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PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\n Shawn P. Pebley, appellant and cross-appellee, v.\n Laci D. Pebley, appellee and cross-appellant.\n ___ N.W.3d ___\n\n Filed January 6, 2026. No. A-24-844.\n\n 1. Divorce: Child Custody: Property Division: Alimony: Attorney\n Fees: Appeal and Error. In a marital dissolution action, an appellate\n court reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether there\n has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge in his or her determi-\n nations regarding custody, child support, division of property, alimony,\n and attorney fees.\n 2. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the\n reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriv-\n ing a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters\n submitted for disposition.\n 3. Evidence: Appeal and Error. When evidence is in conflict, the appel-\n late court considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial court\n heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts\n rather than another.\n 4. Child Custody: Words and Phrases. Under the Parenting Act, the con-\n cept of child custody encompasses both physical custody and legal cus-\n tody, with legal custody focusing entirely on decisionmaking authority.\n 5. ____: ____. The term \"joint legal custody\" is the joint authority and\n responsibility for making major decisions regarding the child's welfare,\n while the term \"sole legal custody\" establishes that one party will have\n the final say in such decisions.\n 6. Child Custody. The best interests of the child are the primary consid-\n eration for developing custodial plans. In considering such best inter-\n ests, it is a common occurrence and a court is permitted to supply a\n party with final decisionmaking authority in some areas to avoid future\n impasses which could negatively affect the child while maintaining both\n parents' rights to consultation and participation in important decisions.\n - 903 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\n 7. Divorce: Property Division. Any given property can constitute a mix-\n ture of marital and nonmarital interests; a portion of an asset can be\n marital property while another portion can be separate property.\n 8. Divorce: Property Division: Proof. The burden of proof rests with the\n party claiming that the property is nonmarital.\n 9. Divorce: Property Division: Equity. The equity in property at the time\n of marriage is a nonmarital asset which, if established, should be set\n aside as separate property.\n10. Divorce: Proof. While documentary evidence is not strictly necessary\n for parties to carry their burden of proof in dissolution cases, a party\n opting to rely upon his or her testimony alone does so at the risk of\n nonpersuasion.\n11. Trial: Evidence. Evidence not directly contradicted is not necessarily\n binding on the trier of fact and may be given no weight where it is\n inherently improbable, unreasonable, self-contradictory, or inconsistent\n with facts or circumstances in evidence.\n12. Property Division. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016), the\n court may take the economic circumstances of the parties into account\n and is not limited to the assets divided as part of the marital estate.\n13. Divorce: Property: Words and Phrases. Dissipation of marital assets\n is defined as one spouse's use of marital property for a selfish purpose\n unrelated to the marriage at the time when the marriage is undergoing an\n irretrievable breakdown.\n14. Divorce: Property Division. The marital assets dissipated by a spouse\n for purposes unrelated to the marriage should be included in the marital\n estate in dissolution actions.\n15. Divorce: Property Division: Equity. The purpose of assigning a date\n of valuation in a dissolution decree is to ensure that the marital estate is\n equitably divided.\n16. Divorce: Property Division: Appeal and Error. Generally, the date\n upon which a marital estate is valued must be rationally related to\n the property composing the marital estate and the property being\n divided. The date of valuation is reviewed for an abuse of the trial\n court's discretion.\n\n Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Lori\nA. Maret, Judge. Affirmed as modified.\n\n John W. Ballew, Jr., of Ballew Hazen Byrd, P.C., L.L.O., for\nappellant.\n - 904 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\n Megan E. McDowell and Terrance A. Poppe, of Morrow,\nPoppe, Watermeier & Lonowski, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.\n\n Riedmann, Chief Judge, and Moore and Welch, Judges.\n\n Riedmann, Chief Judge.\n I. INTRODUCTION\n Shawn P. Pebley appeals, and Laci D. Pebley cross-appeals,\nfrom the decree of dissolution entered by the district court for\nLancaster County dissolving their marriage. Because we find\nthe district court erred in classifying a certain account as mari-\ntal and in ordering the equalization payment to be made within\n60 days, we affirm as modified.\n\n II. BACKGROUND\n Shawn and Laci were married in May 2007. They had three\nchildren, born in 2011, 2013, and 2017. On April 26, 2022,\nShawn filed a complaint for dissolution of marriage. Trial was\nheld February 7 and 8, April 15 and 16, and May 21, 2024.\nThe record in this case is substantial, and we summarize only\nthat evidence which is necessary to address the assigned errors\non appeal.\n\n 1. Custody of Children\n After Shawn filed for dissolution in April 2022, the parties\ncontinued to reside in the marital home until early September.\nA temporary order entered in October provided that the parties\nwould have joint physical custody with a week-on-week-off\nschedule. Both Shawn and Laci described difficulties in\ncoparenting, including disagreeing with decisions made by\nthe other party. The children appeared to be doing well aca-\ndemically, were involved in extracurricular activities, and had\nno significant disciplinary issues. Shawn requested sole legal\ncustody and final decisionmaking authority. Laci requested\nshe be granted either sole legal custody or final decisionmak-\ning authority.\n - 905 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\n 2. Marital Estate\n Shawn served in the U.S. Air Force, eventually moving to\nthe U.S. Air Force Reserve. In October 2007, Shawn received\na separation payment when he moved from active duty to\nreserve duty, with the agreement that he would repay these\nfunds if he received military retirement benefits.\n In the early 2000s, Shawn began purchasing real estate as\nrental properties. At trial, Shawn utilized an April 2007 real\nestate loan application to identify the real estate and bank\naccounts he asserted he owned at the time of marriage. He\nexplained that during the marriage, some of the properties\nwere refinanced to purchase additional properties. Others were\nsold, with the funds being placed back into the rental business.\nShawn moved funds from premarital bank accounts into differ-\nent accounts. He also provided testimony and documentation\nidentifying funds he received as an inheritance from his grand-\nparents and funds received as a gift from his father. Due to\nthe difficulty in tracing the premarital property throughout the\nmarriage and determining its current value, Shawn requested\nthe district court characterize the real estate and accounts he\nowned at the time of marriage as marital property and give\nhim a credit for the value they had on the date of marriage. In\nother words, Shawn agreed that all growth in the premarital\nproperty could be considered marital.\n\n 3. District Court Order\n The district court awarded Shawn and Laci joint legal and\nphysical custody of their children. It declined to award either\nparty final decisionmaking authority. The district court found\nthat Shawn had failed to prove the property listed in the April\n2007 loan application was premarital and that the document\nwas insufficient and unreliable to prove the value of the\nproperties listed. The district court found that Shawn failed\nto trace his inherited funds to accounts existing at the time\nof filing. It determined the separation pay debt was marital\nand divided it evenly between Shawn and Laci. As part of the\n - 906 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\ndistribution of the marital estate, Shawn was ordered to make\nan equalization payment of $643,789.50 within 60 days of the\ndecree of dissolution. Additional facts will be discussed below\nas necessary.\n\n III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR\n Shawn assigns, combined, reordered, and restated, that the\ndistrict court erred by (1) failing to grant him final decision-\nmaking authority, (2) failing to credit him for the value of his\npremarital real estate and other assets and in failing to treat\nhis premarital rental real estate as a single collective asset, (3)\nfailing to find his monetary gifts and inheritance were non-\nmarital property, and (4) ordering him to make an equalization\npayment within 60 days of the entry of the decree.\n On cross-appeal, restated, reordered, and renumbered, Laci\nassigns that the district court erred by (1) failing to award her\neither sole legal custody or final decisionmaking authority;\n(2) failing to include dissipated assets in the marital estate;\n(3) using incorrect valuation dates for bank accounts, Shawn's\nmilitary retirement benefits, and her retirement account; and\n(4) finding the debt for Shawn's separation pay was marital.\n\n IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n [1] In a marital dissolution action, an appellate court reviews\nthe case de novo on the record to determine whether there has\nbeen an abuse of discretion by the trial judge in his or her\ndeterminations regarding custody, child support, division of\nproperty, alimony, and attorney fees. Simons v. Simons, 312\nNeb. 136, 978 N.W.2d 121 (2022).\n [2] A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the reasons or rul-\nings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a\nlitigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters\nsubmitted for disposition. Id.\n [3] When evidence is in conflict, the appellate court consid-\ners and may give weight to the fact that the trial court heard\nand observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the\n - 907 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\nfacts rather than another. Stava v. Stava, 318 Neb. 32, 13\nN.W.3d 184 (2024).\n\n V. ANALYSIS\n 1. Shawn's Appeal\n (a) Final Decisionmaking Authority\n [4,5] Shawn assigns that the district court erred by failing\nto grant him final decisionmaking authority. We conclude that\nthe district court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.\nUnder the Parenting Act, the concept of child custody encom-\npasses both physical custody and legal custody, with legal cus-\ntody focusing entirely on decisionmaking authority. Vyhlidal v.\nVyhlidal, 309 Neb. 376, 960 N.W.2d 309 (2021). See Neb. Rev.\nStat § 43-2922(7) (Cum. Supp. 2024). The term \"joint legal\ncustody\" is the joint authority and responsibility for making\nmajor decisions regarding the child's welfare, while the term\n\"sole legal custody\" establishes that one party will have the\nfinal say in such decisions. Vyhlidal, supra.\n [6] The best interests of the child are the primary consid-\neration for developing custodial plans. Blank v. Blank, 303\nNeb. 602, 930 N.W.2d 523 (2019). In considering such best\ninterests, it is a common occurrence and a court is permitted\nto supply a party with final decisionmaking authority in some\nareas to avoid future impasses which could negatively affect\nthe child while maintaining both parents' rights to consultation\nand participation in important decisions. Id.\n Although a court may choose to grant a party final deci-\nsionmaking authority, this is not required. The best interests of\nthe children are the primary consideration. Here, when declin-\ning to award either party final decisionmaking authority, the\ndistrict court acknowledged the disputes caused by the lack of\ncooperation and communication between the parties. However,\nit specifically stated its belief that with the finalization of the\nproceedings, the parties would be able to make decisions for\nthe best interests of the children.\n - 908 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\n It is clear that both Shawn and Laci love their children.\nIt is also clear that each party has made parenting decisions\nwith which the other parent disagrees. Despite the difficul-\nties experienced during the pendency of the case, the district\ncourt believed Shawn and Laci would be able to work together\nin the future for the best interests of their children. Other\ncourts have recognized that over time, divorced parents learn\nto reconfigure their relationship. See, e.g., State on behalf of\nMaddox S. v. Matthew E., 23 Neb. App. 500, 513, 873 N.W.2d\n208, 217 (2016) (acknowledging that \"‘[u]sually, parties fall\ninto a pattern of conduct that works for them to raise their\nchild free from interference or supervision by the courts'\").\nWe are mindful that the district court heard and observed the\nwitnesses when making this determination. We cannot find\nthat the district court abused its discretion in declining to\naward Shawn final decisionmaking authority.\n (b) Credit for Premarital Assets\n Shawn assigns that the district court erred in failing to\ngrant him credit for the value of his premarital real estate and\nother assets and in failing to treat his premarital real estate\nas a single collective asset. We find no abuse of discretion in\nthe district court's determination that Shawn failed to prove\nthe value of his premarital assets; thus, the district court did\nnot err in failing to award him credit. Because Shawn failed to\nprove the premarital value of his real estate holdings, we need\nnot address whether the district court erred in failing to treat\nthem as a single collective asset. We do find error in the dis-\ntrict court's treatment of one of Shawn's premarital accounts\nand find he should be given credit for its premarital value.\n (i) Additional Facts\n Shawn presented an application for a real estate loan from\nApril 2007, in which he was required to list his assets and\nliabilities. Shawn testified that he prepared the balance sheet\nfor the lender and confirmed that it was a \"Fannie Mae or\nFreddie Mac type of a situation.\" The application listed his\n - 909 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\nchecking accounts and saving accounts, along with their bal-\nances. There was also a list of real estate Shawn owned at the\ntime, with the market value of each property and the loans\nassociated with it. Shawn testified that he owned one addi-\ntional account not listed in the document.\n The application is neither signed by Shawn nor notarized,\nbut a signature appears in the portion of the application for\nan interviewer's signature. The district court determined that\nShawn had \"failed to meet his burden of proof in showing\nthe premarital nature of the rental properties.\" It found that\nthe loan application \"purportedly showing the values of these\nproperties or in the alternative, [Shawn's] ‘net worth' [was]\ninsufficient and unreliable given the purpose for the generation\nof the document and its unsigned nature\" and that Shawn had\nadmitted it was incomplete.\n\n (ii) Analysis\n Equitable property division under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365\n(Reissue 2016) is a three-step process. See Stava v. Stava, 318\nNeb. 32, 13 N.W.3d 184 (2024). The first step is to classify the\nparties' property as marital or nonmarital. Id. The second step\nis to value the marital assets and determine the parties' marital\nliabilities. Id. The third step is to calculate and divide the net\nmarital estate between the parties in accordance with the prin-\nciples contained in § 42-365. Stava, supra.\n [7,8] Any given property can constitute a mixture of marital\nand nonmarital interests; a portion of an asset can be mari-\ntal property while another portion can be separate property. Id.\nThe burden of proof rests with the party claiming that the prop-\nerty is nonmarital. Id. The extent to which the property is mari-\ntal versus nonmarital presents a mixed issue of law and fact.\nId. The manner and method of acquisition involve questions of\nfact, but the classification of the property under those facts is\na legal question and not a matter of the court's discretion. Id.\n [9] Property that a party brings into the marriage is usu-\nally excluded from the marital estate. See id. The Nebraska\n - 910 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\nSupreme Court has said that the equity in property at the time\nof marriage is a nonmarital asset which, if established, should\nbe set aside as separate property. See id. Shawn's assigned\nerror involves the first step of the division process. As the party\nseeking to set aside a portion of property as nonmarital, Shawn\nbore the burden of establishing what should be excluded from\nthe marital estate. If Shawn met this burden, but that particular\nasset no longer existed, he would also need to trace the asset\nthrough the marriage so that it could be identified and shown\nto have retained its nonmarital classification. Our review of\na trial court's determination of whether either of these steps\nwas met is for an abuse of discretion. We determine that, with\none exception, the district court did not abuse its discretion in\ndetermining that Shawn failed to meet his burden to establish\ncertain property should be set aside as premarital.\n Shawn used the loan application to show the premarital\nequity he held in certain real estate properties and financial\naccounts. He testified that he prepared the balance sheet for the\nlender and confirmed that it was a \"Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac\ntype of a situation.\" Although he testified that he was required\nto sign the application under oath that his representations were\ncorrect, the exhibit offered and received into evidence does\nnot include his signature. It indicates that the application was\ntaken by telephone and was signed by the interviewer. The\napplication contained a list of the real estate Shawn claimed\nthat he owned at the time, along with each property's market\nvalue and associated outstanding loans. It also included a list\nof financial accounts with their values. Shawn provided no\nsupporting documentation, such as purchase agreements, clos-\ning statements, mortgage statements, or account statements, to\nsupport the loan application. He testified he failed to identify\none account on the application.\n [10,11] We acknowledge that Shawn's testimony, if believed\nby the district court, could be sufficient to carry his burden of\nproof. While documentary evidence is not strictly necessary\nfor parties to carry their burden of proof in dissolution cases,\n - 911 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\na party opting to rely upon his or her testimony alone does so\nat the risk of nonpersuasion. Montegut v. Mosby-Montegut, 31\nNeb. App. 107, 977 N.W.2d 671 (2022). Evidence not directly\ncontradicted is not necessarily binding on the trier of fact and\nmay be given no weight where it is inherently improbable,\nunreasonable, self-contradictory, or inconsistent with facts or\ncircumstances in evidence. White v. White, 320 Neb. 256, 26\nN.W.3d 924 (2025).\n The dissent accurately observes that Laci did not specifically\ncontest Shawn's premarital ownership or its values. It argues\nthat Shawn's testimony fits none of the categories above for\na trier of fact to discredit uncontroverted testimony. However,\nShawn's testimony was inconsistent with the loan applica-\ntion in that he testified that he filled it out and signed it. The\ndocument itself reflects that the information was taken over the\ntelephone and was signed by only the bank representative. As\nnoted by the White court, we defer to the district court's deter-\nmination of the witness' credibility.\n Although Shawn attempted to use the loan application to\nsupport his testimony, the district court found the document\ninsufficient, unreliable, and incomplete. We agree with the\ndissent that attempting to establish the value of the proper-\nties owned 18 years prior to trial is certainly not an easy task.\nBut other than the loan application, Shawn did not present\nany supporting documentation for the values contained within\nthat document. No purchase agreements, closing statements,\nmortgage statements, valuations from the county assessor, or\naccount statements were provided. Rather, the court was to\ndetermine the validity of the values based upon Shawn's rep-\nresentations. We consider and give weight to the fact that the\ndistrict court heard and observed Shawn as a witness and found\nthe document he presented was unreliable.\n In his brief on appeal, Shawn provides additional details\nto support the validity of the application, but this information\nwas not presented to the district court during trial, and we do\nnot consider it on appeal. Generally, it is not the function of\n - 912 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\nan appellate court to review evidence that was not presented\nto the trial court. Timothy L. Ashford, PC LLO v. Roses, 313\nNeb. 302, 984 N.W.2d 596 (2023). A bill of exceptions is the\nonly vehicle for bringing evidence before an appellate court;\nevidence which is not made a part of the bill of exceptions may\nnot be considered. Id.\n Although we recognize that a contrary finding by the dis-\ntrict court also would not likely be an abuse of discretion,\nbased on this record and giving deference to the district court's\ndetermination of credibility, we cannot say that it erred in its\ndetermination that Shawn failed to prove the value of his pre-\nmarital assets.\n Because Shawn failed to establish the value of his premarital\nassets, we need not determine whether he can properly trace\nhis premarital interests. Without knowing the extent and value\nof his assets at the time of marriage, it would be impossible to\ndetermine whether, and to what extent, they remained.\n Shawn also argues that the district court erred in failing\nto treat his real estate holdings as a collective asset, similar\nto a \"cattle herd.\" Brief for appellant at 35. Because Shawn\nfailed to establish the value of his premarital interests in the\nproperties, we need not address this argument. The district\ncourt rejected Shawn's argument that the loan application\ncredibly established the value of his premarital assets; there-\nfore, whether viewed as individual assets that morphed over\ntime or as a conglomeration resulting in a single asset, the\npremarital value was not established. An appellate court is\nnot obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to\nadjudicate the case and controversy before it. State on behalf\nof Jaide Y. & Demee Y. v. Hope N., 33 Neb. App. 489, 18\nN.W.3d 129 (2025).\n There is one exception to our determination regarding\nShawn's premarital property. We find that Shawn established\nhis premarital interest in funds he held in one account that\nexisted prior to the marriage. An April 1 to June 30, 2007,\nstatement for a Roth individual retirement account (IRA) was\n - 913 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\noffered and received into evidence. It showed a balance of\n$19,866.25. Shawn provided account statements from which\nwe can deduce that in 2009, these funds were transferred to a\ndifferent Roth IRA, with the account number ending in 1373.\nShawn provided a January to March 2022 statement for this\nsame account, showing a balance of $73,871.52. In its dis-\nsolution decree, the district court identified this account as\nShawn's Roth IRA and valued it at $73,872.\n In its order, the district court specifically stated the loan\napplication setting forth the premarital value of Shawn's real\nestate prior to marriage was insufficient and unreliable \"given\nthe purpose for the generation of the document and its unsigned\nnature.\" But unlike the rental properties and their values,\nShawn presented supporting documentation of the existence\nand value of the Roth IRA at the time of marriage and at the\ntime of separation.\n The district court did not address the premarital value of the\nRoth IRA, and unlike Shawn's inherited funds that the court\nfound Shawn failed to properly trace, the court's order is silent\nas to traceable moneys in the Roth IRA. Because uncontested\ndocumentary evidence was received and there was no finding\nby the district court that the premarital Roth IRA money was\nnot traceable, we find the evidence presented establishes that\nShawn's premarital interest in the Roth IRA, with the account\nnumber ending in 1373, was $19,866.25, making the marital\nportion of this account $54,005.75. We modify the district\ncourt's dissolution decree to reflect this change. This results\nin a change to the equalization payment.\n In its decree, the district court calculated the equaliza-\ntion payment by totaling the net value of assets awarded\nto each party and dividing the number in half to determine\nthat each party should be awarded net assets with a total\nvalue of $792,499.50. Laci had been awarded assets with\na net value of $128,710, so to equalize the estate, account-\ning for a previously agreed upon $20,000 credit, Shawn was\nordered to pay Laci an equalization payment of $643,789.50.\n - 914 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\nRemoving $19,866.25 of Shawn's premarital funds from the\nmarital estate and dividing this number in half, each party\nshould receive net assets with a total value of approximately\n$782,566.38. Accounting for the net assets awarded to Laci,\nand for Shawn's previously agreed upon credit, Shawn now\nowes Laci an equalization payment of $633,856.38. We mod-\nify the district court's order to reflect this.\n\n (c) Gifts and Inheritance\n Shawn assigns that the district court erred by failing to\nfind his monetary gifts and inheritance were nonmarital prop-\nerty. Although Shawn established that he received gifts and\ninheritance money and that they were initially deposited into\none account and then transferred to another, he failed to show\nthe balance of the latter account was composed solely of\nthose funds. Therefore, we find no error by the district court.\n\n (i) Additional Facts\n In 2017, Shawn received $61,648.70 from his grandparents'\ntrust. Shawn testified that he used these inherited funds to\nestablish a checking account ending in 3296 (account 3296).\nThe canceled check in the amount of $61,648.70 was received\ninto evidence and reflects \"For Deposit Only,\" with account\n3296 listed. Shawn testified he also opened a money market\naccount (account 7050). An account statement reflects that\nin April 2022, $30,000 was transferred from account 3296 to\naccount 7050. The district court found Shawn failed to meet his\nburden of proof to establish that at the time of separation, these\naccounts were traceable to inherited moneys because there was\nno documentation to show that the balance in account 7050\ncame from account 3296. The district court valued account\n7050 at $62,426.\n\n (ii) Analysis\n The documentation provided is sufficient to establish that\nin 2017, Shawn received $61,648.70 in inherited funds and\n - 915 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\nplaced them in account 3296. In 2022, Shawn transferred\n$30,000 from account 3296 to account 7050, which created\na balance in account 7050 of $62,425.79. The documentary\nevidence supports this. However, the record includes no state-\nment of transactions from account 3296 supporting Shawn's\ntestimony that it was composed solely of inherited funds, nor\ndoes it include statements from account 7050 to explain where\nthe remaining funds came from. Therefore, Shawn failed to\ntrace the existence of his inherited funds and the district court\ndid not abuse its discretion in determining that he failed in his\nburden of proof.\n Although not assigned as error, Shawn raises an issue regard-\ning an incorrect account name and number being listed on the\ndistrict court's division of assets and debts. The district court\nincorrectly listed account 7050, the money market account,\nas a savings account (account 5833). We modify the district\ncourt's order to change the account named \"Capital One 360\nPerformance Savings X5833\" to \"Capital One 360 Money\nMarket X7050.\"\n\n (d) Equalization Payment\n Shawn assigns that the district court erred by ordering him\nto make an equalization payment to Laci within 60 days of\nthe entry of the decree. Shawn argues that without awarding\nhim value for his premarital assets, \"a liquidation of numerous\nrental properties and the triggering of capital gains and recap-\nture of depreciation is all but assured, particularly given the 60\ndays\" that is allowed for the payment. Brief for appellant at 47.\nWe find the district court abused its discretion in the manner in\nwhich it ordered the equalization payment.\n [12] Under § 42-365, the court may take the economic cir-\ncumstances of the parties into account and is not limited to\nthe assets divided as part of the marital estate. Karas v. Karas,\n314 Neb. 857, 993 N.W.2d 473 (2023). A dissolution court is\nnot required to award liquid assets sufficient to cover the cost\nof an equalization payment. See id. A party alleging error in\n - 916 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\nan equalization payment award has the burden to show that he\nor she is unable to make the payment. See id.\n Although Shawn was awarded the bulk of the assets in the\nmarital estate, the vast majority of these assets were in the form\nof real estate. We acknowledge that a dissolution court is not\nrequired to award liquid assets sufficient to cover the cost of an\nequalization payment. See Karas, supra. However, even when\ntaking into consideration the economic circumstances of the\nparties outside of the marital estate, we fail to see how Shawn\ncan realistically obtain funds for such a large payment within\n60 days. We determine the district court abused its discretion\nin ordering the entire equalization payment be made within 60\ndays. We modify the district court's order to reflect that the\nequalization payment, as modified above, of $633,856.38, is\npayable in five equal yearly installments plus interest at the\ncurrent judgment interest rate, with the first payment due 90\ndays after the issuance of the mandate in this case.\n\n 2. Cross-Appeal\n (a) Legal Custody and Final\n Decisionmaking Authority\n Laci assigns that the district court erred by not awarding\nher either sole legal custody of the children or final decision-\nmaking authority. We find the district court did not abuse its\ndiscretion.\n In support of her assigned error, Laci advances the same\nargument regarding final decisionmaking authority as Shawn\npresented in his appeal. For the same reasons we found no\nabuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to grant Shawn\nfinal decisionmaking authority, we find no abuse of discretion\nin the district court's failure to award Laci either sole legal\ncustody or final decisionmaking authority.\n\n (b) Dissipation\n [13,14] Laci assigns that the district court erred by failing\nto include dissipated assets in the marital estate. We find that\n - 917 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\nLaci failed to meet her burden of proof to show that Shawn\ndissipated assets. Dissipation of marital assets is defined as\none spouse's use of marital property for a selfish purpose\nunrelated to the marriage at the time when the marriage is\nundergoing an irretrievable breakdown. White v. White, 320\nNeb. 256, 26 N.W.3d 924 (2025); Schwensow v. Bartnicki, 32\nNeb. App. 798, 6 N.W.3d 549 (2024). As a remedy, the mari-\ntal assets dissipated by a spouse for purposes unrelated to the\nmarriage should be included in the marital estate in dissolu-\ntion actions. Schwensow, supra. The party alleging dissipation\nof marital property has the initial burden of production and\npersuasion. Id. Although Nebraska case law does not precisely\ndefine when a marriage is undergoing an irretrievable break-\ndown, this court has previously declined to conclude that such\nbreakdown can be found only when the parties are estranged\nor have separated. Id.\n Laci argues that Shawn did not provide explanations show-\ning that the money in their joint account was used for mari-\ntal purposes. But as the party claiming dissipation of marital\nassets, Laci had the initial burden of production and persua-\nsion. At trial, Laci testified that Shawn stopped contributing\nfunds to the parties' joint bank account in June 2022 but still\nutilized funds in the joint account for things like car repairs.\nShawn testified that he gave Laci credit for her paycheck\nand took credit for an amount that had been agreed to during\ntheir joint budgeting process. Although Laci stated Shawn\ndid not properly credit her for funds in the joint account,\nShawn testified he did. We are mindful that the district court\nheard and observed the witnesses and believed one version of\nevents over another. We cannot find the district court abused\nits discretion.\n (c) Valuation Dates\n [15,16] Laci assigns that the district court erred by using\nincorrect valuation dates for bank accounts, Shawn's military\nretirement benefits, and her retirement account. The purpose\n - 918 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\nof assigning a date of valuation in a dissolution decree is to\nensure that the marital estate is equitably divided. Radmanesh\nv. Radmanesh, 315 Neb. 393, 996 N.W.2d 592 (2023). It is\nwell settled that, generally, the date upon which a marital\nestate is valued must be rationally related to the property\ncomposing the marital estate and the property being divided.\nId. The date of valuation is reviewed for an abuse of the trial\ncourt's discretion. Id.\n\n (i) Bank Accounts\n Laci argues it was error to value a joint bank account as\nof the date Shawn filed for dissolution, as there was evidence\nthe parties utilized the joint account after that date. Shawn\ntestified that he disbursed the funds in a manner agreed upon\nby the parties. Although Laci argues the parties used the joint\naccount after the date of filing, Shawn's testimony was that\nthe spending that occurred during that time was accounted\nfor in his distribution of account funds. The district court\nheard and observed the witnesses and found Shawn's testi-\nmony credible. We cannot say the district court abused its\ndiscretion.\n Laci argues the district court erred in valuing Shawn's post-\nseparation account. She argues that to assume this account\ncontained no marital funds ignores Shawn's misappropriation\nof money from their joint account. We have already found the\ndistrict court did not abuse its discretion in determining that\nShawn did not dissipate marital assets. Based on the district\ncourt's decision, it did not believe that any of the funds in\nShawn's postseparation bank account were marital. We cannot\nsay that this was an abuse of discretion.\n\n (ii) Shawn's Military Retirement\n Laci argues the district court erred in finding the end date\nfor her portion of Shawn's military retirement benefits was the\nmonth of filing of the complaint for dissolution, rather than\nthe date the decree of dissolution was entered. The district\n - 919 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\ncourt awarded Laci credit for one-half of the points Shawn\naccumulated through the marriage until April 2022, the month\nthe complaint for dissolution was filed. We find no abuse of\ndiscretion in the district court's distribution of Shawn's mili-\ntary retirement benefits.\n The Supreme Court has previously addressed the proper\ninterpretation of a divorce decree awarding a former spouse a\nportion of her ex-husband's military retirement benefits. See\nWeiland v. Weiland, 307 Neb. 882, 951 N.W.2d 519 (2020).\nIn Weiland, the Supreme Court explained that when Congress\npassed the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act\nin 1982, it removed federal preemption and permitted states\nto apply their own laws when determining the proper distribu-\ntion of military pensions. The Supreme Court noted that prior\nto a 2016 amendment to a federal statute regarding the award\nof military retirement pay, a state could determine the marital\nshare of military retirement based on the length of service\neither to the date of retirement or to the date of divorce. See\nWeiland, supra, citing Starr v. Starr, 70 Va. App. 486, 828\nS.E.2d 257 (2019).\n The statute now provides in part that when there is a\ndivision of property as part of a final decree of divorce,\ndissolution, annulment, or legal separation that becomes\nfinal prior to the date of a member's retirement, the retired\npay shall be determined based \"on the date of the decree\nof divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation.\" 10\nU.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B) (2018). However, recent changes to\nthe Department of Defense's financial management regula-\ntions have provided clarification on the language used in the\nstatute. The regulations explain that the statute limitation is\n\"no later than the date of the final decree of divorce, dissolu-\ntion, annulment, or legal separation.\" Department of Defense\nFinancial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, vol. 7B, ch. 29,\n¶ 8.2.1 (May 2025). Thus, the regulation explains, if parties\nwere divorced on October 1, 2024, but the court order uti-\nlized the date the parties separated rather than the date of the\n - 920 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\ndecree to determine the proper division of retirement benefits,\nthis would be acceptable. See id.\n In Nebraska, valuation dates are assigned to ensure a mari-\ntal estate is equitably divided. See Radmanesh v. Radmanesh,\n315 Neb. 393, 996 N.W.2d 592 (2023). The trial court has\ndiscretion to value the marital estate in a manner that is ratio-\nnally related to the property composing the marital estate\nand the property being divided. See id. Viewing the district\ncourt's division of Shawn's military retirement benefits in\nlight of the philosophy of equitable division of marital estates\nin Nebraska, in connection with the federal statutes and regu-\nlations, we see no abuse of discretion here. The valuation of\nShawn's military retirement benefits as of the date of filing\naligns with the valuation of many other assets and is rationally\nrelated to the property composing the estate and the property\nbeing divided. Based on the valuation of the other marital\nassets and the distribution of the marital estate, we cannot\nsay the district court abused its discretion in valuing Shawn's\nmilitary retirement benefits as of the date of filing.\n\n (iii) Laci's Retirement Account\n Laci assigns that the district court erred in choosing\nthe valuation date for her retirement account. She argues\nthe district court valued the account as of December 23, 2023,\nwhen a date closer to the date of the parties' separation was\navailable.\n\n a. Additional Facts\n At trial, Laci was asked if at the time of the filing of the\ncase she had approximately $73,000 to $74,000 in her retire-\nment account, and she responded that this was \"[c]orrect.\"\nThe documents Laci provided showed a balance of $71,077.75\nin the account in August 2022. Laci's January 2024 answers\nto interrogatories were included as part of an exhibit, and\nshe listed her retirement account as having a balance of\n$74,916.56. The district court valued the account at $74,916.\n - 921 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\n b. Analysis\n Considering the size of the marital estate, the difference\nbetween the district court's valuation of Laci's retirement\naccount and her suggested value on appeal is not a significant\namount. Laci's trial testimony was that near the time of filing,\nshe had approximately $73,000 to $74,000 in her retirement\naccount, though there are some records that dispute whether\nthis was the correct amount. Under the circumstances of this\ncase, we cannot say this valuation unfairly deprives Laci of a\nsubstantial right or denies her a just result. As such, we do not\nfind this to be an abuse of discretion.\n (iv) Rental Properties\n To the extent that Laci also assigns and argues that the\ndistrict court erred in valuing the rental properties, we do not\nfind an abuse of discretion. To value the real estate encom-\npassed in the marital estate, the district court averaged the\nvalues of the rental properties between the date of filing and\nMarch 21, 2023. This valuation appears rationally related to\nthe property and the marital estate. Although Laci argues the\nproper valuation date was May 2024 and the district court\nerred in refusing to accept the 2024 appraisals into evidence,\nshe has not assigned this as error. As such, only the 2022 and\n2023 appraisals were before the district court. Considering the\nfacts of this case, the method chosen by the district court was\nan appropriate way to value the properties. We cannot find this\nto be an abuse of discretion.\n (d) Separation Pay Debt\n Laci assigns that the district court erred in classifying\nShawn's voluntary separation pay debt as marital debt. We find\nthat the district court did not err in this regard.\n (i) Additional Facts\n In 2006, Shawn signed an agreement with the armed ser-\nvices that provided he would receive a separation pay bonus\nfor leaving active duty but would repay the funds if he went\n - 922 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\nback into the armed services or accepted retirement. Shawn\nwas released from active duty in September 2007, and in\nOctober, he received $83,756.40. Shawn testified the money\nwas used to fund the retirement accounts for both parties, pay\nsome personal bills, and purchase a car for Laci. Laci had no\nevidence the separation pay was dissipated but was concerned\nthat it had been.\n Because Shawn had over 20 years of service and was retire-\nment eligible, he had no option but to pay back the funds\nout of his retirement paycheck. The district court noted that\nShawn signed the agreement in 2006 but did not receive the\nmoney until October 2007. It found that the money was used\nfor family purchases and was a marital debt. It allocated half\nof the debt to each party.\n (ii) Analysis\n Laci argues the separation pay agreement was entered\ninto prior to the marriage, that Shawn was in control of\nthe account into which the funds were deposited, and that\nthere was a lack of evidence that the money was spent on\nmarital purposes. Marital debt includes only those obliga-\ntions incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of\nthe parties. Karas v. Karas, 314 Neb. 857, 993 N.W.2d 473\n(2023). The burden of proof rests with the party claiming that\nproperty is nonmarital. Id. Although Shawn signed the agree-\nment prior to the marriage, he received the funds during the\nmarriage and spent it for the benefit of the marriage. Because\nShawn was retirement eligible, he would have to repay the\nfunds out of his retirement. Laci failed to meet her burden\nof proof to show that this was not a marital debt. The district\ncourt did not abuse its discretion.\n VI. CONCLUSION\n We find Shawn established that $19,866.25 in retirement\nfunds was nonmarital and modify the district court's order to\nreflect that the Roth IRA, with the account ending in 1373, has\na marital value of $54,005.75. We modify the district court's\n - 923 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\norder to reflect that Shawn owes an equalization payment of\n$633,856.38, to be paid in five equal yearly installments, with\nthe first payment being due 90 days from the issuance of the\nmandate in this case. We modify the district court's order to\nchange the account named \"Capital One 360 Performance\nSavings X5833\" to \"Capital One 360 Money Market X7050.\"\nWe otherwise affirm the district court's order.\n Affirmed as modified.\n Welch, J., concurring in part, and in part dissenting.\n I respectfully disagree with the majority's affirmance of the\ntrial court's decision not to credit Shawn with the premarital\nvalue of his real estate portfolio. It is clear from this record\nthat prior to the parties' marriage, Shawn had acquired a rental\nreal estate portfolio consisting of six properties. By the time of\ntrial, Shawn had grown that portfolio and provided testimony\nand significant documentation as to how he had done so. And\nalthough there is a complexity to that structure, including, but\nnot limited to, the creation of limited liability companies, a\nlike-kind exchange, and numerous refinances to effectuate that\ngrowth, he provided a comprehensive analysis demonstrat-\ning how those premarital assets could be traced to his current\nportfolio, while only requesting credit for the value of the six\nproperties he brought into the marriage.\n Without going into explicit detail, Shawn established that,\nof the six properties for which he was requesting premarital\ncredit, as of the time of trial, he still owned four of them, one\nhad been exchanged utilizing I.R.C. § 1031 (2018) into another\nproperty, and the one remaining property had been refinanced\nto acquire other rental properties and land on Mill Road before\neventually being sold.\n Notwithstanding Shawn's comprehensive attempt to trace\nthose assets utilizing exhibits 30 through 33 and his testimony,\nwhich included testimony on how those rental properties were\nactively managed by him, how the money was recirculated\nto grow the business, and how the rental real estate portfolio\n - 924 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\nwas continuously managed as a separate group of properties\nfrom other marital assets, the trial court provided no premarital\ncredit for the value of the six rental properties brought into the\nmarriage and found:\n It is incumbent upon the party seeking to identify the\n property as premarital, to carry the burden of doing so.\n [Shawn] failed to meet this burden by a preponderance\n of the evidence. The Court has spent a considerable\n amount of time, energy and effort, without the aid of\n expert forensic testimony and analysis, reviewing the\n evidence and trying to follow the \"tracing\" alleged by\n [Shawn] of his premarital holdings. The Court concludes\n that much like its awarding of all the rental properties to\n [Shawn], because of the financial gymnastics that would\n be required to parse out the interlocking loans and cross\n collateral agreements with banks, again without the aid\n of any forensic analysis, all the rental properties and\n interest in them is deemed to be marital. The Court also\n finds that the exhibit purportedly showing the values\n of these properties or in the alternative, [Shawn's] \"net\n worth\" is insufficient and unreliable given the purpose for\n the generation of the document and its unsigned nature.\n Also, by his own admission, [Shawn] testified that the\n document was not complete.\n Insofar as the majority affirms the trial court's conclusion\nthat Shawn failed to properly trace his six premarital rental\nproperties into his modern portfolio, I disagree with that con-\nclusion. As I mentioned above, the evidence established that\nShawn continued to own four of the properties as of the date\nof trial, exchanged one of them, and produced a comprehensive\nanalysis of how the other property was refinanced to produce\nmore properties before eventually being sold. I also note that\nLaci did not dispute any of the specific relevant testimony as\nit related to the origin of these assets—that Shawn brought\nsix properties into the marriage and that Shawn separately\n - 925 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\nmanaged and grew the real estate portfolio, including how he\nspecifically grew it.\n And as it relates to the value of the six rental properties\noriginally brought into the marriage in 2007, Shawn produced\nexhibits 30 and 32 to accompany his testimony that these\nexhibits reflected the value and current debt position on those\nsix rental properties as of the date of the parties' marriage.\nNotably, exhibit 30 was a real estate loan application submit-\nted to a bank in 2007 in an effort to buy another property\nthat was successfully purchased after the parties' marriage.\nExhibit 30 provided written evidence of what Shawn repre-\nsented to be the value of his assets and debts just prior to the\nparties' marriage. Again, Laci provided no testimony refuting\nthe values Shawn ascribed to these assets at that time. This\nreal-time document, together with Shawn's testimony as to\nthe properties' premarital value, provided uncontroverted evi-\ndence of the value of the properties Shawn brought into the\nmarriage. In short, there was no dispute that Shawn brought\nthe six rental properties into the marriage, that they had a pre-\nmarital value, that he still owned four of the properties by the\ntime of trial, that he separated the rental real estate portfolio\nand actively managed it, that he did not request any premari-\ntal value for the appreciation of these assets during the mar-\nriage, and that Laci did not dispute any of Shawn's testimony\nor documentation regarding the value of all six rental real\nestate properties.\n Attempting to establish the value of the six properties owned\n18 years prior to trial is certainly not an easy task. That con-\ncept is recognized in the Nebraska Supreme Court's holding\nin Burgardt v. Burgardt, 304 Neb. 356, 364-66, 934 N.W.2d\n488, 495-96 (2019), wherein the Nebraska Supreme Court, in\nreversing this court's rejection of a party's attempt to establish\nthe premarital value of property without documentary evi-\ndence, held:\n A nonmarital interest in property may be established by\n credible testimony. In Brozek v. Brozek, [292 Neb. 681,\n - 926 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\n874 N.W.2d. 17 (2016),] we recognized that a spouse's\nown testimony can establish a \"‘tracing link,'\" i.e.,\ntracking an asset to a nonmarital source. Of course, triers\nof fact have the right to test the credibility of witnesses\nby their self-interest and to weigh it against the evidence,\nor the lack thereof. Evidence not directly contradicted\nis not necessarily binding on the triers of fact, and may\nbe given no weight where it is inherently improbable,\nunreasonable, self-contradictory, or inconsistent with\nfacts or circumstances in evidence. We acknowledged in\nBrozek that the trial court was \"entitled to discount [the\nhusband's] testimony about [an alleged premarital asset]\nbecause of his admitted uncertainty.\"\n While documentary evidence may be more persuasive,\nit is not absolutely required. In a case where the husband\ndid not produce bank statements proving the premarital\nbalance of his bank accounts but the wife did not contest\nthe values he listed on a joint property statement,\nwe found an abuse of discretion by the trial court in\nfailing to set off the value of premarital bank accounts.\nIn Onstot v. Onstot, [298 Neb 897, 906 N.W.2d 300\n(2018),] we affirmed the trial court's decision to not\ngrant the husband credit for the value of a premarital\nhouse at the time of marriage, stating that \"assuming\n[the husband's] testimony established the value of the\nresidence at $100,000 at the time of the marriage, he did\nnot testify or supply any documentation as to whether\nthe residence was either encumbered or unencumbered\nat that time and, if encumbered, to what extent.\" This\nstatement implies that premarital equity could have\nbeen established by testimony alone. In a case where\nundisputed testimony established items as premarital, the\nCourt of Appeals determined that the trial court erred in\nclassifying the items as marital property.\n Of course, a party opting to rely upon his or her\ntestimony alone does so at the risk of nonpersuasion. In\n - 927 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\n a case where the trial court set aside the total amount\n of premarital funds that the husband claimed he used\n to purchase property, we reduced the amount of the\n set aside—even though the husband's testimony was\n uncontradicted—because there was nothing in the record\n to show the source of certain funds. In Brozek, we affirmed\n the trial court's decision declining to set off any amount\n to the husband for the premarital portion of two checking\n accounts (he testified one account had about $79,000 at\n the time of marriage), crops from a 1993 harvest, and\n machinery owned at the time of marriage (but later sold\n or traded). A party seeking recognition of nonmarital\n property may find it easier to meet his or her burden of\n persuasion with documentary support. But its absence\n does not automatically defeat the claim.\n Here, Shawn provided documentary evidence of the pre-\nmarital value of the six properties in addition to his own\ntestimony that the document represented the value of those\nsix properties at the time of the parties' marriage. And as\nhe testified, that document constituted a loan application to\na bank where he was representing the then-current values in\norder to procure a loan to purchase another rental property,\nwhich he did purchase shortly after the parties' marriage. As I\nmentioned before, Laci did not specifically contest any of this.\nAs the Nebraska Supreme Court stated, evidence not directly\ncontradicted is not necessarily binding on the triers of fact,\nand may be given no weight where it is inherently improbable,\nunreasonable, self-contradictory, or inconsistent with facts or\ncircumstances in evidence. Burgardt v. Burgardt, 304 Neb.\n356, 934 N.W.2d 488 (2019). Shawn's documentary and testi-\nmonial evidence fits none of those categories.\n In a review de novo on the record, an appellate court is\nrequired to make independent factual determinations based\nupon the record, and the court reaches its own independent\nconclusions with respect to the matters at issue. Stava v.\nStava, 318 Neb. 32, 13 N.W.3d 184 (2024). Applying that\n - 928 -\n Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets\n 33 Nebraska Appellate Reports\n PEBLEY V. PEBLEY\n Cite as 33 Neb. App. 902\n\nstandard, I believe, on this record, Shawn provided sufficient\nproof of the value of his premarital rental real estate portfo-\nlio, and I would find that the trial court abused its discretion\nin not crediting Shawn with the value of those six premarital\nrental properties he brought into the marriage. See Ramsey v.\nRamsey, 29 Neb. App. 688, 958 N.W.2d 447 (2021) (finding\nthat value of traceable premarital interest in home where it\nwas not disputed by wife should have been set aside as hus-\nband's premarital interest).", "publication_date": "2026-01-01", "publication_status": "public", "record_id": "rec:v1:c62f81f5-3a57-7ce4-8d63-5092b60c68cf", "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "source_locators": [ { "artifact_id": "art:v1:105b5754-d480-7f8b-8f02-4556512bb6ce", "locator": "full-text", "quote_sha256": "03869f864070666dec96aacf50699425008f36eb2831f54fb79ac5c146aa6f85" } ], "status": "current", "structure_sha256": "03869f864070666dec96aacf50699425008f36eb2831f54fb79ac5c146aa6f85", "text_scope": { "excludes": [ "footer", "navigation", "annotations", "headnotes", "summaries", "editorial_content" ], "includes": [ "opinion_body" ] }, "version_id": "ver:v1:6b7c2cc7-4553-7c0e-8b2e-4ebada2b162d" } }