{ "artifacts": [ { "artifact_id": "art:v1:018f2a00-7b3c-7003-8def-244300000001", "byte_length": 383173, "canonical_url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-43_2b35.pdf", "collector_version": "1.0.0", "content_encoding": null, "current_through_text": null, "discovery_url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-43_2b35.pdf", "fetch_disposition": "new", "final_url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-43_2b35.pdf", "http_headers": {}, "http_status": 200, "kind": "raw_artifact", "mime_type": "application/pdf", "object_uri": "urn:lexyalgo:public-artifact:art:v1:018f2a00-7b3c-7003-8def-244300000001", "privacy_class": "public_primary_law", "publisher_date": null, "raw_sha256": "43a1a329994be812c65f8b6f6bfd8c78f746b893b1ae3357510c603d44842fca", "redirect_chain": [], "registry_revision": 1, "request_url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-43_2b35.pdf", "retrieval_method": "pdf", "retrieved_at": "2026-08-01T16:18:23Z", "rights_decision_ref": "src:v1:us-federal:opinion:scotus@1", "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "source_id": "src:v1:us-federal:opinion:scotus", "source_reported_status": "official" } ], "contract_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "data_as_of": "2026-08-01T16:18:23Z", "defects": [], "graph_edges": [], "kind": "proof_bundle", "reconciliations": [], "record": { "authority_type": "opinion", "body": "Supreme Court of the United States", "canonical_key": { "court": "scotus", "decision_date": "2026-06-30", "docket": "24-43" }, "citation_aliases": [ { "confidence": 1.0, "display_value": "No. 24-43", "normalized_value": "24-43", "scheme": "docket", "source_id": "src:v1:us-federal:opinion:scotus" } ], "created_at": "2026-08-01T16:18:23Z", "heading": null, "identity_state": "complete", "jurisdiction": "us-federal", "kind": "authority_record", "record_id": "auth:v1:us-federal:opinion:scotus:24-43:2026-06-30", "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "title": "West Virginia v. B. P. J." }, "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "verification": { "active_defect_ids": [], "as_of": "2026-08-01", "computed_at": "2026-08-01T16:18:23Z", "currentness": "Slip opinion retrieved August 1, 2026; subject to formal revision", "grade": "B", "input_sha256": "ec7b55d9debc886437ce79bd7cecdc1537ceaa95d20fa52a2010c4ca54741c26", "kind": "verification", "limitations": [ "Final/reported status is not established." ], "official_receipts": [ { "artifact_id": "art:v1:018f2a00-7b3c-7003-8def-244300000001", "locator": "majority-opinion:1-29", "quote_sha256": "8af3d4a57d05ed68bf5b8848c2665982aa92f8b7be1e87061e5d9170f4f88e54" } ], "policy_version": "grade-policy-v1", "reason": "Official source matched, but rendition finality is slip and remains revision-sensitive.", "reason_code": "official_case_revision_sensitive", "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "source_classes": [ "official-publisher" ], "verified_at": "2026-08-01", "version_id": "ver:v1:d1aef83f-3106-70da-8bd7-62cb0fd12ca5" }, "version": { "change_type": "initial", "current_through": "Slip opinion retrieved August 1, 2026; subject to formal revision", "decision_date": "2026-06-30", "effective_date": null, "effective_date_state": "not_applicable", "finality_status": "slip", "kind": "authority_version", "legal_valid_from": "2026-06-30", "legal_valid_until": null, "normalization_warnings": [ "PDF text preserves source lineation." ], "normalized_text_sha256": "8af3d4a57d05ed68bf5b8848c2665982aa92f8b7be1e87061e5d9170f4f88e54", "observed_at": "2026-08-01T16:18:23Z", "parser_id": "scotus-slip-pdf-normalizer", "parser_version": "1.0.0", "primary_text": "JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court. \nTitle IX transformed American sports and American life.\nEnacted in 1972, that landmark law promoted equal \nopportunity for female student-athletes and has facilitated \nthe extraordinary growth of women’s and girls’ sports over \nthe past 54 years.\nTo provide equal opportunity for female athletes, schools \ndo not merely maintain, for example, one soccer team, one\nbasketball team, one ice hockey team, and one lacrosse\nteam that are equally open to female and male athletes.\nThat approach would deny equal opportunity to female\nathletes because, as all ag ree, females and males have \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \ninherent physical differenc es relevant to athletic \nperformance.\nThose “[p]hysical differences between men and women”\nare “enduring.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, \n533 (1996). The differences include, among other things, \nheight, weight, strength, speed, endurance, and jumping \nability. Therefore, in contact sports, forcing female athletes \nto compete against males can create significant safety risks. \nAnd in virtually all competitive sports, forcing female\nathletes to compete against males can undermine \ncompetitive fairness.\nTo ensure equal opportunity for female athletes, schools \ntherefore typically maintain separate women’s and men’s \nsports teams. Women’s teams compete against other\nwomen’s teams, and men’s teams compete against other \nmen’s teams. To ensure equal opportunity, Title IX’s\nregulations also require schools to provide the women’s and\nmen’s teams equivalent equipment, facilities, scheduling, \nand the like. \nIn recent years, some biological males who identify as\nfemale have sought to play on women’s or girls’ sports \nteams. That modern deve lopment has triggered national \nand international concerns about safety and competitive\nfairness for female athletes, as well as related worries about \npreserving equal opportunity for women and girls to play \nsports. For those reasons, 27 States—as well as the \nInternational Olympic Committee, the United States\nOlympic and Paralympic Committee, and the NCAA—have\nbanned all biological males from competing in women’s and \ngirls’ sports. \nThese cases concern two of those state laws, from West \nVirginia and Idaho. The question before the Court is:\nUnder Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the \nFourteenth Amendment, may schools maintain women’s \nand girls’ sports for biological females? In other words, may \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nschools determine eligibility for women’s and girls’ sports\nbased on biological sex? The answer is yes.1 \nI \nA \nPrior to Title IX’s enactment in 1972, the participation of \nthe two sexes in American sports was badly skewed. In the \n1971–1972 school year, only about 300,000 high school girls \nplayed sports. Meanwhile, about 3.6 million high school\nboys played sports. The situation was similarly imbalanced \nat the college level. See NCAA, Title IX 50th Anniversary: \nThe State of Women in College Sports 15, 17. \nThe low female participation rate was the byproduct of\novert sex discrimination, as well as mistaken stereotyping \nof American women and girls. Men and boys usually\nreceived more encouragement and more opportunities to \nplay sports than women and girls. And male sports teams\ntypically received more funding and resources than female \nteams. As of 1972, for exampl e, women’s sports reportedly \naccounted for only 2% of annual college athletics spending.\n130 Cong. Rec. S4601 (Apr. 12, 1984) (remarks of Sen. \nStevens).\nIn 1972, in a belated but historic response to persistent \ndiscrimination against women in educational institutions, \nincluding in athletics, Congress passed and President\nNixon signed Title IX of the Education Amendments of\n1972. Title IX prohibits “discrimination under any \n—————— \n1 As the plaintiffs, the States, and the United States as amicus curiae \nall agree, these cases do not present the distinct question of whether, \nunder Title IX and the Equal Pr otection Clause, schools may allow \nbiological males who identify as fe male to participate on girls’ and \nwomen’s sports teams. That question is currently the subject of litigation \nin some lower courts. Nothing in this opinion is intended to decide that \nquestion. In addition, nothing in th is opinion should be interpreted to\naddress or limit participation by biological females on male or co-ed \nsports teams. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n4 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \neducation program or activity receiving Federal financial\nassistance” “on the basis of sex.” 20 U. S. C. §1681(a).\nFew laws have been as effective and consequential in day-\nto-day American life as Title IX. Every day across America, \ngyms, fields, and other sports venues are filled with female\nathletes competing fiercely in youth, high school, college, \nand professional sports. About 3.5 million high school girls \nnow play sports. Nat. Federation of State High School \nAssns., 2024–2025 High School Athletics Participation\nSurvey, p. 57 (Aug. 22, 2025). An additional 235,000 \nwomen play competitively in college. NCAA, Title IX 50th \nAnniversary: The State of Women in College Sports 16–17; \nNCAA, Sports Sponsorship and Participation Rates Report, \np. 94 (Sept. 4, 2025). \nParticipation in sports has enabled countless American\nwomen and girls to be on a team, to take part in the human\ndrama of athletic competition, to overcome the agony of\ndefeat and know the thrill of victory. And those lessons and \nexperiences in sports have empowered millions of American \nwomen who have gone on to thrive in all aspects of \nAmerican life. \nB \nOver the past several years, some biological males who \nidentify as female have sought to play various women’s and \ngirls’ sports. Some of them have taken, as relevant here: \n(i) puberty-blocking drugs that suppress the rise of puberty-\ninducing hormones; or (ii) cross-sex hormones and other \ndrugs, such as those that suppress testosterone or increase \nestrogen, sometimes called hormone therapy. (For ease of \nreference, we will refer to puberty blockers and hormones.) \nThose biological males conten d that by taking puberty \nblockers or hormones, they can mitigate the physical \nadvantages inherent to their bi ological sex, as relevant to \nsports. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nIntense policy and legal disputes have ensued over \nwhether biological males should be allowed to play on\nwomen’s and girls’ sports teams. Many athletic \norganizations and States have recently acted decisively to\nprohibit all biological males from participating in women’s \nsports—that is, to limit women’s and girls’ teams to\nbiological females.\nIn 2025, the NCAA prohibited biological male students,\nincluding those who identify as female and have taken \nhormones, from competing on women’s teams. The U. S. \nOlympic and Paralympic Committee followed suit, likewise \nprohibiting biological males from competing in women’s \nsports. NCAA, Participation Policy for Transgender\nStudent-Athletes (Feb. 6, 2025); USOPC, Athlete Safety \nPolicy §3.3 (June 18, 2025). \nMore recently, the International Olympic Committee \nsimilarly limited Olympic parti cipation in women’s sports \nto biological females. The IO C did so in order to “protect \nfairness in such sports and events, as well as safety \nparticularly in contact sports.” The IOC found that \nbiological males possess a “performance advantage in all \nsports and events that rely on strength, power, and/or\nendurance,” including a “20+ per cent” advantage in “most \nthrowing and jumping events,” a “10-12 per cent” \nadvantage in “most running and swimming events,” and a \n“greater than 100 per cent” advantage in “events that \ninvolve explosive power.” IOC, Policy on the Protection of\nthe Female (Women’s) Category in Olympic Sport and\nGuiding Considerations for International Federations and \nSports Governing Bodies 2, 3 (Mar. 26, 2026).\nMoreover, the IOC found that “athletes retain Male \nperformance advantage due in part to training effects and \nfixed traits. There is no current evidence that testosterone \nsuppression or gender-affirming hormone treatment \neliminates this advantage.” Id., at 3. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n6 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nMost relevant for present purposes: In the past six years, \n27 States have enacted laws that maintain women’s and \ngirls’ sports for biological females. These cases concern two \nof those state laws, from West Virginia and Idaho. \nC \nWest Virginia has long authorized sex-separated school\nsports teams “where selection for such teams is based upon\ncompetitive skill.” W. Va. Code Rule §127–2–3.8 (2025). In \n2021, the West Virginia Legislature passed and Governor \nJustice signed the Save Women’s Sports Act. The Save \nWomen’s Sports Act prohibits male students from playing\non female teams. W. Va. Code Ann. §§18–2–25d(c)(2)–(3) \n(2022).\nThe law specifies that sex is determined by biology.\n§§18–2–25d(a)(4), (b)(1). The legislature expressly found \nthat prohibiting biological male participation in female \nsports is necessary to promote equal athletic opportunities\nfor women and girls. See §§18–2–25d(a)(1), (3), (5).\nB. P. J. is a biological male who identifies as female. In \nthird grade, B. P. J. socially transitioned and adopted a new \nname. Soon thereafter, B. P. J. took puberty blockers to \nprevent male puberty, and in sixth grade, B. P. J. also \nbegan to take hormones.\nShortly after passage of the West Virginia law, as B. P. J.\nwas about to enter sixth grade, B. P. J.’s middle school \nprincipal informed B. P. J.’s mother that B. P. J. could not \nparticipate on the girls’ cross-country and track-and-field \nteams. B. P. J. is now in high school, where the same \npolicies apply. \nB. P. J. sued West Virginia officials and agencies for \nalleged violations of Title IX and the Equal Protection\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U. S. District \nCourt for the Southern District of West Virginia granted\nsummary judgment for the State on both claims. On \nappeal, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n7 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nreversed on the Title IX issue and remanded for further \nfact-finding on the Equal Protection Clause claim. 98 F. 4th \n542 (2024). This Court granted certiorari. 606 U. S. 959 \n(2025).\nDuring the ongoing litigation, B. P. J. competed on the \nteams. Recently, B. P. J. won the West Virginia Class AAA\nhigh school state championship in girls’ shot put and \nfinished fourth in girls’ discus. B. P. J. won the Region 2 \nchampionship in both events. See Supp. Letter of W. Va. in \nNo. 24–43 (May 29, 2026). \nD \nIn 2020, the Idaho Legislature passed and Governor\nLittle signed the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act. Like the \nWest Virginia law, the Idaho law prohibits male students\nfrom participating on female teams. Idaho Code Ann. §33– \n6203. \nThe Idaho law states that sex is determined by biology. \nIbid. And the law declares that “separate sex-specific \nteams furthers efforts to promote sex equality . . . by\nproviding opportunities for female athletes.” §33–6202(12) \n(2025). It also recognizes the ph ysical differences between \nbiological males and biological females. §§33–6202(1)–(5), \n(7), (8), (10)–(12).\nThe law further found that the benefit “that natural \ntestosterone provides to male athletes is not diminished \nthrough the use of puberty blockers and cross-sex \nhormones. §33–6202(11). \nHecox is a biological male who identifies as female. \nHecox underwent male puberty. In college, Hecox began to \ntake hormones. Hecox attends Boise State University and\nhas competed for the women’s club soccer team. Hecox also \nhas tried out for the women’s Division I track and cross-\ncountry teams. \nShortly after Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s \nSports Act, Hecox sued Idaho officials and agencies, \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n8 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nalleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The \nU. S. District Court for the District of Idaho granted a \npreliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Fairness\nin Women’s Sports Act, and the U. S. Court of Appeals for \nthe Ninth Circuit affirmed. 104 F. 4th 1061 (2023). This \nCourt granted certiorari. 606 U. S. 959 (2025). \nII \nWe first address the Title IX issue, which is raised only \nby B. P. J. in the West Virginia case. B. P. J. argues that \nthe State and school officials violated Title IX by excluding \nB. P. J. from the girls’ cross-country and track-and-field \nteams. Under Title IX, according to B. P. J., schools must\nallow biological males who identify as female and have \ntaken puberty blockers or hormones to compete on girls’ \nsports teams. We respectfully disagree. \nA \nPassed by Congress and signed by President Nixon in\n1972, Title IX provides: “No person in the United States \nshall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, \nbe denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination\nunder any education program or activity receiving Federal\nfinancial assistance.” 20 U. S. C. §1681(a).\nAs originally enacted, Title IX did not explicitly address \nsports. Two years after Title IX became law, Congress\npassed and President Ford signed what is known as the\nJavits Amendment. The Javits Amendment directed the \nthen-Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) \nto promptly issue “regulations implementing the provisions \nof ” Title IX with respect to “the prohibition of sex \ndiscrimination.” §844, 88 Stat. 612. The amendment \nfurther specified that the regulations “shall include with \nrespect to” “athletic activities reasonable provisions \nconsidering the nature of particular sports .” Ibid. \n(emphasis added). \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n9 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nIn 1975, pursuant to that statutory directive, HEW\npromulgated comprehensive regulations to prevent sex\ndiscrimination in school sports. 40 Fed. Reg. 24128. Most \ncritically, the regulations required that schools provide\n“equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes” and \nauthorized “separate teams for members of each sex where \nselection for such teams is bas ed upon competitive skill or \nthe activity involved is a contact sport.” 34 CFR \n§§106.41(b), (c) (2025). The regulations defined contact \nsports as “boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, \nbasketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of \nwhich involves bodily contact.” Ibid. \nThose regulations took effect on July 21, 1975, and they\nremain in place today. Because HEW’s interpretation of\nTitle IX was “issued contemporaneously with the statute”\nand has “remained consistent over time,” it is “especially \nuseful in determining the statute’s meaning.” Loper Bright \nEnterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 394 (2024).\n2 \nB \nThe question is whether Title IX permits schools to\nmaintain women’s and girls’ sports for biological females.\nThe answer is yes.\nTitle IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Title \nIX’s implementing regulations expressly permit schools to \nmaintain separate teams for “members of each sex.” \n—————— \n2 In relevant part, §106.41 of the regulations states: \n“(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the re quirements of paragraph\n(a) of this section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for\nmembers of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon\ncompetitive skill or the acti vity involved is a contact sport. . . . For the \npurposes of this part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice \nhockey, football, basketball and ot her sports the purpose or major\nactivity of which involves bodily contact. \n “(c) Equal opportunity . A recipient which operates or sponsors \ninterscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide\nequal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.” \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n10 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \n§106.41(b). The term “sex” in the 1972 Title IX statute, the \n1974 Javits Amendment, and the 1975 Title IX regulations \ncannot plausibly be interprete d to refer to anything other \nthan biological sex. The ordinary meaning of the term “sex” \nat the time of enactment in the early 1970s was biological \nsex and not gender identity, particularly in the sports \ncontext. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson , 411 U. S. 677, \n686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“sex” is “an immutable \ncharacteristic”). \nIn addition, the Title IX regulations allowed separate \nsports teams precisely because of the biological differences\nbetween the sexes—namely, the inherent physical\ndifferences between biological women and biological men. \nFor example, the regulations authorized separate women’s\nand girls’ teams in sports when the teams are “based upon\ncompetitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport.” \n§106.41(b). By referring to co ntact sports and competitive \nskill, the regulations plainly recognized the inherent \nphysical differences between biological men and biological\nwomen—as well as the safety and competitive fairness \nconcerns that would arise if males were allowed to compete\nin female sports. As Justice Stevens explained a few years \nafterwards: “Without a gender-based classification in\ncompetitive contact sports, there would be a substantial \nrisk that boys would dominate the girls’ programs and deny\nthem an equal opportunity to compete in interscholastic\nevents.” O’Connor v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. 23 , 449 \nU. S. 1301, 1307 (1980) (in chambers).\nNotably, B. P. J. does not seriously contest that the term\n“sex” in Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the \nregulations means biological sex. Moreover, B. P. J. agrees \nwith West Virginia and the United States as amicus curiae \nthat Title IX permits schools to maintain separate female\nand male teams and to prohibit most biological males from\nplaying on women’s and girls’ teams. B. P. J. disagrees \nwith West Virginia and the United States only about \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n11 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nwhether schools must make an exception to that general\nrule for biological males who identify as female and have\ntaken puberty blockers or hormones.\nBut the texts of Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the \nTitle IX regulations do not say (or even hint) that schools \nmust allow certain biological males to participate in\nwomen’s and girls’ sports. Nor do the statute or regulations\nsay that schools must make an exception for those biological \nmales who identify as female and have taken puberty \nblockers or hormones. Put simply, the statute and \nregulations do not speak to that issue in a way that could \nproperly be interpreted to require schools to allow biological\nmales to participate in women’s and girls’ sports. \nB. P. J. counters with an argument based on the 1974 \nJavits Amendment. B. P. J. zeroes in on the Javits \nAmendment’s directive that HEW, in its regulations, adopt \n“reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular \nsports.” §844, 88 Stat. 612 (emphasis added). As B. P. J. \nsees things, if the regulation s authorize a school to limit \nwomen’s and girls’ sports teams to biological females, then\nthe regulations are not “reasonable” and therefore are\nunlawful. \nWe disagree. Separate sports teams for biological males\nand biological females are reasonable: Given the inherent \nphysical differences between the sexes, allowing only \nbiological females to play on women’s and girls’ teams can \nreduce the risk of physical injury and ensure fair \ncompetition. True, some might prefer a different rule\nallowing biological males who identify as female to \nparticipate on women’s and girls’ sports teams, at least in \ncertain circumstances. But it was surely “reasonable” for \nHEW in 1975 to draw a biological line—a line where \nbiological males play only on male sports teams and only\nbiological females play on female sports teams. Even in \nrecent years, 27 States, the NCAA, the USOPC, and the\nIOC have all drawn the same line. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nIn assessing the reasonableness of the regulations, we\nalso must recognize the distinctiveness of competitive\nsports—and the safety and competitive fairness issues that\ncan arise when females are forced to compete against \nmales. \nWith respect to safety, allowi ng biological males to play \non women’s and girls’ sports teams can put women and girls\nat significant risk of injuries. The safety risks are\nparticularly severe in contact sports. \nAnd as to competitive fairness, allowing biological males\nto play on women’s and girls’ sports teams can put female\nathletes at a serious disadvantag e. That is because sports\nare generally zero sum. Allowi ng a biological male athlete \nto compete on a girls’ team necessarily displaces or\ndisadvantages a female athlete—replacing her on the \nroster, knocking her out of the starting lineup, reducing her\nplaying time, depriving her of a medal, and the like. That \nhard reality of sports cannot be ignored or swept under the \nrug. On the contrary, that reality must and does inform \ninterpretation of the term “reasonable” in the Javits \nAmendment. \nWhether biological males may participate on women’s \nand girls’ sports teams may be a debated policy question.\nBut the legal question for Title IX purposes is whether West \nVirginia may limit women’s and girls’ sports teams to \nbiological females. As a matter of text and history, West \nVirginia may do so. \nC \nB. P. J. advances two other Title IX-related arguments\nthat warrant brief mention. \nFirst, B. P. J. contends that the school’s policy violates \nTitle IX because the policy effectively excludes B. P. J. from \nany competitive sports teams at the school. B. P. J. has \ntaken puberty blockers and hormones, meaning that\nB. P. J. apparently will no longer be strong or fast enough \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n13 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nto compete successfully against boys. Moreover, B. P. J. \nmight not want to compete against boys. Either way, it is \nan unhappy occasion whenever a student who wants to play\nschool sports cannot do so. We appreciate the desire of \nevery student, including B. P. J., who wants to play school \nsports. And we recognize that student-athletes are\nunderstandably disappointed and upset when they do not\nmake a team or otherwise cannot participate. But the Title \nIX regulations guarantee “equal athletic opportunity.” The \nregulations cannot and do not guarantee every student a \nspot on a team’s roster. \nSecond, B. P. J. cites Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of\n1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1), and Bostock as support for\ninterpreting Title IX to require that schools allow biological \nmales on female teams. Title VII prohibits employment\ndiscrimination “because of . . . sex,” and Bostock held that \nthe prohibition forbids firing an employee “for being gay or\ntransgender.” Bostock v. Clayton County , 590 U. S. 644, \n662 (2020). B. P. J. contends that Title IX similarly bars\nWest Virginia’s law because (as B. P. J. sees things) the law \nexcludes B. P. J. from sports on the basis of gender identity. \nWe disagree. Title VII concerns employment, whereas \nTitle IX as relevant here focuses on sports. The two factual \ncontexts are vastly different. And the two statutes are also \n“vastly different.” Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed. , 544 \nU. S. 167, 175 (2005). In the workplace, Title VII generally\nrequires that men and women be treated without regard to\ntheir sex. In the sports context, by contrast, Title IX \nauthorizes separate men’s and women’s sports teams. And \nbecause Title IX permits separate teams, the only question \nhere is whether schools may limit women’s and girls’ sports\nto biological females—a question that was not addressed by \nBostock, as the Court expressly noted. See 590 U. S., at 681 \n(we “do not purport to address bathrooms, locker rooms, or \nanything else of the kind”). Stated simply, Title VII and \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n14 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nBostock are not relevant in this very different statutory and \nfactual context. \nIn sum, Title IX allows schools to provide separate\nwomen’s and men’s sports teams defined by biological sex.\nConsistent with Title IX, West Virginia has permissibly\nmaintained women’s and girls’ sports for biological females. \nIII \nWe next address the constitutional challenges to the\nWest Virginia and Idaho laws under the Equal Protection \nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both B. P. J. and \nHecox raise an equal protection argument. They contend \nthat the States violated the Equal Protection Clause by \nmaintaining female sports teams for biological females. \nAgain, we respectfully disagree.\n3 \n—————— \n3 After this Court granted review, Hecox filed a suggestion of mootness\nstating that Hecox will “cease play ing women’s sports in any context \ncovered by” the Idaho law. App. to Suggestion of Mootness, Decl. of L.\nHecox in No. 24–38, ¶6 (Sept. 1, 2025). As the party asserting mootness,\nHecox bears the “formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear\nthe . . . behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Already, \nLLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. 85, 91 (2013) (quotation marks omitted). \nHecox has been a student at Boise State University since 2019 and is\nstill enrolled there. At Boise State, Hecox has competed on the women’s \nclub soccer team and has sought to try out for the Division I women’s \ntrack and cross-country teams. In 2022, Hecox stated in a declaration to \nthe Court of Appeals: “I intend to play for the BSU’s Women’s Club \nSoccer Team this semester, next semester, and through the remainder of \nmy time at BSU.” Decl. of L. Hecox in No. 20–35813 etc., ¶21 (CA9, Sept. \n21, 2022) (emphasis added). \nOnly in September 2025, after this Court granted certiorari, did Hecox\narticulate a different view about playing competitive sports at Boise \nState. But that shift may not be pe rmanent, particularly given Hecox’s \nprior change in position. Cf. Erie v. Pap’s A. M., 529 U. S. 277, 287–288 \n(2000). Moreover, post-certiorari actions that would “insulate a decision\nfrom review by this Court must be viewed with a critical eye.” Knox v. \nService Employees, 567 U. S. 298, 307 (2012). \nHecox remains an enrolled student at Boise State. Hecox’s case is not \nmoot. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nA \nRatified in 1868, the Equal Protection Clause provides\nthat no State shall deny “to any person within its\njurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U. S. Const., \nAmdt. 14. That command “must coexist with the practical \nnecessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or \nanother, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or\npersons.” United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U. S. 495, 509 \n(2025) (quotation marks omitted).\nUnder this Court’s equal protection precedents, laws that\nclassify by sex are subject to what is known as intermediate \nscrutiny: Sex-based classifications are permissible only \nwhen the classification is “substantially related” to \nachieving an “important” government objective. Id., at 510 \n(quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. \nVirginia, 518 U. S. 515, 532–533 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., for \nthe Court); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. \n718, 724–725 (1982) (O’Connor, J., for the Court).\nThe West Virginia and Idaho laws authorize separate\nfemale and male sports teams. And the laws limit women’s \nand girls’ sports teams to biological females. In doing so,\nthe laws make a sex-based classification that triggers \nintermediate scrutiny.\nSo the equal protection questions become: What are the \nStates’ interests in maintaining separate teams for males \nand females, and in limiting female teams to biological \nfemales? And is the States’ sex-based classification—that \nis, the limitation of women’s and girls’ sports teams to\nbiological females—substantially related to those interests? \nThe States start with the undisputed proposition that \nbiological males generally possess inherent physical\nadvantages in sports—in heig ht, weight, strength, speed, \nendurance, jumping ability, and the like. See United States \nv. Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533 (“Physical differences between \nmen and women . . . are enduring”). Therefore, the States \nsay, limiting women’s and girls’ sports to biological females \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n16 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \n(i) helps prevent serious physical injuries to female athletes \nand (ii) preserves opportunities for female athletes to fairly \ncompete and succeed. And more broadly, the States\narticulate the objective of promoting “equal athletic\nopportunities for the female sex”—that is, to provide \nopportunities for biological women and girls to compete only \nagainst other biological women and girls. W. Va. Code Ann. \n§18–2–25d(a)(5); see also Idaho Code Ann. §33–6202(12) \n(“Having separate sex-specific teams furthers efforts to \npromote sex equality” “by providing opportunities for \nfemale athletes to demonstrate their skill, strength, and \nathletic abilities”).\nWith respect to safety, the States say that allowing\nbiological males to play on women’s sports teams puts\nwomen and girls at significant risk of sometimes severe\ninjuries. The safety risks are at their apex in contact sports,\nsuch as soccer, basketball, field hockey, lacrosse, and ice \nhockey, among others. (Anyone who thinks that those \nwomen’s and girls’ sports, and other sports like them, are \nnot contact sports has not witnessed a game recently.) And \nsafety concerns also exist in ostensibly non-contact sports, \nsuch as volleyball, where spiked balls can cause serious \ninjuries, and softball, where line drives can similarly cause \nsignificant harm.\nAs to competitive fairness, the States contend that\nallowing biological males to play women’s and girls’ sports\nwould put female athletes at a debilitating disadvantage.\nAgain, sports are generally zero sum. Every biological male\nwho makes the team takes a roster spot from a female \nathlete. Every biological male who earns playing time\nreduces the playing time of a female athlete. Every\nbiological male who starts takes a starting position from a \nfemale athlete. Every biological male who wins a race takes \nthe gold medal away from a female athlete. And so on. \nEven if only one or a few males were to play on a women’s \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n17 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nor girls’ team, that would still place specific individual\nfemale athletes at a significant competitive disadvantage.\nWhat is more, forcing women and girls to play against \nbiological males can deter some women and girls who would \notherwise participate in sports from doing so—out of\nunderstandable concern about suffering serious injury or \nparticipating in what they view as an unfair competition. \nThat second-order effect of allowing biological males to play \nwomen’s and girls’ sports c annot be papered over, so the\nStates say.\nBased on all of the above, the States argue—and we\nagree—that the interests in safety and competitive fairness \nare important for purposes of equal protection analysis. \nAnd the States’ sex-based classification—limiting women’s \nand girls’ sports to biologic al females—is substantially\nrelated to those interests. See Skrmetti, 605 U. S., at 510; \nTuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53, 70 (2001); Michael \nM. v. Superior Court, Sonoma Cty., 450 U. S. 464, 472–473 \n(1981) (plurality opinion). Therefore, schools may maintain\nwomen’s and girls’ sports for bi ological females. In other \nwords, schools may determine eligibility for women’s and \ngirls’ sports based on biological sex. \nB \nOnce again, the plaintiffs agree with the States that,\nconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause, the States\nmay prohibit most biological males from women’s and girls’ \nteams. The plaintiffs’ equal protection argument is \nnarrower. They contend that safety and competitive\nfairness, while sufficient reasons to exclude most biological \nmales, do not justify excluding a relatively small subclass \nof biological males—namely, those biological males who\nidentify as female and have taken puberty blockers or \nhormones. \nThe plaintiffs characterize their equal protection\nargument in three overlapping ways—(i) as a lack of \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nsubstantial relationship between the law’s biological-sex \nclassification and the State’s interests in safety and\ncompetitive fairness; (ii) as an as-applied challenge to the\nbiological-sex classification; and (iii) as discrimination \nagainst transgender athletes. Under this Court’s \nprecedents, none of those three arguments succeeds. \nFirst, the plaintiffs argue that the States have not \nestablished a substantial relationship between (i) the \nStates’ interests in safety and competitive fairness and (ii) \nlimiting women’s and girls’ sports to biological females.\nThey say that the States’ interests in safety and competitive \nfairness do not justify excluding all biological males—\nincluding those who identify as female and have taken \npuberty blockers or hormones—from participation in \nwomen’s and girls’ sports.\nBut this Court’s equal protection precedents allow \ngeneral classifications like those made in the West Virginia\nand Idaho laws so long as there is at least a substantial\nrelationship between the classification and the State’s\ninterests. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533. \nAfter all, “most legislation cl assifies for one purpose or\nanother, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or\npersons.” Skrmetti, 605 U. S., at 509 (quotation marks\nomitted). As the Court has long recognized, “[p]erfection in \nmaking the necessary classifications is neither possible nor\nnecessary.” Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia , \n427 U. S. 307, 314 (1976) ( per curiam ). For that reason, \nnone of this Court’s “gender-based classification equal \nprotection cases have required that the statute under\nconsideration must be capable of achieving its ultimate\nobjective in every instance.” Nguyen, 533 U. S., at 70. \nRather, under the intermediate scrutiny test that the\nCourt applies in a variety of contexts, the “validity of the \nregulation depends on the relation it bears to the overall\nproblem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent\nto which it furthers the government’s interests in an \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n19 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nindividual case.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism , 491 U. S. \n781, 801 (1989). So we “judge the validity of the restriction\nin this case by the relation it bears to the general problem \n. . . not by the extent to which it furthers the Government’s\ninterest in an individual case.” United States v. Edge \nBroadcasting Co., 509 U. S. 418, 430–431 (1993).\nHere, when analyzing the relationship between the\nclassification based on biological sex and the asserted\ninterests, the sports context is again crucial. Sports are\ndifferent from, say, a typica l employment or educational \nopportunity where equal protection often may require that\nthe government generally treat an individual without \nregard to the individual’s sex. In the sports context, by \ncontrast, everyone agrees that the States may maintain\nseparate women’s and men’s teams—in other words, that\nthe States may make distinctions based on sex—because of \nthe inherent physical differences between women and men.\nAnd importantly, everyone also agrees that States, in \npreserving separate sports teams for female athletes, need \nnot account for the individual physical capabilities of (and \ndifferences among) every biological male who might want to\nplay on a women’s or girls’ team. To spell that out: Not \nevery biological male athlete is bigger, stronger, faster, or\notherwise more athletically able than every biological \nfemale athlete. Some percentage of biological males who \nidentify as male possess physical and athletic capabilities\nthat fall within (or below) the range of typical female \nphysical and athletic capabilities. But the plaintiffs\nacknowledge that States may still exclude those biological\nmales from women’s and girls’ sports, given the general \nphysical differences between males and females.\n4 \n—————— \n4 That concession reveals that the plaintiffs’ argument is based not on \nphysical capabilities alone but also on gender identity. Suppose, for \nexample, that two boys want to play on a girls’ team. One boy identifies \nas male, and the other identifies as female. And suppose that both have \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n20 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nAnd the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the \nStates from applying that same principle to all biological \nmales, including those who identify as female. In the \ndistinctive sports context, in other words, the States may\ntreat all biological males the same and treat all biological \nfemales the same, given the inherent physical differences\nbetween biological males and biological females.\nIn short, States are not required to conduct an individual-\nby-individual comparison of the physical and athletic\ncapabilities of all biological males in order to satisfy \nintermediate scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny permits a\nsex-based classification that, as here, is “not invidious, but \nrather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not\nsimilarly situated in certain circumstances.” Michael M., \n450 U. S., at 469 (plurality opinion). \nSecond, and relatedly, the plaintiffs advance what they\ndescribe as an as-applied equal protection argument. The \nplaintiffs say that the States’ sex-based classification is \ngenerally permissible—but not as applied to those \nbiological males such as B. P. J. and Hecox who identify as\nfemale and have taken puberty blockers or hormones. \nBut that argument is basically the same as the plaintiffs’ \nfirst argument about the relationship between the laws’ \nclassification and the States’ interests—just with different\nlabeling. The plaintiffs’ as-applied argument posits that \nthe States’ interests must justify the laws’ application to a \n—————— \nthe same size, height, strength, speed, jumping ability, and the like. The \nplaintiffs say that schools must allo w the biological male who identifies \nas female to play on a girls’ team. But schools may exclude from the girls’ \nteam the biological male who identifies as male, even if he has the same \nphysical capabilities. So the plaint iffs’ position is based not only on \nphysical capabilities but also in part on gender identity. In a cryptic\nfootnote, the dissent articulates the sa me view as the plaintiffs on that \npoint. Post, at 23, n. 9 (S OTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment in part \nand dissenting in part). But the Constitution does not require that\nschools determine eligibility for wo men’s and girls’ sports based on \ngender identity rather than biological sex. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nspecific subclass or individual. To be sure, the plaintiffs’ as-\napplied nomenclature and focus on subclasses is a useful \nconstruct in equal protection cases to help analyze the \nrelationship between a State’s classification and the State’s\nasserted interests. Specifically , if a State’s interests do not \napply to an especially large subclass within the class \nspecified by the State’s law, then that fact may demonstrate \nthat the relationship between the State’s classification and\nthe State’s interests is not close enough. But as long as the\nrelationship is sufficient as a general matter, the State is \nnot constitutionally required to grant individualized \nexemptions to specific athletes or subclasses.\n5 \nThe plaintiffs’ as-applied argument is in essence a \nbackdoor argument for strict scrutiny, which requires a\nmuch tighter relationship between the State’s classification \nand the State’s asserted interests. But strict scrutiny does \nnot apply to sex-based classifications, as the plaintiffs\nacknowledge. And strict scruti ny would be particularly out\nof place in this sports case, where sex-based classifications \nare permitted and the only question is whether the States\nmay limit women’s and girls’ sports to biological females.\nEspecially in the sports co ntext, moreover, an enormous \npractical and administrability problem would arise if courts \n—————— \n5 For support of their as-applied argument, the plaintiffs cite Caban v. \nMohammed, 441 U. S. 380 (1979), and Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248 \n(1983). But Caban nowhere stated that a plaintiff may obtain an as-\napplied exception to a law’s classification under intermediate scrutiny \nreview. Rather, Caban looked to the facts of the case at hand to illustrate \nthe overbroad classification. 441 U. S., at 391. And Lehr in turn rejected \nan asserted as-applied exception. 463 U. S., at 267–268. It is true that \nLehr somewhat confusingly characterized Caban as accepting something \nakin to an as-applied argument. Id., at 267. But that characterization \nwas incorrect, in our view, and in any event, Lehr’s holding did not turn \non its characterization of Caban. Also, the Court’s more recent decision \nin Nguyen clarified that as-applied challenges are not entertained when \ncourts apply intermediate scrutiny or rational basis review. See Tuan \nAnh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53, 70 (2001). \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n22 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nsuddenly had to make such individualized exemptions.\nHow would courts draw those lines? Individuals come in all \nshapes and sizes, with different height, weight, muscle\nmass, heart capacity, lung capacity, strength, speed,\nendurance, jumping ability, and so on. Particularly in the\nsports context, determining the effects of the puberty \nblockers and hormones taken by transgender athletes—and \nthen comparing each of those transgender athletes’ abilities\nto those of other individual biological males and individual \nbiological females in the relevant sport—would be an\nalmost impossible task for a judge to perform on an\nequitable basis. The legislatures and the schools are better \nequipped—and under the Constitution, are the more\nappropriate entities—to assess the competing medical and \nscientific considerations and draw appropriate lines. Of \ncourse, no line that the States draw will satisfy everyone. \nBut the Judiciary is not the proper institution to make what\nwould often be arbitrary and highly intrusive athlete-by-\nathlete assessments. \nAnd if those kinds of ad hoc exemptions based on physical \ncapacity were constitutionally required, would exemptions \nalso be required for biological males who still identify as\nmale but contend that they, too, are no taller, no stronger,\nno faster than the typical females in their chosen sport? \nWould those males also be entitled to play on a women’s or \ngirls’ team? If not, why not?\nWe need not belabor the point. In the sports context,\nstarting down the road of judicially managed individualized \nexemptions based on physical capabilities of individual \nathletes could fundamentally undermine women’s and\ngirls’ sports—especially if the number of biological males\nwho seek to play women’s and girls’ sports increases\nsignificantly over time. The questions would be endless \n(and bitter) and yield few, if any, principled answers. The \nEqual Protection Clause and this Court’s precedents do not \nrequire such a judicial quagmire. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n23 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nThird, the plaintiffs also argue that the States’ laws\nunconstitutionally discriminate against transgender\nindividuals—specifically, biological males who identify as\nfemale. \nThat argument, too, is unavailing. To begin, under this \nCourt’s decision in Skrmetti, the laws do not classify based \non gender identity or transgender status. 605 U. S., at 517. \nThe laws classify on the basis of biological sex. By contrast, \nif a school had a co-ed sports team but prohibited all\ntransgender individuals from participating on the team,\nthat would be a distinct transgender classification and,\nunlike today’s cases, would presumably not be analyzed and \njustified as a classification based on biological sex. \nThat said, even if the laws made a transgender or gender-\nidentity classification, this Court “has not previously held” \nthat intermediate or other heightened scrutiny applies to a\ntransgender or gender-identity classification. Ibid. Several \nMembers of this Court, moreover, have concluded that \nclassifications based on transgender status or gender\nidentity should receive only deferential rational basis \nreview and not intermediate or other heightened scrutiny.\nSee id., at 550–553 (B\nARRETT, J., joined by T HOMAS, J., \nconcurring); id., at 566 (A LITO, J., concurring in part and \nconcurring in judgment). \nIn these cases, we need not definitively resolve whether\nrational basis review or inte rmediate scrutiny applies to \ntransgender classifications. In either event, the \nclassification here readily satisfies rational basis review or \nintermediate scrutiny for the reasons already explained at \nsome length above. The States’ interests in ensuring safety\nand competitive fairness amply justify the States in \nmaintaining women’s and girls’ sports for biological\nfemales. Under the Equal Protection Clause, therefore,\nschools may determine eligibility for women’s and girls’\nsports based on biological sex. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nC \nFinally, the underlying medical and scientific premise of\nthe plaintiffs’ entire equal protection argument is that at \nleast some biological males who identify as female and take\npuberty blockers or hormones do not retain physical \nadvantages over biological females.\nEven if true, that empirical claim would not alter the\nequal protection conclusion set forth above. Under \nintermediate scrutiny, there still would be a sufficient\nrelationship between the States’ classification based on \nbiological sex and the States’ asserted interests in safety\nand competitive fairness. \nIn any event, the plaintiffs’ premise is the subject of\nongoing medical and scientific debate and is not settled in\ntheir direction at this time. States and leading athletic\norganizations disagree with the plaintiffs and have \nconcluded that biological males still retain a physical\nadvantage after taking puberty blockers and hormones. To \ntake one prominent example, the IOC found that “athletes \nretain Male performance advantage due in part to training\neffects and fixed traits. There is no current evidence that \ntestosterone suppression or gender-affirming hormone \ntreatment eliminates this advantage.” IOC, Policy on the\nProtection of the Female (Women’s) Category in Olympic \nSport and Guiding Considerations for International \nFederations and Sports Governing Bodies (Mar. 26, 2026). \nThe plaintiffs counter with arguments and studies of\ntheir own. But in assessing state and federal laws passed\nunder circumstances of “m edical and scientific \nuncertainty,” this Court has often said that the Judiciary\nmust be cautious about swooping in and invalidating laws. \nSkrmetti, 605 U. S., at 524 (quotation marks omitted). The \nlegislatures, we have emphasized, maintain “wide \ndiscretion to pass legislation” in those circumstances. Ibid. \n(quotation marks omitted). For good reason. Especially on\nmedical and scientific matters where there is serious debate \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nand disagreement, it can be difficult for courts to \nmeaningfully evaluate the cons idered policy judgments of\nthe lawmakers who have scrutinized the medical evidence \nand scientific data before them, and have made a reasoned \ndecision. See ibid.; cf. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. \nFCC, 520 U. S. 180, 195–196 (1997). When there are “open\nquestions regarding basic factual issues before medical \nauthorities and other regulatory bodies,” there is “little \nbasis for judicial respon ses in absolute terms.” Skrmetti , \n605 U. S., at 525 (quotation marks omitted). The “calculus \nof effects, the manner in which a particular law \nreverberates in a society, is a legislative and not a judicial\nresponsibility.” Ibid. (quotation marks omitted).\nTo be sure, judicial deference does not mean abdication. \nBut the current public medical and scientific record does \nnot definitively establish that the 27 States, the IOC, the\nUSOPC, and the NCAA are wrong in acting on the basis\nthat at least some biological males who have taken puberty \nblockers or hormones still retain physical advantages over\nfemales. \nIn those circumstances, to reiterate, the legislative \n“institution is far better equipped than the judiciary to\namass and evaluate the vast amounts of data,” particularly \nin cases involving a topic of “inherent complexity.” Turner \nBroadcasting, 520 U. S., at 195–196 (quotation marks \nomitted). Indeed, “it is precisely where such disagreement\nexists that legislatures have been afforded the widest\nlatitude in drafting such statutes.” Kansas v. Hendricks, \n521 U. S. 346, 360, n. 3 (1997). Stated simply, “courts\nshould be cautious not to rewrite legislation” “in areas\nfraught with medical and scientific uncertainties.” \nMarshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). So it \nis here. \nIn closing on the equal protection issue, we repeat what \nthe Court said in Skrmetti: \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \n“This case carries with it the weight of fierce scientific\nand policy debates . . . in an evolving field. The voices \nin these debates raise sincere concerns; the \nimplications for all are profound. The Equal Protection\nClause does not resolve these disagreements. Nor does \nit afford us license to decide them as we see best. Our \nrole is not to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the\nlaw before us, but only to ensure that it does not violate \nthe equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth \nAmendment. Having concluded that it does not, we \nleave questions regarding its policy to the people, their \nelected representatives, and the democratic process.”\n605 U. S., at 525 (quotation marks and citation\nomitted). \nIV \nTwo points in response to the dissent: \nFirst, the dissent directs various rhetoric against the\nCourt’s opinion—employing phrases such as “contorted \nlogic” and “misguided approach” and “diminished view of \nequal protection” and “unencumbered by fact or law.” Post, \nat 2, 23, 29 (S\nOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment in part \nand dissenting in part).\nWith respect, that rhetoric is misdirected. The Court’s \nholding today is straightforw ard. The Equal Protection\nClause allows schools to maintain separate teams for\nfemale and male athletes. Schools may determine\neligibility for women’s and girls’ teams based on biological \nsex. That policy is constitutionally justified by the vitally \nimportant interests in safety and competitive fairness so as \nto provide equal opportunities for women and girls to \nparticipate in sports. And wh en a sex-based classification \nis justified as a constitutional matter, as it is here, States \nneed not make case-by-case exceptions—for example, \nschools need not make individual exceptions to allow \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \ncertain biological males to compete in women’s and girls’ \nsports.\nSecond, we do not accept the dissent’s assumed monopoly \non understanding the effects on individuals involved in \ndisputes over transgender athletes. We are acutely aware\nof the difficulties sometimes faced by boys who identify as \ngirls (and by girls who identify as boys) in middle school, \nhigh school, and beyond. And we greatly admire the desire \nof all students, including transgender students such as \nB. P. J., who want to participate in sports. But in \nconducting the equal protection inquiry, we must also \naccount for the effects on girls who are forced to compete \nagainst biological males in sports. \n* * * \nSome might ask: What is the harm in allowing an\nadditional athlete to compete in women’s or girls’ sports? \nThat sentiment, though understandable, misunderstands\nthe nature and reality of sports.\nSports are highly competitive and generally zero sum. At \nalmost every turn, someone wins and someone loses. Every\nathlete who makes a team takes a roster spot from another\nathlete. Every player who earns playing time reduces the\nplaying time of a teammate. Every player who makes the \nstarting lineup sidelines another who remains on the\nbench. Every competitor who wins a race or competition \ndeprives another athlete of that victory, or medal, or prize. \nEvery team that wins because of an added player means\nthat another team has lost because of that added player. \nEvery player who makes all-conference beats out another \nplayer who does not. Every student who earns an athletic \nscholarship takes that opportunity away from another \nstudent. And so on. \nWomen and girls who play sports care deeply about all of \nthose things. They obsess about them. They spend\nextraordinary time and effort to train in the heat and in the \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \ncold, to work out early in the morning and late at night, to\nget a little faster, to become a little stronger, to jump a little \nhigher, to shoot a little better, to watch a little more video, \nto make the lonely journey back from an ACL tear, to scrap \nfor playing time, to start, to win the game, to win a \nchampionship, to hang a banner, to bring home a medal, to \nbe all-tournament, all-county, all-State, or all-American.\nThey put a championship trophy or all-league award on\ntheir bedroom shelf—and it stays there forever as a \nreminder of their love of the game and pride in their \nachievements. They learn to endure losses with grace, to\nlift up their teammates, and to respect opponents who have\nbeaten them fairly and squarely. They learn to win with \nclass—to look a defeated opponent in the eye, shake her \nhand, and congratulate her on her effort. Whether the star \nof the team or the last player on the bench, they form \nlifelong friendships and lifetime memories. They savor \ntheir athletic accomplishments and cherish them for years,\neven decades, after their playing days are over.\nThe two States here—along with 25 other States, the\nIOC, the USOPC, and the NCAA—have concluded at this \ntime that women and girls should be allowed to compete for\nthose life-changing opportunities on an equal playing field, \nwithout fear of physical injury from biological males or \nbeing forced to compete against biological males. \nConsistent with Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, \nwe hold that the States may maintain women’s and girls’ \nsports for biological females. They may determine\neligibility for women’s and girls’ sports based on biological \nsex. The Constitution and Title IX do not require an\noverhaul of women’s and girls’ sports throughout America.\nIn so ruling, we emphasize one last point. Most of the \nbiological female and transgender student-athletes who are \ninvolved in transgender sports disputes around the country \nare teenagers or in their early twenties. Those student-\nathletes want to play sports. Their desire to compete \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nwarrants respect. No student-athlete on either side of the \nissue, whether a biological female or transgender, deserves \nto be ostracized or vilified. \nIn B. P. J.’s case, we reverse the judgment of the U. S.\nCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and remand the \ncase for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In \nHecox’s case, we reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of \nAppeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for\nfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion. \nIt is so ordered.", "prior_version_id": null, "publication_date": "2026-06-30", "publication_status": "published", "record_id": "auth:v1:us-federal:opinion:scotus:24-43:2026-06-30", "recorded_at": "2026-08-01T16:18:23Z", "repeal_date": null, "schema_version": "1.0.0-draft.1", "source_locators": [ { "artifact_id": "art:v1:018f2a00-7b3c-7003-8def-244300000001", "locator": "majority-opinion:1-29", "quote_sha256": "8af3d4a57d05ed68bf5b8848c2665982aa92f8b7be1e87061e5d9170f4f88e54" } ], "status": "in_force", "structure": { "children": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court. \nTitle IX transformed American sports and American life.\nEnacted in 1972, that landmark law promoted equal \nopportunity for female student-athletes and has facilitated \nthe extraordinary growth of women’s and girls’ sports over \nthe past 54 years.\nTo provide equal opportunity for female athletes, schools \ndo not merely maintain, for example, one soccer team, one\nbasketball team, one ice hockey team, and one lacrosse\nteam that are equally open to female and male athletes.\nThat approach would deny equal opportunity to female\nathletes because, as all ag ree, females and males have \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n2 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \ninherent physical differenc es relevant to athletic \nperformance.\nThose “[p]hysical differences between men and women”\nare “enduring.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, \n533 (1996). The differences include, among other things, \nheight, weight, strength, speed, endurance, and jumping \nability. Therefore, in contact sports, forcing female athletes \nto compete against males can create significant safety risks. \nAnd in virtually all competitive sports, forcing female\nathletes to compete against males can undermine \ncompetitive fairness.\nTo ensure equal opportunity for female athletes, schools \ntherefore typically maintain separate women’s and men’s \nsports teams. Women’s teams compete against other\nwomen’s teams, and men’s teams compete against other \nmen’s teams. To ensure equal opportunity, Title IX’s\nregulations also require schools to provide the women’s and\nmen’s teams equivalent equipment, facilities, scheduling, \nand the like. \nIn recent years, some biological males who identify as\nfemale have sought to play on women’s or girls’ sports \nteams. That modern deve lopment has triggered national \nand international concerns about safety and competitive\nfairness for female athletes, as well as related worries about \npreserving equal opportunity for women and girls to play \nsports. For those reasons, 27 States—as well as the \nInternational Olympic Committee, the United States\nOlympic and Paralympic Committee, and the NCAA—have\nbanned all biological males from competing in women’s and \ngirls’ sports. \nThese cases concern two of those state laws, from West \nVirginia and Idaho. The question before the Court is:\nUnder Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the \nFourteenth Amendment, may schools maintain women’s \nand girls’ sports for biological females? In other words, may \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n3 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nschools determine eligibility for women’s and girls’ sports\nbased on biological sex? The answer is yes.1 \nI \nA \nPrior to Title IX’s enactment in 1972, the participation of \nthe two sexes in American sports was badly skewed. In the \n1971–1972 school year, only about 300,000 high school girls \nplayed sports. Meanwhile, about 3.6 million high school\nboys played sports. The situation was similarly imbalanced \nat the college level. See NCAA, Title IX 50th Anniversary: \nThe State of Women in College Sports 15, 17. \nThe low female participation rate was the byproduct of\novert sex discrimination, as well as mistaken stereotyping \nof American women and girls. Men and boys usually\nreceived more encouragement and more opportunities to \nplay sports than women and girls. And male sports teams\ntypically received more funding and resources than female \nteams. As of 1972, for exampl e, women’s sports reportedly \naccounted for only 2% of annual college athletics spending.\n130 Cong. Rec. S4601 (Apr. 12, 1984) (remarks of Sen. \nStevens).\nIn 1972, in a belated but historic response to persistent \ndiscrimination against women in educational institutions, \nincluding in athletics, Congress passed and President\nNixon signed Title IX of the Education Amendments of\n1972. Title IX prohibits “discrimination under any \n—————— \n1 As the plaintiffs, the States, and the United States as amicus curiae \nall agree, these cases do not present the distinct question of whether, \nunder Title IX and the Equal Pr otection Clause, schools may allow \nbiological males who identify as fe male to participate on girls’ and \nwomen’s sports teams. That question is currently the subject of litigation \nin some lower courts. Nothing in this opinion is intended to decide that \nquestion. In addition, nothing in th is opinion should be interpreted to\naddress or limit participation by biological females on male or co-ed \nsports teams. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n4 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \neducation program or activity receiving Federal financial\nassistance” “on the basis of sex.” 20 U. S. C. §1681(a).\nFew laws have been as effective and consequential in day-\nto-day American life as Title IX. Every day across America, \ngyms, fields, and other sports venues are filled with female\nathletes competing fiercely in youth, high school, college, \nand professional sports. About 3.5 million high school girls \nnow play sports. Nat. Federation of State High School \nAssns., 2024–2025 High School Athletics Participation\nSurvey, p. 57 (Aug. 22, 2025). An additional 235,000 \nwomen play competitively in college. NCAA, Title IX 50th \nAnniversary: The State of Women in College Sports 16–17; \nNCAA, Sports Sponsorship and Participation Rates Report, \np. 94 (Sept. 4, 2025). \nParticipation in sports has enabled countless American\nwomen and girls to be on a team, to take part in the human\ndrama of athletic competition, to overcome the agony of\ndefeat and know the thrill of victory. And those lessons and \nexperiences in sports have empowered millions of American \nwomen who have gone on to thrive in all aspects of \nAmerican life. \nB \nOver the past several years, some biological males who \nidentify as female have sought to play various women’s and \ngirls’ sports. Some of them have taken, as relevant here: \n(i) puberty-blocking drugs that suppress the rise of puberty-\ninducing hormones; or (ii) cross-sex hormones and other \ndrugs, such as those that suppress testosterone or increase \nestrogen, sometimes called hormone therapy. (For ease of \nreference, we will refer to puberty blockers and hormones.) \nThose biological males conten d that by taking puberty \nblockers or hormones, they can mitigate the physical \nadvantages inherent to their bi ological sex, as relevant to \nsports. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n5 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nIntense policy and legal disputes have ensued over \nwhether biological males should be allowed to play on\nwomen’s and girls’ sports teams. Many athletic \norganizations and States have recently acted decisively to\nprohibit all biological males from participating in women’s \nsports—that is, to limit women’s and girls’ teams to\nbiological females.\nIn 2025, the NCAA prohibited biological male students,\nincluding those who identify as female and have taken \nhormones, from competing on women’s teams. The U. S. \nOlympic and Paralympic Committee followed suit, likewise \nprohibiting biological males from competing in women’s \nsports. NCAA, Participation Policy for Transgender\nStudent-Athletes (Feb. 6, 2025); USOPC, Athlete Safety \nPolicy §3.3 (June 18, 2025). \nMore recently, the International Olympic Committee \nsimilarly limited Olympic parti cipation in women’s sports \nto biological females. The IO C did so in order to “protect \nfairness in such sports and events, as well as safety \nparticularly in contact sports.” The IOC found that \nbiological males possess a “performance advantage in all \nsports and events that rely on strength, power, and/or\nendurance,” including a “20+ per cent” advantage in “most \nthrowing and jumping events,” a “10-12 per cent” \nadvantage in “most running and swimming events,” and a \n“greater than 100 per cent” advantage in “events that \ninvolve explosive power.” IOC, Policy on the Protection of\nthe Female (Women’s) Category in Olympic Sport and\nGuiding Considerations for International Federations and \nSports Governing Bodies 2, 3 (Mar. 26, 2026).\nMoreover, the IOC found that “athletes retain Male \nperformance advantage due in part to training effects and \nfixed traits. There is no current evidence that testosterone \nsuppression or gender-affirming hormone treatment \neliminates this advantage.” Id., at 3. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n6 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nMost relevant for present purposes: In the past six years, \n27 States have enacted laws that maintain women’s and \ngirls’ sports for biological females. These cases concern two \nof those state laws, from West Virginia and Idaho. \nC \nWest Virginia has long authorized sex-separated school\nsports teams “where selection for such teams is based upon\ncompetitive skill.” W. Va. Code Rule §127–2–3.8 (2025). In \n2021, the West Virginia Legislature passed and Governor \nJustice signed the Save Women’s Sports Act. The Save \nWomen’s Sports Act prohibits male students from playing\non female teams. W. Va. Code Ann. §§18–2–25d(c)(2)–(3) \n(2022).\nThe law specifies that sex is determined by biology.\n§§18–2–25d(a)(4), (b)(1). The legislature expressly found \nthat prohibiting biological male participation in female \nsports is necessary to promote equal athletic opportunities\nfor women and girls. See §§18–2–25d(a)(1), (3), (5).\nB. P. J. is a biological male who identifies as female. In \nthird grade, B. P. J. socially transitioned and adopted a new \nname. Soon thereafter, B. P. J. took puberty blockers to \nprevent male puberty, and in sixth grade, B. P. J. also \nbegan to take hormones.\nShortly after passage of the West Virginia law, as B. P. J.\nwas about to enter sixth grade, B. P. J.’s middle school \nprincipal informed B. P. J.’s mother that B. P. J. could not \nparticipate on the girls’ cross-country and track-and-field \nteams. B. P. J. is now in high school, where the same \npolicies apply. \nB. P. J. sued West Virginia officials and agencies for \nalleged violations of Title IX and the Equal Protection\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U. S. District \nCourt for the Southern District of West Virginia granted\nsummary judgment for the State on both claims. On \nappeal, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n7 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nreversed on the Title IX issue and remanded for further \nfact-finding on the Equal Protection Clause claim. 98 F. 4th \n542 (2024). This Court granted certiorari. 606 U. S. 959 \n(2025).\nDuring the ongoing litigation, B. P. J. competed on the \nteams. Recently, B. P. J. won the West Virginia Class AAA\nhigh school state championship in girls’ shot put and \nfinished fourth in girls’ discus. B. P. J. won the Region 2 \nchampionship in both events. See Supp. Letter of W. Va. in \nNo. 24–43 (May 29, 2026). \nD \nIn 2020, the Idaho Legislature passed and Governor\nLittle signed the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act. Like the \nWest Virginia law, the Idaho law prohibits male students\nfrom participating on female teams. Idaho Code Ann. §33– \n6203. \nThe Idaho law states that sex is determined by biology. \nIbid. And the law declares that “separate sex-specific \nteams furthers efforts to promote sex equality . . . by\nproviding opportunities for female athletes.” §33–6202(12) \n(2025). It also recognizes the ph ysical differences between \nbiological males and biological females. §§33–6202(1)–(5), \n(7), (8), (10)–(12).\nThe law further found that the benefit “that natural \ntestosterone provides to male athletes is not diminished \nthrough the use of puberty blockers and cross-sex \nhormones. §33–6202(11). \nHecox is a biological male who identifies as female. \nHecox underwent male puberty. In college, Hecox began to \ntake hormones. Hecox attends Boise State University and\nhas competed for the women’s club soccer team. Hecox also \nhas tried out for the women’s Division I track and cross-\ncountry teams. \nShortly after Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s \nSports Act, Hecox sued Idaho officials and agencies, \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n8 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nalleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The \nU. S. District Court for the District of Idaho granted a \npreliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Fairness\nin Women’s Sports Act, and the U. S. Court of Appeals for \nthe Ninth Circuit affirmed. 104 F. 4th 1061 (2023). This \nCourt granted certiorari. 606 U. S. 959 (2025). \nII \nWe first address the Title IX issue, which is raised only \nby B. P. J. in the West Virginia case. B. P. J. argues that \nthe State and school officials violated Title IX by excluding \nB. P. J. from the girls’ cross-country and track-and-field \nteams. Under Title IX, according to B. P. J., schools must\nallow biological males who identify as female and have \ntaken puberty blockers or hormones to compete on girls’ \nsports teams. We respectfully disagree. \nA \nPassed by Congress and signed by President Nixon in\n1972, Title IX provides: “No person in the United States \nshall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, \nbe denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination\nunder any education program or activity receiving Federal\nfinancial assistance.” 20 U. S. C. §1681(a).\nAs originally enacted, Title IX did not explicitly address \nsports. Two years after Title IX became law, Congress\npassed and President Ford signed what is known as the\nJavits Amendment. The Javits Amendment directed the \nthen-Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) \nto promptly issue “regulations implementing the provisions \nof ” Title IX with respect to “the prohibition of sex \ndiscrimination.” §844, 88 Stat. 612. The amendment \nfurther specified that the regulations “shall include with \nrespect to” “athletic activities reasonable provisions \nconsidering the nature of particular sports .” Ibid. \n(emphasis added). \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n9 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nIn 1975, pursuant to that statutory directive, HEW\npromulgated comprehensive regulations to prevent sex\ndiscrimination in school sports. 40 Fed. Reg. 24128. Most \ncritically, the regulations required that schools provide\n“equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes” and \nauthorized “separate teams for members of each sex where \nselection for such teams is bas ed upon competitive skill or \nthe activity involved is a contact sport.” 34 CFR \n§§106.41(b), (c) (2025). The regulations defined contact \nsports as “boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, \nbasketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of \nwhich involves bodily contact.” Ibid. \nThose regulations took effect on July 21, 1975, and they\nremain in place today. Because HEW’s interpretation of\nTitle IX was “issued contemporaneously with the statute”\nand has “remained consistent over time,” it is “especially \nuseful in determining the statute’s meaning.” Loper Bright \nEnterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 394 (2024).\n2 \nB \nThe question is whether Title IX permits schools to\nmaintain women’s and girls’ sports for biological females.\nThe answer is yes.\nTitle IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Title \nIX’s implementing regulations expressly permit schools to \nmaintain separate teams for “members of each sex.” \n—————— \n2 In relevant part, §106.41 of the regulations states: \n“(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the re quirements of paragraph\n(a) of this section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for\nmembers of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon\ncompetitive skill or the acti vity involved is a contact sport. . . . For the \npurposes of this part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice \nhockey, football, basketball and ot her sports the purpose or major\nactivity of which involves bodily contact. \n “(c) Equal opportunity . A recipient which operates or sponsors \ninterscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide\nequal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.” \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n10 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \n§106.41(b). The term “sex” in the 1972 Title IX statute, the \n1974 Javits Amendment, and the 1975 Title IX regulations \ncannot plausibly be interprete d to refer to anything other \nthan biological sex. The ordinary meaning of the term “sex” \nat the time of enactment in the early 1970s was biological \nsex and not gender identity, particularly in the sports \ncontext. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson , 411 U. S. 677, \n686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“sex” is “an immutable \ncharacteristic”). \nIn addition, the Title IX regulations allowed separate \nsports teams precisely because of the biological differences\nbetween the sexes—namely, the inherent physical\ndifferences between biological women and biological men. \nFor example, the regulations authorized separate women’s\nand girls’ teams in sports when the teams are “based upon\ncompetitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport.” \n§106.41(b). By referring to co ntact sports and competitive \nskill, the regulations plainly recognized the inherent \nphysical differences between biological men and biological\nwomen—as well as the safety and competitive fairness \nconcerns that would arise if males were allowed to compete\nin female sports. As Justice Stevens explained a few years \nafterwards: “Without a gender-based classification in\ncompetitive contact sports, there would be a substantial \nrisk that boys would dominate the girls’ programs and deny\nthem an equal opportunity to compete in interscholastic\nevents.” O’Connor v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. 23 , 449 \nU. S. 1301, 1307 (1980) (in chambers).\nNotably, B. P. J. does not seriously contest that the term\n“sex” in Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the \nregulations means biological sex. Moreover, B. P. J. agrees \nwith West Virginia and the United States as amicus curiae \nthat Title IX permits schools to maintain separate female\nand male teams and to prohibit most biological males from\nplaying on women’s and girls’ teams. B. P. J. disagrees \nwith West Virginia and the United States only about \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n11 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nwhether schools must make an exception to that general\nrule for biological males who identify as female and have\ntaken puberty blockers or hormones.\nBut the texts of Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the \nTitle IX regulations do not say (or even hint) that schools \nmust allow certain biological males to participate in\nwomen’s and girls’ sports. Nor do the statute or regulations\nsay that schools must make an exception for those biological \nmales who identify as female and have taken puberty \nblockers or hormones. Put simply, the statute and \nregulations do not speak to that issue in a way that could \nproperly be interpreted to require schools to allow biological\nmales to participate in women’s and girls’ sports. \nB. P. J. counters with an argument based on the 1974 \nJavits Amendment. B. P. J. zeroes in on the Javits \nAmendment’s directive that HEW, in its regulations, adopt \n“reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular \nsports.” §844, 88 Stat. 612 (emphasis added). As B. P. J. \nsees things, if the regulation s authorize a school to limit \nwomen’s and girls’ sports teams to biological females, then\nthe regulations are not “reasonable” and therefore are\nunlawful. \nWe disagree. Separate sports teams for biological males\nand biological females are reasonable: Given the inherent \nphysical differences between the sexes, allowing only \nbiological females to play on women’s and girls’ teams can \nreduce the risk of physical injury and ensure fair \ncompetition. True, some might prefer a different rule\nallowing biological males who identify as female to \nparticipate on women’s and girls’ sports teams, at least in \ncertain circumstances. But it was surely “reasonable” for \nHEW in 1975 to draw a biological line—a line where \nbiological males play only on male sports teams and only\nbiological females play on female sports teams. Even in \nrecent years, 27 States, the NCAA, the USOPC, and the\nIOC have all drawn the same line. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n12 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nIn assessing the reasonableness of the regulations, we\nalso must recognize the distinctiveness of competitive\nsports—and the safety and competitive fairness issues that\ncan arise when females are forced to compete against \nmales. \nWith respect to safety, allowi ng biological males to play \non women’s and girls’ sports teams can put women and girls\nat significant risk of injuries. The safety risks are\nparticularly severe in contact sports. \nAnd as to competitive fairness, allowing biological males\nto play on women’s and girls’ sports teams can put female\nathletes at a serious disadvantag e. That is because sports\nare generally zero sum. Allowi ng a biological male athlete \nto compete on a girls’ team necessarily displaces or\ndisadvantages a female athlete—replacing her on the \nroster, knocking her out of the starting lineup, reducing her\nplaying time, depriving her of a medal, and the like. That \nhard reality of sports cannot be ignored or swept under the \nrug. On the contrary, that reality must and does inform \ninterpretation of the term “reasonable” in the Javits \nAmendment. \nWhether biological males may participate on women’s \nand girls’ sports teams may be a debated policy question.\nBut the legal question for Title IX purposes is whether West \nVirginia may limit women’s and girls’ sports teams to \nbiological females. As a matter of text and history, West \nVirginia may do so. \nC \nB. P. J. advances two other Title IX-related arguments\nthat warrant brief mention. \nFirst, B. P. J. contends that the school’s policy violates \nTitle IX because the policy effectively excludes B. P. J. from \nany competitive sports teams at the school. B. P. J. has \ntaken puberty blockers and hormones, meaning that\nB. P. J. apparently will no longer be strong or fast enough \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n13 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nto compete successfully against boys. Moreover, B. P. J. \nmight not want to compete against boys. Either way, it is \nan unhappy occasion whenever a student who wants to play\nschool sports cannot do so. We appreciate the desire of \nevery student, including B. P. J., who wants to play school \nsports. And we recognize that student-athletes are\nunderstandably disappointed and upset when they do not\nmake a team or otherwise cannot participate. But the Title \nIX regulations guarantee “equal athletic opportunity.” The \nregulations cannot and do not guarantee every student a \nspot on a team’s roster. \nSecond, B. P. J. cites Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of\n1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1), and Bostock as support for\ninterpreting Title IX to require that schools allow biological \nmales on female teams. Title VII prohibits employment\ndiscrimination “because of . . . sex,” and Bostock held that \nthe prohibition forbids firing an employee “for being gay or\ntransgender.” Bostock v. Clayton County , 590 U. S. 644, \n662 (2020). B. P. J. contends that Title IX similarly bars\nWest Virginia’s law because (as B. P. J. sees things) the law \nexcludes B. P. J. from sports on the basis of gender identity. \nWe disagree. Title VII concerns employment, whereas \nTitle IX as relevant here focuses on sports. The two factual \ncontexts are vastly different. And the two statutes are also \n“vastly different.” Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed. , 544 \nU. S. 167, 175 (2005). In the workplace, Title VII generally\nrequires that men and women be treated without regard to\ntheir sex. In the sports context, by contrast, Title IX \nauthorizes separate men’s and women’s sports teams. And \nbecause Title IX permits separate teams, the only question \nhere is whether schools may limit women’s and girls’ sports\nto biological females—a question that was not addressed by \nBostock, as the Court expressly noted. See 590 U. S., at 681 \n(we “do not purport to address bathrooms, locker rooms, or \nanything else of the kind”). Stated simply, Title VII and \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n14 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nBostock are not relevant in this very different statutory and \nfactual context. \nIn sum, Title IX allows schools to provide separate\nwomen’s and men’s sports teams defined by biological sex.\nConsistent with Title IX, West Virginia has permissibly\nmaintained women’s and girls’ sports for biological females. \nIII \nWe next address the constitutional challenges to the\nWest Virginia and Idaho laws under the Equal Protection \nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both B. P. J. and \nHecox raise an equal protection argument. They contend \nthat the States violated the Equal Protection Clause by \nmaintaining female sports teams for biological females. \nAgain, we respectfully disagree.\n3 \n—————— \n3 After this Court granted review, Hecox filed a suggestion of mootness\nstating that Hecox will “cease play ing women’s sports in any context \ncovered by” the Idaho law. App. to Suggestion of Mootness, Decl. of L.\nHecox in No. 24–38, ¶6 (Sept. 1, 2025). As the party asserting mootness,\nHecox bears the “formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear\nthe . . . behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Already, \nLLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. 85, 91 (2013) (quotation marks omitted). \nHecox has been a student at Boise State University since 2019 and is\nstill enrolled there. At Boise State, Hecox has competed on the women’s \nclub soccer team and has sought to try out for the Division I women’s \ntrack and cross-country teams. In 2022, Hecox stated in a declaration to \nthe Court of Appeals: “I intend to play for the BSU’s Women’s Club \nSoccer Team this semester, next semester, and through the remainder of \nmy time at BSU.” Decl. of L. Hecox in No. 20–35813 etc., ¶21 (CA9, Sept. \n21, 2022) (emphasis added). \nOnly in September 2025, after this Court granted certiorari, did Hecox\narticulate a different view about playing competitive sports at Boise \nState. But that shift may not be pe rmanent, particularly given Hecox’s \nprior change in position. Cf. Erie v. Pap’s A. M., 529 U. S. 277, 287–288 \n(2000). Moreover, post-certiorari actions that would “insulate a decision\nfrom review by this Court must be viewed with a critical eye.” Knox v. \nService Employees, 567 U. S. 298, 307 (2012). \nHecox remains an enrolled student at Boise State. Hecox’s case is not \nmoot. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n15 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nA \nRatified in 1868, the Equal Protection Clause provides\nthat no State shall deny “to any person within its\njurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U. S. Const., \nAmdt. 14. That command “must coexist with the practical \nnecessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or \nanother, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or\npersons.” United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U. S. 495, 509 \n(2025) (quotation marks omitted).\nUnder this Court’s equal protection precedents, laws that\nclassify by sex are subject to what is known as intermediate \nscrutiny: Sex-based classifications are permissible only \nwhen the classification is “substantially related” to \nachieving an “important” government objective. Id., at 510 \n(quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. \nVirginia, 518 U. S. 515, 532–533 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., for \nthe Court); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. \n718, 724–725 (1982) (O’Connor, J., for the Court).\nThe West Virginia and Idaho laws authorize separate\nfemale and male sports teams. And the laws limit women’s \nand girls’ sports teams to biological females. In doing so,\nthe laws make a sex-based classification that triggers \nintermediate scrutiny.\nSo the equal protection questions become: What are the \nStates’ interests in maintaining separate teams for males \nand females, and in limiting female teams to biological \nfemales? And is the States’ sex-based classification—that \nis, the limitation of women’s and girls’ sports teams to\nbiological females—substantially related to those interests? \nThe States start with the undisputed proposition that \nbiological males generally possess inherent physical\nadvantages in sports—in heig ht, weight, strength, speed, \nendurance, jumping ability, and the like. See United States \nv. Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533 (“Physical differences between \nmen and women . . . are enduring”). Therefore, the States \nsay, limiting women’s and girls’ sports to biological females \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n16 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \n(i) helps prevent serious physical injuries to female athletes \nand (ii) preserves opportunities for female athletes to fairly \ncompete and succeed. And more broadly, the States\narticulate the objective of promoting “equal athletic\nopportunities for the female sex”—that is, to provide \nopportunities for biological women and girls to compete only \nagainst other biological women and girls. W. Va. Code Ann. \n§18–2–25d(a)(5); see also Idaho Code Ann. §33–6202(12) \n(“Having separate sex-specific teams furthers efforts to \npromote sex equality” “by providing opportunities for \nfemale athletes to demonstrate their skill, strength, and \nathletic abilities”).\nWith respect to safety, the States say that allowing\nbiological males to play on women’s sports teams puts\nwomen and girls at significant risk of sometimes severe\ninjuries. The safety risks are at their apex in contact sports,\nsuch as soccer, basketball, field hockey, lacrosse, and ice \nhockey, among others. (Anyone who thinks that those \nwomen’s and girls’ sports, and other sports like them, are \nnot contact sports has not witnessed a game recently.) And \nsafety concerns also exist in ostensibly non-contact sports, \nsuch as volleyball, where spiked balls can cause serious \ninjuries, and softball, where line drives can similarly cause \nsignificant harm.\nAs to competitive fairness, the States contend that\nallowing biological males to play women’s and girls’ sports\nwould put female athletes at a debilitating disadvantage.\nAgain, sports are generally zero sum. Every biological male\nwho makes the team takes a roster spot from a female \nathlete. Every biological male who earns playing time\nreduces the playing time of a female athlete. Every\nbiological male who starts takes a starting position from a \nfemale athlete. Every biological male who wins a race takes \nthe gold medal away from a female athlete. And so on. \nEven if only one or a few males were to play on a women’s \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n17 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nor girls’ team, that would still place specific individual\nfemale athletes at a significant competitive disadvantage.\nWhat is more, forcing women and girls to play against \nbiological males can deter some women and girls who would \notherwise participate in sports from doing so—out of\nunderstandable concern about suffering serious injury or \nparticipating in what they view as an unfair competition. \nThat second-order effect of allowing biological males to play \nwomen’s and girls’ sports c annot be papered over, so the\nStates say.\nBased on all of the above, the States argue—and we\nagree—that the interests in safety and competitive fairness \nare important for purposes of equal protection analysis. \nAnd the States’ sex-based classification—limiting women’s \nand girls’ sports to biologic al females—is substantially\nrelated to those interests. See Skrmetti, 605 U. S., at 510; \nTuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53, 70 (2001); Michael \nM. v. Superior Court, Sonoma Cty., 450 U. S. 464, 472–473 \n(1981) (plurality opinion). Therefore, schools may maintain\nwomen’s and girls’ sports for bi ological females. In other \nwords, schools may determine eligibility for women’s and \ngirls’ sports based on biological sex. \nB \nOnce again, the plaintiffs agree with the States that,\nconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause, the States\nmay prohibit most biological males from women’s and girls’ \nteams. The plaintiffs’ equal protection argument is \nnarrower. They contend that safety and competitive\nfairness, while sufficient reasons to exclude most biological \nmales, do not justify excluding a relatively small subclass \nof biological males—namely, those biological males who\nidentify as female and have taken puberty blockers or \nhormones. \nThe plaintiffs characterize their equal protection\nargument in three overlapping ways—(i) as a lack of \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n18 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nsubstantial relationship between the law’s biological-sex \nclassification and the State’s interests in safety and\ncompetitive fairness; (ii) as an as-applied challenge to the\nbiological-sex classification; and (iii) as discrimination \nagainst transgender athletes. Under this Court’s \nprecedents, none of those three arguments succeeds. \nFirst, the plaintiffs argue that the States have not \nestablished a substantial relationship between (i) the \nStates’ interests in safety and competitive fairness and (ii) \nlimiting women’s and girls’ sports to biological females.\nThey say that the States’ interests in safety and competitive \nfairness do not justify excluding all biological males—\nincluding those who identify as female and have taken \npuberty blockers or hormones—from participation in \nwomen’s and girls’ sports.\nBut this Court’s equal protection precedents allow \ngeneral classifications like those made in the West Virginia\nand Idaho laws so long as there is at least a substantial\nrelationship between the classification and the State’s\ninterests. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533. \nAfter all, “most legislation cl assifies for one purpose or\nanother, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or\npersons.” Skrmetti, 605 U. S., at 509 (quotation marks\nomitted). As the Court has long recognized, “[p]erfection in \nmaking the necessary classifications is neither possible nor\nnecessary.” Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia , \n427 U. S. 307, 314 (1976) ( per curiam ). For that reason, \nnone of this Court’s “gender-based classification equal \nprotection cases have required that the statute under\nconsideration must be capable of achieving its ultimate\nobjective in every instance.” Nguyen, 533 U. S., at 70. \nRather, under the intermediate scrutiny test that the\nCourt applies in a variety of contexts, the “validity of the \nregulation depends on the relation it bears to the overall\nproblem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent\nto which it furthers the government’s interests in an \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n19 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nindividual case.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism , 491 U. S. \n781, 801 (1989). So we “judge the validity of the restriction\nin this case by the relation it bears to the general problem \n. . . not by the extent to which it furthers the Government’s\ninterest in an individual case.” United States v. Edge \nBroadcasting Co., 509 U. S. 418, 430–431 (1993).\nHere, when analyzing the relationship between the\nclassification based on biological sex and the asserted\ninterests, the sports context is again crucial. Sports are\ndifferent from, say, a typica l employment or educational \nopportunity where equal protection often may require that\nthe government generally treat an individual without \nregard to the individual’s sex. In the sports context, by \ncontrast, everyone agrees that the States may maintain\nseparate women’s and men’s teams—in other words, that\nthe States may make distinctions based on sex—because of \nthe inherent physical differences between women and men.\nAnd importantly, everyone also agrees that States, in \npreserving separate sports teams for female athletes, need \nnot account for the individual physical capabilities of (and \ndifferences among) every biological male who might want to\nplay on a women’s or girls’ team. To spell that out: Not \nevery biological male athlete is bigger, stronger, faster, or\notherwise more athletically able than every biological \nfemale athlete. Some percentage of biological males who \nidentify as male possess physical and athletic capabilities\nthat fall within (or below) the range of typical female \nphysical and athletic capabilities. But the plaintiffs\nacknowledge that States may still exclude those biological\nmales from women’s and girls’ sports, given the general \nphysical differences between males and females.\n4 \n—————— \n4 That concession reveals that the plaintiffs’ argument is based not on \nphysical capabilities alone but also on gender identity. Suppose, for \nexample, that two boys want to play on a girls’ team. One boy identifies \nas male, and the other identifies as female. And suppose that both have \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n20 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nAnd the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the \nStates from applying that same principle to all biological \nmales, including those who identify as female. In the \ndistinctive sports context, in other words, the States may\ntreat all biological males the same and treat all biological \nfemales the same, given the inherent physical differences\nbetween biological males and biological females.\nIn short, States are not required to conduct an individual-\nby-individual comparison of the physical and athletic\ncapabilities of all biological males in order to satisfy \nintermediate scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny permits a\nsex-based classification that, as here, is “not invidious, but \nrather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not\nsimilarly situated in certain circumstances.” Michael M., \n450 U. S., at 469 (plurality opinion). \nSecond, and relatedly, the plaintiffs advance what they\ndescribe as an as-applied equal protection argument. The \nplaintiffs say that the States’ sex-based classification is \ngenerally permissible—but not as applied to those \nbiological males such as B. P. J. and Hecox who identify as\nfemale and have taken puberty blockers or hormones. \nBut that argument is basically the same as the plaintiffs’ \nfirst argument about the relationship between the laws’ \nclassification and the States’ interests—just with different\nlabeling. The plaintiffs’ as-applied argument posits that \nthe States’ interests must justify the laws’ application to a \n—————— \nthe same size, height, strength, speed, jumping ability, and the like. The \nplaintiffs say that schools must allo w the biological male who identifies \nas female to play on a girls’ team. But schools may exclude from the girls’ \nteam the biological male who identifies as male, even if he has the same \nphysical capabilities. So the plaint iffs’ position is based not only on \nphysical capabilities but also in part on gender identity. In a cryptic\nfootnote, the dissent articulates the sa me view as the plaintiffs on that \npoint. Post, at 23, n. 9 (S OTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment in part \nand dissenting in part). But the Constitution does not require that\nschools determine eligibility for wo men’s and girls’ sports based on \ngender identity rather than biological sex. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n21 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nspecific subclass or individual. To be sure, the plaintiffs’ as-\napplied nomenclature and focus on subclasses is a useful \nconstruct in equal protection cases to help analyze the \nrelationship between a State’s classification and the State’s\nasserted interests. Specifically , if a State’s interests do not \napply to an especially large subclass within the class \nspecified by the State’s law, then that fact may demonstrate \nthat the relationship between the State’s classification and\nthe State’s interests is not close enough. But as long as the\nrelationship is sufficient as a general matter, the State is \nnot constitutionally required to grant individualized \nexemptions to specific athletes or subclasses.\n5 \nThe plaintiffs’ as-applied argument is in essence a \nbackdoor argument for strict scrutiny, which requires a\nmuch tighter relationship between the State’s classification \nand the State’s asserted interests. But strict scrutiny does \nnot apply to sex-based classifications, as the plaintiffs\nacknowledge. And strict scruti ny would be particularly out\nof place in this sports case, where sex-based classifications \nare permitted and the only question is whether the States\nmay limit women’s and girls’ sports to biological females.\nEspecially in the sports co ntext, moreover, an enormous \npractical and administrability problem would arise if courts \n—————— \n5 For support of their as-applied argument, the plaintiffs cite Caban v. \nMohammed, 441 U. S. 380 (1979), and Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248 \n(1983). But Caban nowhere stated that a plaintiff may obtain an as-\napplied exception to a law’s classification under intermediate scrutiny \nreview. Rather, Caban looked to the facts of the case at hand to illustrate \nthe overbroad classification. 441 U. S., at 391. And Lehr in turn rejected \nan asserted as-applied exception. 463 U. S., at 267–268. It is true that \nLehr somewhat confusingly characterized Caban as accepting something \nakin to an as-applied argument. Id., at 267. But that characterization \nwas incorrect, in our view, and in any event, Lehr’s holding did not turn \non its characterization of Caban. Also, the Court’s more recent decision \nin Nguyen clarified that as-applied challenges are not entertained when \ncourts apply intermediate scrutiny or rational basis review. See Tuan \nAnh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53, 70 (2001). \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n22 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nsuddenly had to make such individualized exemptions.\nHow would courts draw those lines? Individuals come in all \nshapes and sizes, with different height, weight, muscle\nmass, heart capacity, lung capacity, strength, speed,\nendurance, jumping ability, and so on. Particularly in the\nsports context, determining the effects of the puberty \nblockers and hormones taken by transgender athletes—and \nthen comparing each of those transgender athletes’ abilities\nto those of other individual biological males and individual \nbiological females in the relevant sport—would be an\nalmost impossible task for a judge to perform on an\nequitable basis. The legislatures and the schools are better \nequipped—and under the Constitution, are the more\nappropriate entities—to assess the competing medical and \nscientific considerations and draw appropriate lines. Of \ncourse, no line that the States draw will satisfy everyone. \nBut the Judiciary is not the proper institution to make what\nwould often be arbitrary and highly intrusive athlete-by-\nathlete assessments. \nAnd if those kinds of ad hoc exemptions based on physical \ncapacity were constitutionally required, would exemptions \nalso be required for biological males who still identify as\nmale but contend that they, too, are no taller, no stronger,\nno faster than the typical females in their chosen sport? \nWould those males also be entitled to play on a women’s or \ngirls’ team? If not, why not?\nWe need not belabor the point. In the sports context,\nstarting down the road of judicially managed individualized \nexemptions based on physical capabilities of individual \nathletes could fundamentally undermine women’s and\ngirls’ sports—especially if the number of biological males\nwho seek to play women’s and girls’ sports increases\nsignificantly over time. The questions would be endless \n(and bitter) and yield few, if any, principled answers. The \nEqual Protection Clause and this Court’s precedents do not \nrequire such a judicial quagmire. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n23 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nThird, the plaintiffs also argue that the States’ laws\nunconstitutionally discriminate against transgender\nindividuals—specifically, biological males who identify as\nfemale. \nThat argument, too, is unavailing. To begin, under this \nCourt’s decision in Skrmetti, the laws do not classify based \non gender identity or transgender status. 605 U. S., at 517. \nThe laws classify on the basis of biological sex. By contrast, \nif a school had a co-ed sports team but prohibited all\ntransgender individuals from participating on the team,\nthat would be a distinct transgender classification and,\nunlike today’s cases, would presumably not be analyzed and \njustified as a classification based on biological sex. \nThat said, even if the laws made a transgender or gender-\nidentity classification, this Court “has not previously held” \nthat intermediate or other heightened scrutiny applies to a\ntransgender or gender-identity classification. Ibid. Several \nMembers of this Court, moreover, have concluded that \nclassifications based on transgender status or gender\nidentity should receive only deferential rational basis \nreview and not intermediate or other heightened scrutiny.\nSee id., at 550–553 (B\nARRETT, J., joined by T HOMAS, J., \nconcurring); id., at 566 (A LITO, J., concurring in part and \nconcurring in judgment). \nIn these cases, we need not definitively resolve whether\nrational basis review or inte rmediate scrutiny applies to \ntransgender classifications. In either event, the \nclassification here readily satisfies rational basis review or \nintermediate scrutiny for the reasons already explained at \nsome length above. The States’ interests in ensuring safety\nand competitive fairness amply justify the States in \nmaintaining women’s and girls’ sports for biological\nfemales. Under the Equal Protection Clause, therefore,\nschools may determine eligibility for women’s and girls’\nsports based on biological sex. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n24 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \nC \nFinally, the underlying medical and scientific premise of\nthe plaintiffs’ entire equal protection argument is that at \nleast some biological males who identify as female and take\npuberty blockers or hormones do not retain physical \nadvantages over biological females.\nEven if true, that empirical claim would not alter the\nequal protection conclusion set forth above. Under \nintermediate scrutiny, there still would be a sufficient\nrelationship between the States’ classification based on \nbiological sex and the States’ asserted interests in safety\nand competitive fairness. \nIn any event, the plaintiffs’ premise is the subject of\nongoing medical and scientific debate and is not settled in\ntheir direction at this time. States and leading athletic\norganizations disagree with the plaintiffs and have \nconcluded that biological males still retain a physical\nadvantage after taking puberty blockers and hormones. To \ntake one prominent example, the IOC found that “athletes \nretain Male performance advantage due in part to training\neffects and fixed traits. There is no current evidence that \ntestosterone suppression or gender-affirming hormone \ntreatment eliminates this advantage.” IOC, Policy on the\nProtection of the Female (Women’s) Category in Olympic \nSport and Guiding Considerations for International \nFederations and Sports Governing Bodies (Mar. 26, 2026). \nThe plaintiffs counter with arguments and studies of\ntheir own. But in assessing state and federal laws passed\nunder circumstances of “m edical and scientific \nuncertainty,” this Court has often said that the Judiciary\nmust be cautious about swooping in and invalidating laws. \nSkrmetti, 605 U. S., at 524 (quotation marks omitted). The \nlegislatures, we have emphasized, maintain “wide \ndiscretion to pass legislation” in those circumstances. Ibid. \n(quotation marks omitted). For good reason. Especially on\nmedical and scientific matters where there is serious debate \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n25 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nand disagreement, it can be difficult for courts to \nmeaningfully evaluate the cons idered policy judgments of\nthe lawmakers who have scrutinized the medical evidence \nand scientific data before them, and have made a reasoned \ndecision. See ibid.; cf. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. \nFCC, 520 U. S. 180, 195–196 (1997). When there are “open\nquestions regarding basic factual issues before medical \nauthorities and other regulatory bodies,” there is “little \nbasis for judicial respon ses in absolute terms.” Skrmetti , \n605 U. S., at 525 (quotation marks omitted). The “calculus \nof effects, the manner in which a particular law \nreverberates in a society, is a legislative and not a judicial\nresponsibility.” Ibid. (quotation marks omitted).\nTo be sure, judicial deference does not mean abdication. \nBut the current public medical and scientific record does \nnot definitively establish that the 27 States, the IOC, the\nUSOPC, and the NCAA are wrong in acting on the basis\nthat at least some biological males who have taken puberty \nblockers or hormones still retain physical advantages over\nfemales. \nIn those circumstances, to reiterate, the legislative \n“institution is far better equipped than the judiciary to\namass and evaluate the vast amounts of data,” particularly \nin cases involving a topic of “inherent complexity.” Turner \nBroadcasting, 520 U. S., at 195–196 (quotation marks \nomitted). Indeed, “it is precisely where such disagreement\nexists that legislatures have been afforded the widest\nlatitude in drafting such statutes.” Kansas v. Hendricks, \n521 U. S. 346, 360, n. 3 (1997). Stated simply, “courts\nshould be cautious not to rewrite legislation” “in areas\nfraught with medical and scientific uncertainties.” \nMarshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). So it \nis here. \nIn closing on the equal protection issue, we repeat what \nthe Court said in Skrmetti: \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n26 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \n“This case carries with it the weight of fierce scientific\nand policy debates . . . in an evolving field. The voices \nin these debates raise sincere concerns; the \nimplications for all are profound. The Equal Protection\nClause does not resolve these disagreements. Nor does \nit afford us license to decide them as we see best. Our \nrole is not to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the\nlaw before us, but only to ensure that it does not violate \nthe equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth \nAmendment. Having concluded that it does not, we \nleave questions regarding its policy to the people, their \nelected representatives, and the democratic process.”\n605 U. S., at 525 (quotation marks and citation\nomitted). \nIV \nTwo points in response to the dissent: \nFirst, the dissent directs various rhetoric against the\nCourt’s opinion—employing phrases such as “contorted \nlogic” and “misguided approach” and “diminished view of \nequal protection” and “unencumbered by fact or law.” Post, \nat 2, 23, 29 (S\nOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment in part \nand dissenting in part).\nWith respect, that rhetoric is misdirected. The Court’s \nholding today is straightforw ard. The Equal Protection\nClause allows schools to maintain separate teams for\nfemale and male athletes. Schools may determine\neligibility for women’s and girls’ teams based on biological \nsex. That policy is constitutionally justified by the vitally \nimportant interests in safety and competitive fairness so as \nto provide equal opportunities for women and girls to \nparticipate in sports. And wh en a sex-based classification \nis justified as a constitutional matter, as it is here, States \nneed not make case-by-case exceptions—for example, \nschools need not make individual exceptions to allow \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n27 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \ncertain biological males to compete in women’s and girls’ \nsports.\nSecond, we do not accept the dissent’s assumed monopoly \non understanding the effects on individuals involved in \ndisputes over transgender athletes. We are acutely aware\nof the difficulties sometimes faced by boys who identify as \ngirls (and by girls who identify as boys) in middle school, \nhigh school, and beyond. And we greatly admire the desire \nof all students, including transgender students such as \nB. P. J., who want to participate in sports. But in \nconducting the equal protection inquiry, we must also \naccount for the effects on girls who are forced to compete \nagainst biological males in sports. \n* * * \nSome might ask: What is the harm in allowing an\nadditional athlete to compete in women’s or girls’ sports? \nThat sentiment, though understandable, misunderstands\nthe nature and reality of sports.\nSports are highly competitive and generally zero sum. At \nalmost every turn, someone wins and someone loses. Every\nathlete who makes a team takes a roster spot from another\nathlete. Every player who earns playing time reduces the\nplaying time of a teammate. Every player who makes the \nstarting lineup sidelines another who remains on the\nbench. Every competitor who wins a race or competition \ndeprives another athlete of that victory, or medal, or prize. \nEvery team that wins because of an added player means\nthat another team has lost because of that added player. \nEvery player who makes all-conference beats out another \nplayer who does not. Every student who earns an athletic \nscholarship takes that opportunity away from another \nstudent. And so on. \nWomen and girls who play sports care deeply about all of \nthose things. They obsess about them. They spend\nextraordinary time and effort to train in the heat and in the \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n28 WEST VIRGINIA v. B. P. J. \nOpinion of the Court \ncold, to work out early in the morning and late at night, to\nget a little faster, to become a little stronger, to jump a little \nhigher, to shoot a little better, to watch a little more video, \nto make the lonely journey back from an ACL tear, to scrap \nfor playing time, to start, to win the game, to win a \nchampionship, to hang a banner, to bring home a medal, to \nbe all-tournament, all-county, all-State, or all-American.\nThey put a championship trophy or all-league award on\ntheir bedroom shelf—and it stays there forever as a \nreminder of their love of the game and pride in their \nachievements. They learn to endure losses with grace, to\nlift up their teammates, and to respect opponents who have\nbeaten them fairly and squarely. They learn to win with \nclass—to look a defeated opponent in the eye, shake her \nhand, and congratulate her on her effort. Whether the star \nof the team or the last player on the bench, they form \nlifelong friendships and lifetime memories. They savor \ntheir athletic accomplishments and cherish them for years,\neven decades, after their playing days are over.\nThe two States here—along with 25 other States, the\nIOC, the USOPC, and the NCAA—have concluded at this \ntime that women and girls should be allowed to compete for\nthose life-changing opportunities on an equal playing field, \nwithout fear of physical injury from biological males or \nbeing forced to compete against biological males. \nConsistent with Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, \nwe hold that the States may maintain women’s and girls’ \nsports for biological females. They may determine\neligibility for women’s and girls’ sports based on biological \nsex. The Constitution and Title IX do not require an\noverhaul of women’s and girls’ sports throughout America.\nIn so ruling, we emphasize one last point. Most of the \nbiological female and transgender student-athletes who are \ninvolved in transgender sports disputes around the country \nare teenagers or in their early twenties. Those student-\nathletes want to play sports. Their desire to compete \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n29 Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) \nOpinion of the Court \nwarrants respect. No student-athlete on either side of the \nissue, whether a biological female or transgender, deserves \nto be ostracized or vilified. \nIn B. P. J.’s case, we reverse the judgment of the U. S.\nCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and remand the \ncase for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In \nHecox’s case, we reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of \nAppeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for\nfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion. \nIt is so ordered.", "type": "paragraph" } ], "type": "document" }, "structure_sha256": "3d53a7bb3011d8be7f1f6729702dfb43e5330dfc436687657aaa6712a27f2f48", "superseded_at": null, "text_scope": { "excludes": [ "footer", "navigation", "annotations", "headnotes", "summaries", "editorial_content" ] }, "version_fingerprint": "2da075bf8039f955b90a8997c3888755aea3c9d612bd745d3c0c46a882d27489", "version_id": "ver:v1:d1aef83f-3106-70da-8bd7-62cb0fd12ca5" } }