Mark Miles Waldrip v. Angela Eason Waldrip

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 29 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CV-23-671

Opinion Delivered January 22, 2025 MARK MILES WALDRIP APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 72DR-21-1759]

HONORABLE CRISTI BEAUMONT, ANGELA EASON WALDRIP JUDGE APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT AFFIRMED ON DIRECT APPEAL; REVERSED AND REMANDED ON CROSS-APPEAL

WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge

The parties in this divorce case, Mark Waldrip and Angela Waldrip, resolved all issues

pursuant to a property-settlement agreement but asked the Washington County Circuit

Court to determine and divide their interest in Razorback Foundation ("Foundation")

priority points and in tickets and suites to sporting events at the University of Arkansas. The

circuit court entered a divorce decree finding that the priority points, tickets, and suites are

marital property and ordering that the priority points be divided in half, the suites be shared

with each party paying for half the cost of the suites and receiving half the seats within the

suites, and the tickets be sold at a private auction between the parties. Mark appeals from

the decree, arguing that the circuit court erred in finding that the priority points, tickets, and

suites are marital property subject to division. Angela cross-appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred in ordering the parties to share the suites and to purchase the tickets at a private

auction. We affirm on direct appeal and reverse and remand on cross-appeal.

The parties married in 1982 and divorced in 2023. During the course of their

marriage, they donated over $650,000 to the Foundation and accumulated 19,523.63

priority points in two accounts,1 several suites, and numerous tickets.2 The circuit court held

a hearing in May 2023 to decide the issues related to the priority points, suites, and tickets.

There was no dispute that they were accumulated during the marriage. Rather, the

disagreement was related to the nature of the priority points, suites, and tickets and their

division. At the outset of the hearing, Mark argued that the "privilege of buying Razorback

tickets and the points supporting that privilege are not owned by either [party]" and that if

they are property, they belong to the Foundation because it "has complete discretion to

assign and parcel out these tickets." Mark argued that the circuit court should not address it

and "leave it up to the Razorback Foundation." Angela argued that the points, tickets, and

suites are "most definitely property" with a "tremendous value associated with them or we

would not have resolved every other issue in this matter and be before the [circuit court]

arguing about it."

1 One account is in the name of East Arkansas Seeds, Inc. (a company owned by the parties), and it has 19,283.72 points. The second account is in Mark's name, and it has 239.91 points. 2 Mark testified that he thought the parties had a football suite with twenty seats and eighteen additional tickets, a baseball suite with twenty seats and eight additional tickets, a softball suite with twelve seats, and sixteen basketball tickets. There are also numerous parking passes.

2 Mark testified that he entertained clients in the suites and that he wanted to maintain

the privilege of buying the suites and the tickets. He also testified that he had no objection

to some priority points being "set off" for Angela so that she could purchase tickets. Angela

testified that if the priority points were divided in half, she would pay for half of the tickets.

Billie Veteto, the Foundation's interim executive director and chief financial officer,

testified that the Foundation is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization that fundraises for the

Department of Athletics at the University of Arkansas. She stated that while the University

of Arkansas sells the tickets and suites, the Foundation assigns those tickets and suites to

donors. Veteto stated that the first factor considered by the Foundation is a donor's

membership class, which is determined by an annual donation to the Foundation. She

explained that the second factor is the number of priority points a donor has. The priority

points determine the ranking of donors within their membership class, and tickets and suites

are assigned to donors on the basis of their rank. Veteto testified that the parties are members

of the Broyles-Matthew platinum classification—the highest classification—which has

approximately two hundred members and requires a $20,000 annual donation. Mark

testified that he thought the parties were ranked twentieth in their membership class.

Veteto further testified that although the Foundation does not "attribute a true dollar

value" to the priority points, it keeps an accounting of the points. She stated that the person

whose name is on the account "owns" the points. While the Foundation generally does not

transfer or divide priority points, Veteto testified that it will do so if the owners of the points

agree to transfer them to an immediate family member, if the owners die, or if the

3 Foundation is presented with a court order in a divorce. Veteto stated that if a donor elects

not to purchase any tickets or suites, the donor keeps the priority points in his or her account

indefinitely.

Veteto testified that an annual donation of $20,000 entitles the donor to purchase

certain tickets and suites and that once purchased, the donor has the right to repurchase

them every year as long as the donor continues the annual donation. She explained that

maintaining entitlement to the same tickets and suites may require a donation increase when

there are new Foundation guidelines, but donors will have the same tickets and suites as long

as they donate according to the new guidelines. Veteto also testified that if the priority points

are divided in half, each party will have to contribute $20,000 a year to stay in the platinum

class, and if they do, they will keep the same tickets and suites. 3 A priority-point summary

for each account, which included donation and ticket summaries, was entered into evidence.

In the June 21, 2023 divorce decree, the circuit court made the following findings:

7. This Court finds no reason for an inequitable division of property.

8. This Court finds that the Razorback points are marital property because they were acquired during the marriage, and it is tangible property being the subject of ownership and has value, thus all accounts should be split in half between the parties.

9. The Court further finds the suites should be split in half, which means each party is required to split half the cost of the suites and the seats are split evenly between the parties.

3 Veteto noted that if the parties' priority points are split between them, the ability to purchase tickets in visiting venues may be affected.

4 10. In reference to the individual tickets, this is a much more difficult item to split because there are many tickets and who is to say which are best, better or equivalent. The Court finds that the property is not divisible without great prejudice to one or both parties; therefore, since these tickets are only available for the two parties to purchase, according to the testimony of the Razorback Foundation, the tickets are to be sold at a private sale at the Washington County Circuit Clerk's Office between the parties. Kyle Sylvester as Circuit Clerk or a representative of his office is ordered to perform and supervise the sale. The tickets will be sold in groups. So for example: if there are 5 seats together for baseball, those seats will all be sold together. Each party can bid on the group. The highest bid will receive that group of seats. At the end of the auction, whichever party owes more will pay the difference to the other party.

11. If either party decides to turn back in their tickets or their half of a suite, the other party is to be notified immediately and given the opportunity to purchase the tickets or pay for the rest of the suite from the University of Arkansas or Razorback Foundation.

On July 18, Mark filed a notice of appeal from the decree. Angela filed a notice of cross-

appeal from the decree on August 17 following the deemed denial of her motion for

reconsideration. This appeal followed.

The circuit court is given broad powers to distribute both marital and nonmarital

property to achieve an equitable division, and the overriding purpose of the property-division

statute is to enable the court to make a division that is fair and equitable. Howard v. Howard,

2024 Ark. App. 566, at 8, 701 S.W.3d 48, 53. We review division-of-marital-property cases

de novo, but we will not reverse the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly

erroneous or against the preponderance of the evidence. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 371 Ark.

323, 327, 265 S.W.3d 746, 749 (2007). A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing

court, on the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been made. Kelly v. Kelly, 2014 Ark. 543, at 5, 453 S.W.3d 655, 660.

5 I. Direct Appeal

A. Priority Points

Mark first contends that the circuit court erred in finding that the priority points are

marital property. Marital property is "all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to

the marriage." Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b) (Repl. 2020). Mark does not dispute that the

priority points were acquired during the marriage but instead contends that they are not

property. He claims that the priority points do not fall within the definition of property set

forth in Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024), which is a "bundle of rights" that includes

the "right to possess and use, the right to exclude, and the right to transfer." He argues that

the priority points do not bestow upon the donor any such rights and that the Foundation

retains the ability to unilaterally modify or retract the rights that flow from the priority

points, and as a result, they are not property subject to division.

For support, Mark cites two bankruptcy cases from other jurisdictions where courts

held that the opportunity to renew season tickets for professional sports teams was not a

property interest to be included in the debtor's estate. See In re Harrell, 73 F.3d 218 (9th Cir.

1996); In re Liebman, 208 B.R. 38 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). He argues that, as in those cases,

the priority points are not an enforceable right because "the Foundation is under no

obligation to renew the donor's tickets," and a donor's mere expectation that they will be

renewed is not a property interest. These arguments are not persuasive.

First, this is a divorce case—not a bankruptcy proceeding. Second, the evidence in

these bankruptcy cases showed that the opportunity to renew tickets to these professional

6 sporting events was expressly stated to be a revocable license, and there is no such evidence

in the instant case. On the contrary, Veteto testified that the parties' tickets and suites would

be renewed if they each made a $20,000 annual contribution.

Mark also cites Pelts v. Pelts, 2017 Ark. 98, 514 S.W.3d 455, for support. In Pelts, the

supreme court held that retirement interests may be divided in a divorce decree if they are

vested. "Whether a retirement interest is vested hinges on several factors, including whether

the benefit "cannot be diminished by the [employer] and is not dependent upon . . .

continued employment." Id. at 3, 514 S.W.3d at 457 (quoting Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261,

264, 663 S.W.2d 719, 720 (1984)). Mark likens unvested retirement benefits, which are not

marital property, to the priority points because he claims the points can be "unilaterally

terminated by the Foundation," they "create no more than a mere expectancy in the donor,"

and they "are not property subject to division."

This argument also lacks merit. Again, Veteto testified that donors maintain the right

to purchase their tickets and suites annually as long as they continue to contribute to the

Foundation at the requisite level. Contrary to Mark's argument, there was no evidence

presented that the Foundation could unilaterally terminate a donor's priority points or

tickets and suites. At most, the Foundation may modify donation amounts within each level,

and if a donor makes the modified donation, he or she maintains the right to repurchase

the same tickets and suites.

The evidence established that (1) the parties contributed more than $650,000 over

the course of their forty-two-year marriage to accumulate the priority points; (2) the

7 Foundation will split and transfer the points to an immediate family member by agreement

of the owners, due to death of the owners, or pursuant to a court order in a divorce case; (3)

the points are held in an account with the Foundation in the names of the parties (or their

business) and are subject to an accounting; (4) the points are "owned" by the person whose

name is on the account; and (5) the parties keep the points even if they do not purchase

tickets or suites. This is sufficient evidence of an ownership interest in the Foundation

priority points such that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that they were marital

property subject to division under section 9-12-315(b).

B. Tickets and Suites

Mark next argues that the circuit court erred in ordering that the tickets and suites be

sold at a private auction because, like the priority points, there is no enforceable right to the

tickets and suites; thus, they are not marital property. We disagree. The tickets and suites are

inextricably linked to the priority points. And like the priority points, the parties have

accumulated multiple suites and tickets over the course of their marriage. There was

testimony that the Foundation allows donors to maintain their existing suites and tickets as

long as they make the required annual donation. There was also evidence that the parties

can sell their tickets on a game-by-game basis. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did

not clearly err in finding that the tickets and suites are marital property subject to division.

8 II. Cross-Appeal

In her cross-appeal, Angela challenges the circuit court's division of the suites and

tickets.4 In accordance with Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315(a)(1), when a divorce

decree is entered, the circuit court shall distribute all marital property one-half to each party

unless it is determined that such distribution would be inequitable; if the property is not

divided equally, then the circuit court must state the reasons and bases for not doing so,

which should be recited in the order. See Dixon v. Dixon, 2023 Ark. App. 519, at 8–9, 679

S.W.3d 429, 435. The overriding purpose of section 9-12-315 is to enable the circuit court

to make a division of property that is fair and equitable under the circumstances;

mathematical precision is not required. Id. at 10, 679 S.W.3d at 436.

A. Suites

Angela first contends that the circuit court clearly erred in requiring the parties to

share the parties' three suites. The circuit court found that the suites should be "split in half"

with each party having half the seats and bearing half the cost.

By requiring that all property be divided and distributed at the time the divorce decree

is entered, section 9-12-315(a) seeks to disentangle the parties' financial affairs and free each

party from the other's interference. Farrell v. Farrell, 2020 Ark. App. 250, at 3, 600 S.W.3d

640, 642. Angela argues that the circuit court's decision not only requires their financial

affairs to remain entangled but also puts them in the position to be present in the suites

4 Mark did not file a reply/cross-appellee's brief to Angela's arguments on cross-appeal.

9 together should they both want to watch games from the suites. Angela also contends that

because Mark has historically managed the Foundation accounts, she would be put in a

position to rely on him to share all communication related to the account. We agree that the

circuit court clearly erred in ordering the parties to share the suites. They are divisible, and

in failing to divide them, the parties remain financially and personally entangled, which is

counter to one of the purposes of section 9-12-315(a).

B. Tickets

Angela next contends that the circuit court erred in ordering the tickets sold at a

private auction between the parties. The circuit court found that with respect to the

individual tickets, they were "much more difficult . . . to split because there are many tickets

and who is to say which are best, better or equivalent." The court ultimately found that the

tickets were "not divisible without great prejudice to one or both parties." While we

acknowledge the unique circumstances presented here, we hold that the circuit court's

finding is clearly erroneous.

Section 9-12-315(a)(1)(A) provides that at the time a divorce decree is entered, all

marital property shall be distributed one-half to each party unless the court finds such a

division to be inequitable. The circuit court in the instant case specifically found no reason

for an unequal division of property—a finding neither party challenges in this case. There are

approximately forty-two tickets at issue. They are divisible, and they are all good. Veteto

testified that the parties have access to "certain ticket locations" because they are members

of the platinum class, which she characterized as being "the very elite of the elite."

10 Moreover, ordering the parties to bid against one another for their marital property

could result in an unequal distribution because the parties' business acumen is not equal. 5

See Ballegeer v. Ballegeer, 2019 Ark. App. 269, at 7, 577 S.W.3d 66, 71 (reversing and

remanding the circuit court's order that required the wife to compete with the husband in a

reverse-auction bidding process for their marital business valued at $336,000 rather than

requiring the husband to buy the wife's one-half interest because the award effectively

resulted in an unequal distribution of marital property).

Because we agree that the circuit court clearly erred in ordering the parties to share

the suites and to purchase the tickets at a private auction, we reverse and remand for the

court to divide the suites and tickets. As stated above, the circuit court is to make a division

that is fair and equitable under the circumstances—mathematical precision is not required.

Affirmed on direct appeal; reversed and remanded on cross-appeal.

TUCKER and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Castleberry Law Firm, PLLC, by: Kenneth P. "Casey" Castleberry; and Everett Law Firm,

by: John C. Everet, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Clark Law Firm PLLC, by: Suzanne G. Clark and Payton C. Bentley, for appellee/cross-

appellant.

5 Mark testified that he—not Angela—dealt with professional and business colleagues.

11