \"insufficient evidence to sustain the support order.\" Id.\n\n Here, after review, we conclude the record does not sustain the support\n\norder. The record only contained Father's testimony and documentation,\n\nwhich discloses the following: Father testified that he owns minority interests\n\nin various businesses; and his Exhibit D-6 (the respective K-1 Schedules for\n\neach business) identifies his respective ownership interest, his share of the\n\ncorporate earnings (if any), and the amount of the distribution (if any). See\n\nN.T., at 19. Father's minority interests, across nine businesses, ranged from\n\nas little as 2.75% to as much as 28.95%.5\n____________________________________________\n4 For instance, a plausible reading of the cold transcript suggests that the\nhearing officer failed to understand why an individual would have to claim\nflow-through income to the IRS, even though the individual did not actually\nreceive of the income. See N.T., 11/29/19 at 19.\n\n5 We note that the trial court remarked in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that it\nappeared the K-1 Schedules were never submitted, and that they did not\nappear in the record. See T.C.O. at 3, n.11. However, our review of the\nrecord reveals Father abided by the hearing officer's directive and faxed the\nK-1 Schedules four days after the hearing. Father then included the\ncorrespondence and the K-1 Schedules in his exceptions before the trial court.\nMoreover, it appears the trial court reviewed Father's K-1 Schedules, before\nopining that the hearing officer's decision should be affirmed. See id. at 7.\n(Footnote Continued Next Page)\n\n - 13 -\n J-A21005-21\n\n Father presented uncontested testimony and evidence that he was a\n\nminority owner; and there was no finding, nor evidence to support the\n\ninference, that the businesses attempted to shield income from Father's\n\nsupport obligation by retaining his earnings instead of distributing them.\n\nTherefore, we conclude Father met his burden to prove he had no control over\n\nthe decision to retain or distribute earnings. See Fennell, 753 A.2d at 869.\n\n In his Brief, Father suggests that a minority owner, by definition, cannot\n\ncontrol the retention or disbursement of corporate earnings. See Father's\n\nBrief, at 19. We do not quite go that far. For instance, Mother could have\n\nchallenged Father's ability to control the distribution of funds, notwithstanding\n\nFather's minority ownership; or, the hearing officer could have asked other\n\nrelevant questions to determine whether Father was shielding his income\n\n(e.g., whether Father's partners were similarly treated). In other words,\n\ninformation gleaned from a minority owner's tax return can be questioned.\n\nSee, e.g., Labar v. Labar, 731 A.2d 1252, 1255 (Pa. 1999) (\"[I]ncome must\n\nreflect actual available financial resources and not the oft-time fictional\n\nfinancial picture which develops as a result of depreciation deductions taken\n\nagainst…income as permitted by the federal income tax laws.\") (citation\n\nomitted)).\n\n In this case, however, all the court had was Father's testimony and\n\ndocumentation that he was a minority owner. Nothing in the record indicates\n\nFather had control over whether the corporate earnings were distributed or\n____________________________________________\n\n - 14 -\n J-A21005-21\n\nretained. As such, Father had no burden to show that businesses' retention\n\nof their earnings were \"‘necessary to maintain or preserve' the business.\" See\n\nFennell, 753 A.2d at 869. Therefore, the trial court erred by considering the\n\nretained portion of Father's flow-through income from his various business\n\nventures.\n\n While Father suggests the court should not have considered any of his\n\nflow-through income, we disagree. Our clear case law provides that a\n\ncorporate distribution, even if used to pay a party's tax liability, nevertheless\n\ncounts as income for purposes of child support calculations. See Spahr v.\n\nSpahr, 869 A.2d 548, 553 (Pa. Super. 2005); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. §\n\n4302 (defining \"income\" as \"distributive share of partnership gross income\").\n\nNevertheless, Father is entitled to relief on his first three issues.\n\n Next, we address Father's final issue. Anticipating that our disposition\n\nwould necessitate a recalculation of his support obligation, Father seeks to\n\nguard against a future error – namely, that the trial court could deviate his\n\nguideline obligation upward by 30%. See generally Father's Brief at 36-43;\n\nsee also Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4 (Explanatory Comment – 2010). 6 Recall that\n____________________________________________\n6 The 2010 Explanatory Comment to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4 provides, in\nrelevant part:\n\n The basic support schedule incorporates an assumption that the children\n spend 30% of the time with the obligor and that the obligor makes direct\n expenditures on their behalf during that time. Variable expenditures,\n such as food and entertainment, that fluctuate based upon parenting\n time were adjusted in the schedule to build in the assumption of 30%\n parenting time. Upward deviation should be considered in cases in which\n the obligor has little or no contact with the children. However, an upward\n(Footnote Continued Next Page)\n\n - 15 -\n J-A21005-21\n\nwhen the trial court dismissed Father's exceptions, it hypothesized that, even\n\nif the hearing officer was wrong to include the flow-through income, the\n\nsupport obligation did not have to be recalculated. The trial court reasoned\n\nthat the hearing officer could have just as easily deviated Father's obligation\n\nupward and reached the same result. On appeal, Father concedes an upward\n\ndeviation is allowed under the support Rules. His argument is that\n\nExplanatory Comment's presumption of 30% custodial time does not mean\n\nthat the entire support obligation can be deviated upward by 30%.\n\n Because no deviation was imposed in this case, and because we remand\n\nfor a new calculation, we decline to address this issue. Our role as an error-\n\ncorrecting court \"does not include making independent factual\n\ndeterminations.\" See, e.g., M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 334 (Pa. Super.\n\n2013). Moreover, \"[t]he courts in our Commonwealth do not render decisions\n\nin the abstract or offer purely advisory opinions[.]\" Pittsburgh Palisades\n\nPark, LLC. V. Com., 888 A.2d 655, 659 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted).\n\n To conclude: the trial court erred when it accepted the hearing officer's\n\nrecommendation that all of Father's flow-through income, including that\n\nportion retained by his various business ventures, should be considered for\n\nsupport purposes. On remand, the trial court may only consider that portion\n\n____________________________________________\n\n deviation may not be appropriate if an obligor has infrequent overnight\n contact with the child, but provides meals and entertainment during\n daytime contact. Fluctuating expenditures should be considered rather\n than the extent of overnight time.\n\nPa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4 (Explanatory Comment – 2010).\n\n - 16 -\n J-A21005-21\n\nof Father's flow-through income which was distributed to him. Finally, we\n\ndecline to issue an advisory opinion regarding the propriety of an upward\n\ndeviation.\n\n Order vacated in part. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with\n\nthis Opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.\n\n President Judge Emeritus Stevens joins this Opinion.\n\n Judge Nichols files a Dissenting Opinion.\n\nJudgment Entered.\n\nJoseph D. Seletyn, Esq.\nProthonotary\n\nDate: 3/17/2022\n\n - 17 -",
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