{ "artifacts": [ { "artifact_id": "art:v1:2a077e9d-700c-7784-8708-09e9a6013735", "byte_length": 24310, "canonical_url": null, "final_url": "", "mime_type": "text/plain", "privacy_class": "public_primary_law", "publisher": "Free Law Project / CourtListener", "raw_sha256": "b499a481e5a53ce8f11453babc8d451965416a76d44307af5a79fc4a39567565", "retrieval_method": "database_export", "retrieved_at": "2026-08-06T02:50:22Z", "rights_basis": "Public judicial opinion text via CourtListener; no Lexis/West editorial content.", "source_id": "src:v1:us:opinion:courtlistener" } ], "contract_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "data_as_of": "2026-08-06T02:50:22Z", "defects": [], "graph_edges": [], "kind": "proof_bundle", "reconciliations": [], "record": { "authority_type": "opinion", "body": "Ohio Supreme Court", "canonical_key": { "content_hash": "b499a481e5a53ce8", "source": "courtlistener" }, "citation_aliases": [ { "confidence": 0.7, "display_value": "Columbus Bar Assn. v. 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Ryan" }, "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "verification": { "active_defect_ids": [], "as_of": "2026-08-05", "computed_at": "2026-08-06T02:50:22Z", "currentness": "2024-01-01", "grade": "B", "input_sha256": "b499a481e5a53ce8f11453babc8d451965416a76d44307af5a79fc4a39567565", "kind": "verification", "limitations": [ "Text was ingested from CourtListener public full text.", "Not yet matched byte-for-byte to an official court/reporter PDF or HTML edition.", "Treat as researchable public law text with an open official-verification task." ], "official_receipts": [], "policy_version": "grade-policy-v1-bulk-courtlistener", "reason": "CourtListener public full text captured with content hash; not yet matched to an official court or reporter edition.", "reason_code": "courtlistener_public_full_text_unverified_against_official_reporter", "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "source_classes": [ "independent_structured_corpus" ], "verified_at": null, "version_id": "ver:v1:b934b202-65b8-7fec-85ff-ef64497d69a3" }, "version": { "current_through": "2024-01-01", "decision_date": "2024-01-01", "effective_date": null, "finality_status": "public_full_text_unverified", "kind": "authority_version", "normalization_warnings": [ "Bulk CourtListener import; official reporter comparison pending." ], "normalized_text_sha256": "b499a481e5a53ce8f11453babc8d451965416a76d44307af5a79fc4a39567565", "observed_at": "2026-08-06T02:50:22Z", "parser_id": "bulk-courtlistener-v1", "parser_version": "1", "primary_text": "[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as\nColumbus Bar Assn. v. Ryan, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-5570.]\n\n NOTICE\n This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an\n advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to\n promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65\n South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other\n formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before\n the opinion is published.\n\n SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-5570\n COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. RYAN.\n [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it\n may be cited as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Ryan, Slip Opinion No.\n 2024-Ohio-5570.]\nAttorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—\n Conditionally stayed one-year suspension.\n(No. 2024-1099—Submitted September 3, 2024—Decided November 27, 2024.)\n ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme\n Court, No. 2023-039.\n __________________\n The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,\nDEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and DETERS, JJ. BRUNNER, J., did not participate.\n\n Per Curiam.\n {¶ 1} Respondent, Corinne Noelle Ryan, of Gahanna, Ohio, Attorney\nRegistration No. 0066393, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1996. On\n SUPREME COURT OF OHIO\n\nJune 2, 2015, we publicly reprimanded Ryan for neglecting two client matters and\nfor failing to reasonably communicate with those clients. Columbus Bar Assn. v.\nRyan, 2015-Ohio-2069, ¶ 1, 6.\n {¶ 2} On November 15, 2023, relator, Columbus Bar Association, filed a\ntwo-count complaint with the Board of Professional Conduct alleging that Ryan\nhad neglected a client's divorce matter, failed to reasonably consult and\ncommunicate with the client, knowingly made false statements of material fact to\nthe client, and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or\nmisrepresentation. Relator also alleged that after the client filed a grievance with\nrelator, Ryan attempted to interfere with the investigation into the alleged\nmisconduct.\n {¶ 3} Ryan waived a probable-cause determination, and the parties entered\ninto stipulations of fact, two rule violations (Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 and 1.4(a)(3)), and\naggravating and mitigating factors. The parties also jointly recommended a\nsanction of a stayed suspension. After a hearing before a three-member panel of\nthe board, the panel issued a report finding that Ryan had committed some of the\nmisconduct alleged and unanimously dismissing charges involving other rule\nviolations. The panel unanimously dismissed charges alleging that Ryan violated\nProf.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with a client about\nthe means by which a client's objectives are to be accomplished), 4.1(a)\n(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or\nlaw to a third person),1 and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct\nthat adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law). The panel then\nrecommended that Ryan be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with\n\n1. The panel unanimously dismissed one charged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 4.1(a) under Count 1 of\nthe complaint, but it did not dismiss a second charged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 4.1(a) under Count\n2 of the complaint.\n\n 2\n January Term, 2024\n\nthe suspension fully stayed on conditions. The board adopted the panel's findings\nof fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction.\n {¶ 4} After a review of the record, we adopt the board's findings of fact and\nmisconduct and the recommended sanction. We suspend Ryan from the practice\nof law in Ohio for one year, with the suspension fully stayed on the conditions that\nshe (1) serve a one-year period of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar\nR. V(21), with monitoring focused on law-practice management, (2) complete 12\nhours of continuing legal education (\"CLE\") focused on law-practice management\nand/or law-office technology within one year of the date of this disciplinary order,\nin addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, and (3) engage in no further\nmisconduct.\n MISCONDUCT\n Count 1: The Smith Matter\n {¶ 5} In 2015, Monique Smith retained Ryan to represent her in her divorce.\nA fee agreement that was executed between the two established that the\nrepresentation was limited to Ryan's securing a divorce decree for Smith and did\nnot include postdecree work, such as orders to divide marital property.\n {¶ 6} On October 13, 2017, the domestic-relations court issued the divorce\ndecree. In the decree, the court awarded Smith half of the marital portion of her\nformer husband's interest in his Ohio Public Employees Retirement (\"OPERS\")\naccount. However, Smith could not access her share of that account until the\ndomestic-relations court entered a division of property order (\"DOPO\") in the\ndivorce action.\n {¶ 7} On September 5, 2018, Smith sent a text message to Ryan requesting\nthat she finalize the DOPO. Ryan did not respond to that particular text. After\nroughly a year of limited, intermittent communications, Ryan finally quoted Smith\n$750 for the DOPO representation on November 13, 2019. Although she initially\ncould not afford this fee, Smith agreed to having Ryan pause her work on the case\n\n 3\n SUPREME COURT OF OHIO\n\nuntil Smith could pay the balance that she owed. Smith mustered the necessary\nfunds by January 28, 2020, and Ryan sent Smith a copy of the representation\nagreement for signature.\n {¶ 8} Ryan failed to complete the DOPO. Despite numerous—and\nsometimes desperate—pleas from Smith, Ryan continued to neglect Smith's case\nfor more than two and a half years. And throughout that time, Ryan reassured Smith\nthat she was making progress on the DOPO, saying things like \"I will get to it\ntoday!\" (December 17, 2020), \"I will be able to send it later this afternoon\"\n(February 4, 2021), and \"I am on it. I apologize for the delay. I will follow up\ntomorrow.\" (March 21, 2022).\n {¶ 9} By August 2022, Smith's frustration with Ryan was apparent, as she\ntexted Ryan: \"[I] paid for the [DOPO] 3 years ago.\" Ryan's continued inaction\neventually led Smith to file a grievance with relator on August 31, 2022. However,\nless than two weeks later, Smith sought to withdraw her grievance following a\nconversation she had with Ryan that led Smith to believe that Ryan could not\ncontinue to represent her unless Smith withdrew the grievance. Relator nonetheless\ncontinued its investigation into the matter. In a subsequent email to relator, Smith\nsaid that she hoped to \"dismiss the case\" against Ryan and that she \"did not agree\nto waive privileges.\" When Smith sent that email, she did not have a full\nunderstanding of the implication of waiving the attorney-client privilege.\n {¶ 10} Ryan finally filed a motion addressing the DOPO on October 18,\n2022, but as of April 2024, the DOPO was still pending before the domestic-\nrelations court.\n {¶ 11} Based on the evidence presented at the hearing and the stipulations\nof the parties, the board found by clear and convincing evidence that Ryan violated\nProf.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and\npromptness in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep a client\nreasonably informed about the status of a matter), and 1.4(b) (requiring a lawyer to\n\n 4\n January Term, 2024\n\nexplain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary for the client to make informed\ndecisions regarding the representation).\n Count 2: The Disciplinary Investigation\n {¶ 12} As noted above, on August 31, 2022, Smith filed a grievance against\nRyan based on Ryan's neglect and lack of communication. Then, on September 9,\n2022, Smith decided to withdraw her grievance, and she sent a letter to relator\ndeclaring: \"I have been in contact with Mrs. Ryan, and she has agreed to finish\nworking on my case.\" Then, in subsequent text messages between Smith and Ryan\nconcerning the DOPO, Smith stated: \"You asked me to take my complaint back,\nwhich I did the very next morning and I'm still waiting!\" The text messages\nindicate what amounts to a quid pro quo with Smith: in exchange for Smith's\nwithdrawing the grievance, Ryan would complete the work on her case.\n {¶ 13} Nevertheless, relator continued its investigation, and Ryan initially\nfailed to respond to relator's letter of inquiry regarding the grievance, as required\nby Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G). When she did respond on September 16, 2022, Ryan told\nrelator, \"I am concerned about how much of a response I can provide without\nviolating attorney/client privilege.\" Relator replied the same day, informing Ryan\nthat pursuant to Prof.Cond.R. 1.6(b)(5),2 she would not violate the attorney-client\nprivilege if during relator's investigation into Smith's grievance, Ryan disclosed\ninformation about her representation of Smith. Even so, Ryan refused to produce\n\n2. Prof.Cond.R. 1.6(b)(5) provides:\n\n (b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a\n client, including information protected by the attorney-client privilege under\n applicable law, to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary for any of\n the following purposes:\n ...\n (5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a\n controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal\n charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client\n was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding, including any\n disciplinary matter, concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.\n\n 5\n SUPREME COURT OF OHIO\n\ndocuments related to the representation, insisting that relator cite to specific rules\nor legal authorities that would permit her to comply without violating attorney-\nclient privilege. In a follow-up email to her request to withdraw the grievance she\nhad filed against Ryan, Smith again sought to end relator's investigation into\nRyan's misconduct. This time, Smith ended the letter by stating that she did \"not\nagree to waive privileges\" and that she would not give relator \"permission to\ncommunicate\" with her. Smith had added this language in accordance with Ryan's\nexplicit instruction, in which Ryan had asked Smith to \"update the letter to the CBA\nto include a line that [Smith did] not want to waive privilege.\" As Smith understood\nit, her refusal to waive the attorney-client privilege was needed \"to withdraw the\ncomplaint.\" Later, during her testimony at Ryan's disciplinary hearing in April\n2024, Smith confirmed that she had not had a problem with the disclosure of her\ninformation to relator.\n {¶ 14} Based on the evidence presented at the hearing and the stipulations\nof the parties, the board found by clear and convincing evidence that Ryan violated\nProf.Cond.R. 4.1(a) and 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct\ninvolving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). The panel unanimously\ndismissed the charge related to Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from\nengaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law).\n SANCTION\n {¶ 15} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all\nrelevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the\naggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions\nimposed in similar cases.\n {¶ 16} The parties stipulated and the board found that two aggravating\nfactors were present in this case: (1) prior discipline and (2) a pattern of misconduct.\nSee Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1) and (3). As for mitigating factors, the parties\nstipulated and the board found that Ryan: (1) made a timely, good faith effort to\n\n 6\n January Term, 2024\n\nmake restitution to Smith and to rectify the consequences of her misconduct, (2)\ndisplayed a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings before the\nboard, and (3) provided evidence of good character and reputation. See Gov.Bar\nR. V(13)(C)(3) through (5). Further, the board also considered the fact that Ryan\nhad subsequently worked on completing her representation of Smith without\ncharging her and that the delay in court proceedings in Smith's divorce case was at\nleast partially attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and Ryan's uncertainty about\nher potentially competing duties to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation while\nsimultaneously working to safeguard Smith's privileged information from falling\ninto the hands of an adverse party (i.e., Smith's former husband).\n {¶ 17} The board recommends that we suspend Ryan from the practice of\nlaw for one year, with the suspension fully stayed on the conditions that she (1)\nserve a one-year period of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R.\nV(21), with monitoring focused on law-practice management, (2) complete 12\nhours of CLE focused on law-practice management and/or law-office technology\nwithin one year of the date of this disciplinary order, in addition to the requirements\nof Gov.Bar R. X, and (3) engage in no further misconduct.\n {¶ 18} In determining the appropriate sanction for Ryan's misconduct, we\nbegin with the presumption that an actual suspension is warranted when an attorney\nengages in a course of conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or\nmisrepresentation. Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 1995-Ohio-261, syllabus.\nWe have, however, tempered this presumption in two sets of circumstances. See\nMahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Macala, 2024-Ohio-3158, ¶ 24. First, when the\nmisconduct is an isolated incident and not a course of misconduct, an otherwise\nunblemished legal career may warrant a lesser sanction. See Disciplinary Counsel\nv. Eisenberg, 1998-Ohio-472, ¶ 4. And second, if there is \"an abundance of\nmitigating evidence,\" a lesser sanction may be warranted as well. Disciplinary\nCounsel v. Markijohn, 2003-Ohio-4129, ¶ 8.\n\n 7\n SUPREME COURT OF OHIO\n\n {¶ 19} In addition to considering the presumptive sanction from\nFowerbaugh, the board also relied on Columbus Bar Assn. v. Bulson, 2023-Ohio-\n4258, and Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Arkow, 2022-Ohio-3209, among others, in making\nits recommendation.\n {¶ 20} In Bulson, a client retained Bulson to represent her in a domestic-\nrelations case. Bulson at ¶ 7. After the domestic-relations court entered an agreed\njudgment entry in January 2013, Bulson was tasked with preparing a qualified\ndomestic-relations order (\"QDRO\") to transfer a portion of his client's former\nhusband's 401(k) account to his client. Id. Bulson \"did not take the necessary\nactions to finalize the QDRO for more than eight years notwithstanding [the\nclient's] frequent inquiries and attempts to call him.\" Id. at ¶ 8.\n {¶ 21} We concluded that Bulson's misconduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3,\n1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), and 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as\npracticable with a client's reasonable requests for information). Bulson at ¶ 12.\nThree aggravating factors were present: prior discipline, a pattern of misconduct,\nand the vulnerability of and resulting harm to the client. Id. at ¶ 14. Mitigation\nincluded the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive and a cooperative attitude\ntoward the disciplinary proceedings. Id. We imposed an 18-month suspension,\nwith 12 months stayed on the condition that Bulson commit no further misconduct.\nId. at ¶ 33. We also ordered him to complete three hours of CLE focused on law-\noffice management and serve a one-year period of monitored probation. Id. Of\nnote, the board concluded that Bulson's conduct warranted an actual suspension\nbecause he had previously received a fully stayed suspension in a prior disciplinary\ncase. Id. at ¶ 17.\n {¶ 22} In Arkow, 2022-Ohio-3209, a client paid the attorney in November\n2019 to obtain a QDRO to divide her former husband's retirement account. Id. at\n¶ 5. Arkow falsely assured the client that he had submitted her information to a\ncompany that would prepare the QDRO and was waiting for it to be processed,\n\n 8\n January Term, 2024\n\ndelaying the matter for over a year. Id. at ¶ 6-7. Eventually, the client informed\nArkow that she was going to file a grievance against him, after which Arkow\nattempted to mislead the client by backdating documents related to the QDRO. Id.\nat ¶ 7. Arkow then falsely assured the relator that he had timely submitted the\nclient's payment and documents for the QDRO. Id. Arkow engaged in a similar\npattern of misconduct with a second client's QDRO beginning in March 2020. Id.\nat ¶ 10.\n {¶ 23} We concluded that Arkow's misconduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3,\n1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 8.1(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false\nstatement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter), and 8.4(c). Id.\nat ¶ 9-10. As aggravating factors, there was prior discipline, a dishonest or selfish\nmotive, a pattern of misconduct, the commission of multiple offenses, and the\nsubmission of false evidence and false statements during the disciplinary process.\nId. at ¶ 12. Mitigation included timely restitution to the affected clients, full and\nfree disclosure to the board, and evidence of good character. Id. at ¶ 13. We\nsuspended Arkow from the practice of law for two years, with one year stayed on\nthe conditions that he commit no further misconduct; engage in regular mental-\nhealth treatment as recommended by a qualified healthcare professional; and\ncomplete eight hours of CLE, with a focus on QDROs, ethics, and law-office\nmanagement. Id. at ¶ 22. Like the attorney in Bulson, Arkow had previously been\ndisciplined and had received a fully stayed one-year suspension. Id. at ¶ 1.\n {¶ 24} In addition to the caselaw relied on by the board, Dayton Bar Assn.\nv. Ellison, 2008-Ohio-1808, is also instructive here. In Ellison, the attorney never\nfollowed through with a client's divorce case, failing to obtain a QDRO after she\n\"‘kind of gave up' \" on the matter when it became too complicated. Id. at ¶ 6.\nAdditionally, in her representation of a second client, Ellison neglected the client's\nemployment-discrimination case and subsequently misled the client about the\nstatus of the case, telling the client that she \"‘didn't know anything' \" about an\n\n 9\n SUPREME COURT OF OHIO\n\nadverse judgment that had been entered against the client. Id. at ¶ 7-9. Only when\ndirectly confronted by the client did Ellison admit that she had known for months\nthat summary judgment had been entered against the client. Id. at ¶ 9.\n {¶ 25} We concluded that Ellison's misconduct violated former Code of\nProfessional Responsibility rules DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 1-102(A)(6), and DR 6-\n101(A)(3), because she had failed to diligently pursue two client matters and misled\none client about the disposition in her case. Id. at ¶ 6, 12; see also Prof.Cond.R.\nAppendix A (former DR 1-102(A)(4) is substantially similar to Prof.Cond.R.\n8.4(c); former DR 1-102(A)(6) is substantially similar to Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h);\nformer DR 6-101(A)(3) is substantially similar to Prof.Cond.R. 1.3). We noted that\nEllison had been publicly reprimanded but that the discipline had been imposed\nnearly 20 years earlier. Ellison at ¶ 15. Mitigating factors included cooperation in\nthe disciplinary process and evidence of good character and reputation. Id. at ¶ 16.\nWe imposed a fully stayed one-year suspension on the conditions that Ellison serve\na one-year term of monitored probation and complete a CLE course on law-office\nmanagement. Id. We declined to impose an actual suspension for her dishonest\nconduct because there was sufficient mitigating evidence. Id. at ¶ 13-16 (finding\nthat sufficient mitigating evidence warranted a stayed suspension).\n {¶ 26} In the case now before us, Ryan's misconduct is comparable to the\nethical violations in Bulson, Arkow, and Ellison. As in other cases involving\ndishonesty by an attorney, we begin with the presumption from Fowerbaugh, 1995-\nOhio-261, that an actual suspension is warranted here. Ryan violated Prof.Cond.R.\n8.4(c) when she misled Smith and relator about the waiver of the attorney-client\nprivilege and other matters related to Smith's grievance. Even so, as explained\nabove, we have recognized that a lesser sanction may be appropriate when the\nattorney presents sufficient mitigating evidence. See Macala, 2024-Ohio-3158, at\n¶ 24; Markijohn, 2003-Ohio-4129, at ¶ 8. And here, there is sufficient mitigating\nevidence to warrant a fully stayed suspension. In addition to the mitigating factors\n\n 10\n January Term, 2024\n\npresent here, Ryan's delay was at least partially attributable to the COVID-19\npandemic, and she has since worked toward completing her representation of Smith\nwithout charge.\n {¶ 27} However, alongside the Fowerbaugh presumption, Bulson provides\nan additional basis for an actual suspension in certain cases: an attorney's\nmisconduct may warrant an actual suspension when the attorney's sanction in a\nprior disciplinary matter was a fully stayed suspension. Bulson, 2023-Ohio-4258,\nat ¶ 17 (imposing an actual suspension after recognizing that the fully stayed\nsuspension for prior misconduct had not adequately protected the public); see also\nArkow, 2022-Ohio-3209, at ¶ 1, 22 (sanction included an actual suspension after\nprior one-year suspension that was fully stayed on conditions). By contrast, when\nan attorney's prior sanction involved only a public reprimand, a fully stayed\nsuspension with conditions may be appropriate in a subsequent disciplinary matter.\nSee, e.g., Ellison, 2008-Ohio-1808, at ¶ 15-16 (prior public reprimand and\nsubsequent discipline of fully stayed suspension with conditions). Ryan's only\nprior discipline is a 2015 public reprimand. Therefore, in addition to our\ndetermination that Ryan has offered sufficient mitigating evidence to warrant a\nlesser sanction in accord with the exceptions to the Fowerbaugh presumption set\nout in Macala, we conclude that Ryan's prior discipline does not warrant an actual\nsuspension under our holdings in Bulson and Arkow.\n {¶ 28} Ryan's misconduct included violations of Prof.Cond.R. 4.1(a) and\n8.4(c) by being dishonest with her client and relator. As such, her misconduct is\nmost analogous to the misconduct in Ellison, in which the attorney deceived a client\nin addition to neglecting client matters. In Ellison we imposed a one-year\nsuspension, fully stayed on conditions. We agree with the board that the same\nsanction is warranted for Ryan's misconduct.\n {¶ 29} We do not condone Ryan's neglect of a client matter, her failure to\nreasonably communicate with a client, and her false statements to her client and\n\n 11\n SUPREME COURT OF OHIO\n\nrelator. But in accord with our holdings in Fowerbaugh, Macala, and Bulson, we\nconclude that a fully stayed one-year suspension, with the conditions recommended\nby the board, will adequately protect the public from future misconduct. See\nCleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Mariotti, 2019-Ohio-5191, ¶ 27; see also\nDisciplinary Counsel v. Carter, 2023-Ohio-3992, ¶ 31 (\"The primary purpose of\nattorney discipline is not to punish the offender but to protect the public against\nmembers of the bar who are unworthy of the trust and confidence essential to the\nattorney-client relationship.\").\n CONCLUSION\n {¶ 30} Accordingly, Corinne Noelle Ryan is suspended from the practice of\nlaw in Ohio for one year, with the suspension stayed in its entirety on the conditions\nthat she (1) serve a one-year period of monitored probation in accordance with\nGov.Bar R. V(21), with monitoring focused on law-practice management, (2)\ncomplete 12 hours of CLE focused on law-practice management and/or law-office\ntechnology within one year of the date of this disciplinary order, in addition to the\nrequirements of Gov.Bar R. X, and (3) engage in no further misconduct. If Ryan\nfails to comply with any condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and she will\nserve the full one-year suspension. Costs are taxed to Ryan.\n Judgment accordingly.\n __________________\n Holly Wolf and Kent R. Markus, Bar Counsel; Vorys, Sater, Seymour and\nPease, L.L.P., and Elizabeth Thym Smith; and The Piacentino Law Group and Gina\nM. Piacentino, for relator.\n Montgomery Jonson, L.L.P., George D. Jonson, and Lindsay M. Upton, for\nrespondent.\n __________________\n\n 12", "publication_date": "2024-01-01", "publication_status": "public", "record_id": "rec:v1:50aa3c3f-4bdb-7a25-861e-bded5b215bb2", "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "source_locators": [ { "artifact_id": "art:v1:2a077e9d-700c-7784-8708-09e9a6013735", "locator": "full-text", "quote_sha256": "b499a481e5a53ce8f11453babc8d451965416a76d44307af5a79fc4a39567565" } ], "status": "current", "structure_sha256": "b499a481e5a53ce8f11453babc8d451965416a76d44307af5a79fc4a39567565", "text_scope": { "excludes": [ "footer", "navigation", "annotations", "headnotes", "summaries", "editorial_content" ], "includes": [ "opinion_body" ] }, "version_id": "ver:v1:b934b202-65b8-7fec-85ff-ef64497d69a3" } }